tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-191724152024-03-23T11:53:04.883-07:00S. Varadarajan's ArchiveBackground material on the India-U.S. nuclear agreement, Iran, energy security and arms controlSiddharth Varadarajanhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/07721228307097170092noreply@blogger.comBlogger86125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-19172415.post-52086991847404785892008-10-10T13:12:00.000-07:002008-10-10T13:15:38.318-07:00Pranab's signing statement on the 123He's still speaking live but he just said these words on the 123<br /><br />"The agreeement has been passed by the U.S. Congress without amendments. <span style="font-weight: bold;">Its provisions are now legally binding on both parties once it enters into force</span>."<br /><br />A good first step in clarifying India's understanding.Siddharth Varadarajanhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/07721228307097170092noreply@blogger.com1tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-19172415.post-23961207694280142602008-10-10T12:48:00.001-07:002008-10-10T12:48:23.495-07:00The Candidates on U.S. Policy toward India<div dir="ltr"><a href="http://www.cfr.org/publication/14750/candidates_on_us_policy_toward_india.html">http://www.cfr.org/publication/14750/candidates_on_us_policy_toward_india.html</a><br><br><h3>The Candidates on U.S. Policy toward India</h3> <p> October 3, 2008 </p> <p> </p> <table style="border-style: solid; border-color: rgb(245, 241, 232) rgb(216, 217, 216) rgb(216, 217, 216) rgb(245, 241, 232); border-width: 1px 2px 2px 1px; margin: 0px 0px 10px 10px; padding: 10px; float: right;" bgcolor="#ffffff" border="0" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0"> <tbody><tr> <td width="184"><a href="http://www.cfr.org/publication/14750/candidates_on_us_policy_toward_india.html#democratic"><strong>Democratic Ticket</strong></a><br> <a href="http://www.cfr.org/publication/14750/candidates_on_us_policy_toward_india.html#11603">Barack Obama</a><br></td> <td width="192"><a href="http://www.cfr.org/publication/14750/candidates_on_us_policy_toward_india.html#republican"><strong>Republican Ticket</strong></a><br> <a href="http://www.cfr.org/publication/14750/candidates_on_us_policy_toward_india.html#662">John McCain</a></td> </tr> <tr> <td><a href="http://www.cfr.org/publication/14750/candidates_on_us_policy_toward_india.html#1451">Joseph Biden Jr.</a></td> <td><a href="http://www.cfr.org/publication/14750/candidates_on_us_policy_toward_india.html#14564">Sarah Palin</a></td> </tr> </tbody></table> <div class="cms"><p>Between its burgeoning economy and <a href="http://www.cfr.org/publication/9663/">major nuclear deal</a> with the United States, India's international profile has soared in recent years. Outsourcing to India and India's role combating environmental problems like climate change are among the issues that have figured in U.S. policy discussions. The <a target="_blank" href="http://www.indianembassy.org/ind_us/index.htm">Indian-American population</a> neared two million as of the last census in 2000, and political lobbies like the <a target="_blank" href="http://www.usinpac.com/">U.S. India Political Action Committee</a> (USINPAC) have become increasingly influential. Perhaps more than any past election, presidential candidates are making a concerted effort to appeal to this constituency and its top donors. Indian voters, according to USINPAC, want <a href="http://www.cfr.org/publication/12714/">immigration reform</a>, a strong geostrategic partnership between the United States and India, and a viable plan for combating HIV/AIDS and other public health crises in India.</p> <p>All of the remaining candidates serving serving in Congress voted for groundbreaking legislation aimed at opening civilian nuclear cooperation between the United States and India as well as a range of other economic deals.</p></div> <br><h4>Democratic Candidates on U.S. Policy toward India<a name="democratic"> </a></h4><p><strong>Barack Obama</strong> <a name="11603"> </a></p> <div class="cms"><p>Obama has said he would build "<a href="http://news.in.msn.com/international/article.aspx?cp-documentid=1256697" target="_blank">a close strategic partnership</a>" with India if he is elected president. Because India and the United States have both experienced major terrorist attacks, "we have a shared interest in succeeding in the fight against al-Qaeda and its operational and ideological affiliates," Obama wrote in a February 2008 article in <em>India Abroad,</em> a newspaper on Indian affairs published in New York.</p> <p>The Obama campaign's June 2007 memo exposing Clinton's ties to India sparked an outcry from the Indian-American community. USINPAC denounced Obama's memo as "the worst kind of <a target="_blank" href="http://www.usinpac.com/news_details.asp?News_ID=64">anti Indian American stereotyping</a>." Obama apologized for the memo, which referred to Clinton as <a target="_blank" href="http://www.rediff.com/news/2007/jun/19aziz.htm">"Clinton (D-Punjab)" (Rediff.com)</a>.</p> <p>Obama voted to approve the <a href="http://www.cfr.org/publication/9663/">U.S.-India Civil Nuclear Agreement</a> in October 2008. He voted in favor of the United States-India Energy Security Cooperation Act of 2006. In September 2008, Obama praised the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) for deciding to allow its members to <a href="http://www.barackobama.com/2008/09/06/statement_by_senator_barack_ob_2.php" target="_blank">cooperate with India</a> on nuclear issues.</p> <p>South Asians for Obama published this <a target="_blank" href="http://www.safo2008.com/SAFOIssues.pdf">list (PDF)</a> of Obama's stances on issues of interest to the South Asian community in the United States.</p></div> <p>Click <a href="http://www.cfr.org/bios/11603/barack_obama.html">here</a> for this candidate's position on other top foreign policy issues.</p> <p><strong>Joseph Biden Jr.</strong> <a name="1451"> </a></p> <div class="cms"><p>Sen. Biden (D-DE) called U.S. ties with India the "single most important relationship that we have to get right for our own <a target="_blank" href="http://in.rediff.com/news/2006/dec/05inter.htm">safety's sake" (Rediff.com)</a>. He faced criticism in 2006 for commenting that "you cannot go to a 7-Eleven or a Dunkin' Donuts unless you have a <a target="_blank" href="http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/13757367/">slight Indian accent" (AP)</a>. But, Biden says, he has had a "great relationship" with the growing Indian population in Delaware. Rediff<em>.</em>com called Biden "the <a target="_blank" href="http://www.rediff.com/news/2006/dec/04inter.htm">driving force</a>" behind the United States-India Peaceful Atomic Energy Cooperation Act of 2006, which was intended to help India develop its <a href="http://www.cfr.org/publication/12264/">nuclear energy program</a>. Biden voted to approve the <a href="http://www.cfr.org/publication/9663/">U.S.-India Civil Nuclear Agreement</a> in October 2008. He called that bill's passage "<a href="http://biden.senate.gov/press/press_releases/release/?id=14f65508-df91-46a9-9a61-b0a3c98513e3" target="_blank">a victory for U.S.-India relations</a>," but said there is "still much to be done in India," including U.S. support for Indian energy production, counterterrorism, and public health efforts.</p> <p>Biden cosponsored the Energy Diplomacy and Security Act of 2007, which calls on the secretary of state to establish "<a target="_blank" href="http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?tab=summary&bill=s110-193">petroleum crisis-response</a> mechanisms with the governments of China and India."</p> </div> <p>Click <a href="http://www.cfr.org/bios/1451/joseph_r_biden_jr.html">here</a> for this candidate's position on other top foreign policy issues.</p> <p><strong>Hillary Clinton</strong> <a name="8211"> </a></p> <div class="cms"><p>Sen. Clinton (D-NY) enjoys strong support from the <a target="_blank" href="http://www.nysun.com/article/56332">Indian-American community (<em>NY Sun</em>)</a>. Indian Americans for Hillary 2008, founded by prominent hotelier Sant Singh Chatwal, plans to raise at least <a target="_blank" href="http://www.hindustantimes.com/StoryPage/StoryPage.aspx?id=ee93e020-4eb2-4d9c-9a47-ed3261a45552&&Headline=Indian+group+plans+to+raise+%245+mn+for+Hillary">$5 million for the Clinton campaign (<em>Hindustan Times</em>)</a>.</p> <p>With Sen. John Cornyn (R-TX), Clinton announced plans in April to form a <a target="_blank" href="http://www.hindu.com/2004/04/28/stories/2004042813711400.htm">Senate India Caucus (<em>The Hindu</em>)</a>, which she would cochair.</p> <p>In June 2007, the Barack Obama campaign sparked controversy by <a target="_blank" href="http://blogs.chicagotribune.com/news_columnists_ezorn/2007/06/dpunjab_funny_d.html">circulating a memo</a> accusing Clinton of pandering to the Indian-American community. That memo notes the "<a href="http://blogs.cfr.org/campaign2008/2007/06/19/the-india-vote/%C2%A0">tens of thousands</a>" Clinton has received from companies that outsource jobs to India.</p> <p>Clinton voted for the United States-India Energy Security Cooperation Act of 2006.</p> <p><em><strong>Editor's Note</strong>: Sen. Clinton withdrew her candidacy for the Democratic presidential nomination on June 7, 2008.</em></p></div> <p>Click <a href="http://www.cfr.org/bios/8211/hillary_rodham_clinton.html">here</a> for this candidate's position on other top foreign policy issues.</p> <p><strong>Christopher Dodd</strong> <a name="5486"> </a></p> <div class="cms"><p>Sen. Dodd (D-CT) voted for the United States-India Energy Security Cooperation Act of 2006. Other than that, however, little is known about Dodd's <a target="_blank" href="http://www.chrisdodd.com/">stance</a> on U.S. policy toward India. </p><p><em><strong>Editor's Note</strong>: Sen. Dodd withdrew his candidacy for the Democratic presidential nomination on January 3, 2008.</em></p> </div> <p>Click <a href="http://www.cfr.org/bios/5486/christopher_j_dodd.html">here</a> for this candidate's position on other top foreign policy issues.</p> <p><strong>John Edwards</strong> <a name="9641"> </a></p> <div class="cms"><p>Edwards has said a "strong U.S.-Indian relationship will be one of my highest priorities" as president. He told the Indian American Center for Political Awareness that the United States and India should "enhance our efforts to cooperate in law enforcement, intelligence sharing, and nonproliferation." He also said he would support India's efforts to become a permanent member of the <a target="_blank" href="http://www.iacfpa.org/p_news/nit/iacpa-archieve/iacpa/12052003edwards.shtml">UN Security Council</a>.</p> <p>In late 2005, Edwards said he was "<a target="_blank" href="http://johnedwards.com/news/headlines/rediff20051130/">generally supportive</a>" of the proposed U.S.-India civilian nuclear agreement.</p> <p><strong><em>Editor's note</em></strong><em>: Edwards dropped out of the race for the Democratic nomination on January 30, 2008.</em></p></div> <p>Click <a href="http://www.cfr.org/bios/9641/john_edwards.html">here</a> for this candidate's position on other top foreign policy issues.</p> <p><strong>Mike Gravel</strong> <a name="13306"> </a></p> <div class="cms"><p>Gravel's stance on this issue is <a target="_blank" href="http://www.gravel2008.us/">unknown</a>.</p><p><em><strong>Editor's Note</strong>: Mike Gravel ended his bid for the Democraticnomination on March 26, 2008. He then ran for the LibertarianParty's presidential nomination before announcing the end ofhis political career on May 25, 2008.</em> </p></div> <p>Click <a href="http://www.cfr.org/bios/13306/mike_gravel.html">here</a> for this candidate's position on other top foreign policy issues.</p> <p><strong>Dennis Kucinich</strong> <a name="9730"> </a></p> <div class="cms"><p>Rep. Kucinich (D-OH) opposed the U.S. and India <a target="_blank" href="http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/z?c109:hr.5682:">Nuclear Cooperation Promotion Act of 2006</a>, arguing that it would "threaten global security and unilaterally modify the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty."</p> <p>Kucinich also cosponsored a May 2007 House resolution that the United States "should address the ongoing problem of untouchability in India." That <a target="_blank" href="http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=hc110-139">resolution</a> passed in the House, but has not yet been voted in on the Senate.</p> <p><em><strong>Editor's Note</strong>: Rep. Kucinich withdrew his candidacy for the Democratic presidential nomination on January 25, 2008.</em></p></div> <p>Click <a href="http://www.cfr.org/bios/9730/dennis_kucinich.html">here</a> for this candidate's position on other top foreign policy issues.</p> <p><strong>Bill Richardson</strong> <a name="7908"> </a></p> <div class="cms"><p>Richardson says the relationship between the United States and India can potentially serve to deter extremism and counterbalance China economically. He also says India should <a target="_blank" href="http://www.richardsonforpresident.com/newsroom/speeches?id=0010">join the G8</a>.</p><p>Richardson says if elected, he would hold an Asian Energy Summit with India, China, Japan, the World Bank, the Asian Development Bank, and the United Nations Environment Program to "adopt a ten-year strategy for a major energy transition in Asia."</p><p>In a January 2008 <em>Foreign Affairs</em> essay, Richardson praised the U.S.-India nuclear agreement, which he said will "help bring a great democracy, a natural ally of the United States, into the <a href="http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20080101faessay87111-p0/bill-richardson/a-new-realism.html" target="_blank">global nuclear regime</a>." </p><p><em><strong>Editor's Note</strong>: Richardson withdrew his campaign for the Democratic presidential nomination on January 10, 2008.</em></p> </div> <p>Click <a href="http://www.cfr.org/bios/7908/bill_richardson.html">here</a> for this candidate's position on other top foreign policy issues.</p> <br><h4>Republican Candidates on U.S. Policy toward India<a name="republican"> </a></h4><p><strong>John McCain</strong> <a name="662"> </a></p> <div class="cms"><p>Sen. McCain (R-AZ), has noted India's potential to be one of the "natural allies" of the United States. He stresses the "importance of securing <a target="_blank" href="http://www.johnmccain.com/informing/News/PressReleases/bba416b9-372d-4c2e-ac02-866a37db0c86.htm">greater U.S. market access</a> to [India's] economy of a billion consumers."</p> <p>In a March 2008 <a href="http://www.cfr.org/publication/15834/">speech</a>, McCain said he believes India should be included in the G-8.</p> <p>McCain voted in favor of the <a href="http://www.cfr.org/publication/9663/">U.S.-India Civil Nuclear Agreement</a> in October 2008. He also voted for the United States-India Energy Security Cooperation Act of 2006. In a May 2008 <a href="http://www.cfr.org/publication/16349/%C2%A0">speech</a> on nuclear security, McCain said he supports the U.S.-India Civil Nuclear Accord "as a means of strengthening our relationship with the world's largest democracy, and further involving India in the fight against proliferation." He also said the United States should "engage actively" with India to "improve the security of nuclear stockpiles and weapons materials," and to construct a secure global nuclear order that eliminates the likelihood of proliferation and the possibility of nuclear conflict."</p></div> <p>Click <a href="http://www.cfr.org/bios/662/john_mccain.html">here</a> for this candidate's position on other top foreign policy issues.</p> <p><strong>Sam Brownback</strong> <a name="7911"> </a></p> <div class="cms"><p>Sen. Brownback (R-KS) calls India "one of our most important strategic partners in Asia." Like Richardson, he has stressed India's potential role as a "<a href="http://brownback.senate.gov/pressapp/record.cfm?id=252201" target="_blank">counterweight</a>" to China's economy.</p><p>Brownback, who formerly chaired the Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, has long advocated engagement with India. In 1999, he called for an <a href="http://brownback.senate.gov/pressapp/record.cfm?id=175803" target="_blank">end to economic sanctions</a> intended to force India to sign the <a href="http://www.cfr.org/publication/10480/" target="_blank">Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty</a>.</p> <p>Brownback voted for the United States-India Energy Security Cooperation Act of 2006 in part, he said, because "India has protected its nuclear program for thirty years and has not proliferated."</p><p><em><strong>Editor's Note</strong>: Sen. Brownback withdrew his candidacy for the GOP presidential nomination on October 19, 2007. </em></p></div> <p>Click <a href="http://www.cfr.org/bios/7911/sam_brownback.html">here</a> for this candidate's position on other top foreign policy issues.</p> <p><strong>Rudolph Giuliani</strong> <a name="10534"> </a></p> <div class="cms"><p>Giuliani views India's rapidly growing economy as a potentially lucrative market, saying the United States should <a target="_blank" href="http://www.realclearpolitics.com/articles/2007/03/interview_with_rudy_giuliani_1.html">"take advantage" (CNBC)</a> of the "large number of consumers that are emerging in India." In particular, Giuliani said, the U.S. stands to "make a lot of money in India" in new energy technology. </p><p><strong><em>Editor's note</em></strong><em>: Giuliani dropped out of the race for the Republican nomination on January 31, 2008.</em></p></div> <p>Click <a href="http://www.cfr.org/bios/10534/rudy_giuliani.html">here</a> for this candidate's position on other top foreign policy issues.</p> <p><strong>Mike Huckabee</strong> <a name="13301"> </a></p> <div class="cms"><p>Huckabee's stance on this issue is <a target="_blank" href="http://www.explorehuckabee.com/index.cfm?FuseAction=Home.Home">unknown</a>. </p><p><em><strong>Editor's Note</strong>: Huckabee withdrew his candidacy for the Democratic presidential nomination on March 4, 2008.</em></p> </div> <p>Click <a href="http://www.cfr.org/bios/13301/mike_huckabee.html">here</a> for this candidate's position on other top foreign policy issues.</p> <p><strong>Duncan Hunter</strong> <a name="13302"> </a></p> <div class="cms"><p>Rep. Hunter (R-CA) has often expressed concern that too many U.S. jobs are being outsourced to countries like India and China.</p><p>Hunter voted for the U.S.and India Nuclear Cooperation Act of 2006.</p> <p><strong><em>Editor's note</em></strong><em>: Hunter dropped out of the race for the Republican nomination on January 19, 2008.</em></p></div> <p>Click <a href="http://www.cfr.org/bios/13302/duncan_hunter.html">here</a> for this candidate's position on other top foreign policy issues.</p> <p><strong>Ron Paul</strong> <a name="13303"> </a></p> <div class="cms"><p>Rep. Paul (R-TX) has addressed India in terms of U.S. policy towards Iran. He says U.S. "provision of nuclear materials to India is a clear violation of the [Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)], which contradicts "anti-Iran voices" claiming that Iran is violating the NPT. In fact, says Paul, Iran is entitled under the NPT to develop nuclear power "for peaceful purposes." Further, he argued, "If Iran had a nuclear weapon, why would this be different from Pakistan, India, and North Korea having one? Why does Iran have less right to a <a target="_blank" href="http://www.house.gov/paul/congrec/congrec2006/cr040506.htm">defensive weapon</a> than these other countries?"</p><p>Paul opposed the U.S. and India Nuclear Cooperation Act of 2006.</p> <p><em><strong>Editor's Note</strong>: Rep. Paul withdrew his candidacy for theRepublican presidential nomination on June 12, 2008.</em> </p></div> <p>Click <a href="http://www.cfr.org/bios/13303/ron_paul.html">here</a> for this candidate's position on other top foreign policy issues.</p> <p><strong>Mitt Romney</strong> <a name="13226"> </a></p> <div class="cms"><p>Romney views India as potentially profitable for U.S. marketing and investment, due to its flourishing economy and huge population. Romney said in 2005 that although outsourcing to countries like India is a problem, "we'll see new opportunities created selling products there. We'll have a <a target="_blank" href="http://www.crn.com/networking/174300587">net increase</a> in economic activity, just as we did with free trade." </p><p><strong><em>Editor's note</em></strong><em>: Romney dropped out of the race for the Republican nomination on February 7, 2008.</em></p> </div> <p>Click <a href="http://www.cfr.org/bios/13226/mitt_romney.html">here</a> for this candidate's position on other top foreign policy issues.</p> <p><strong>Tom Tancredo</strong> <a name="13304"> </a></p> <div class="cms"><p>Rep. Tancredo (R-CO), whose candidacy focused almost exclusively on immigration issues, has not often spoken about India. However, his <a target="_blank" href="http://www.iacfpa.org/p_news/nit/iacpa-archieve/h1bvisa/c250703.shtml">failed proposal</a> to end the H-1B visa program during the 108th Congress may have turned some Indian-American voters against him. USINPAC has called for the cap on H-1B visas to be <a target="_blank" href="http://www.usinpac.com/immigration.asp">eliminated</a> altogether.</p><p>Tancredo voted for the U.S.and India Nuclear Cooperation Act of 2006.</p><p>With Rep. Kucinich and others, Tancredo cosponsored a May 2007 House resolution calling on the United States to "address the ongoing problem of untouchability in India." That resolution has not yet been voted on.</p><p><em><strong>Editor's Note</strong>: Congressman Tancredo formally withdrew his candidacy for the GOP presidential nomination on December 20, 2007.</em></p> </div> <p>Click <a href="http://www.cfr.org/bios/13304/tom_tancredo.html">here</a> for this candidate's position on other top foreign policy issues.</p> <p><strong>Fred Thompson</strong> <a name="8702"> </a></p> <div class="cms"><p>Thompson's stance on this issue is <a href="http://www.fred08.com/index.aspx" target="_blank">unknown</a>. </p><p><strong><em>Editor's note</em></strong><em>: Thompson dropped out of the race for the Republican nomination on January 22, 2008.</em></p> </div> <p>Click <a href="http://www.cfr.org/bios/8702/fred_thompson.html">here</a> for this candidate's position on other top foreign policy issues.</p> <p><strong>Tommy Thompson</strong> <a name="13305"> </a></p> <div class="cms"><p>The former health and human services secretary has boasted of a "productive bilateral relationship" with India in the fight against HIV/AIDS. He cited funding granted for Indian scientists on AIDS vaccine research and for the expansion of "government and free market interventions in HIV, TB, and malaria treatment and prevention efforts" there.</p><p>Darshan Dhaliwal, the Indian-born head of Bulk Petroleum (<em>Milwaukee Journal-Sentinel</em>), has pledged to raise $1 million for the Thompson campaign.</p> <p><em><strong>Editor's note</strong>: Thompson dropped out of the race for the Republican nomination on August 12, 2007.</em></p></div><br> </div> Siddharth Varadarajanhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/07721228307097170092noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-19172415.post-12243437544235039352008-10-02T07:21:00.001-07:002008-10-02T07:21:03.161-07:00Australia must now help a nuclear India<div dir="ltr"><a href="http://www.theage.com.au/opinion/australia-must-now-help-a-nuclear-india-20081002-4sr9.html?page=-1">http://www.theage.com.au/opinion/australia-must-now-help-a-nuclear-india-20081002-4sr9.html?page=-1</a><br clear="all"> <h1>Australia must now help a nuclear India</h1> <ul class="articleDetails"><li><strong> Neville Roach </strong></li><li>October 3, 2008</li></ul> <p style="font-weight: bold;">The reduction of carbon emissions can be tied to uranium sales.</p> <p><b>T</b>HE deal on nuclear trade struck between George Bush and Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh approved by the United States Congress on Wednesday marks a new era in US-India relations. This agreement, and that with France that followed the September decision by the Nuclear Suppliers Group to allow resumption of nuclear trade with India, herald a new de facto non-proliferation framework that has profound implications for Australia's policies on climate change and the exporting of uranium.</p> <p>No country faces a harder task of responding to climate change than India. With one of the lowest per capita carbon footprints in the world, it has to reduce emissions while needing more energy to sustain its recent economic growth. Clearly, with the world's largest carbon footprint, Australia has a moral obligation to make it easier, rather than more difficult, for India to generate energy in the least polluting way.</p> <p>To tackle its challenge,</p> <p>India will have to implement every carbon-efficient energy solution available, including solar, wind, biofuels, natural and coal seam gas and the solution strongly advocated by Australia, clean coal. However, the most effective and immediately available solution is unquestionably nuclear power, which produces zero carbon emissions.</p> <p>To expand its nuclear power production substantially, India needs secure access to the latest technology as well as uranium ore. The importance of gaining such access led Singh to risk his Government by seeking a confidence vote in the Indian Parliament linked to the US nuclear deal.</p> <p>As the suppliers group decision does not require India to sign the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, the Australian Government</p> <p>will need to review its longstanding policy to export uranium only to NPT signatories. This will have profound implications for Australia's relations with India and the world's response to climate change.</p> <p>A key recommendation of the Prime Minister's 2020 summit was to engage more actively with Australia's four major regional economies — the US, Japan, China and India. The recommendation reflects India's growing importance regionally and globally. Australia is one of the biggest beneficiaries of India's rapid economic growth (Australia has a trade surplus of more than $10 billion a year) and is a major source of skilled migrants, overseas students and tourists.</p> <p>The Australian Government is paying much more attention to India than ever before.</p> <p>Trade Minister Simon Crean and Foreign Affairs Minister Stephen Smith have visited India this year and have hosted visits to Australia by their Indian counterparts. The</p> <p>Prime Minister is reported to be planning a visit later this year. However, the uranium issue poses the greatest opportunity, as well as threat, to the bilateral relationship.</p> <p>The Rudd Government has shown great courage and global leadership by unilaterally committing to a reduction in carbon emissions by 2020 and a carbon trading regime by 2010.</p> <p>By taking the moral high ground, Australia is in a strong position to persuade other major emitters to follow suit. This influence can be decisive in relation to India if Australia requires it to commit to a reduction in emissions as a prerequisite for access to this country's uranium.</p> <p>Australia's willingness to support the suppliers group decision and to decouple the issue of uranium exports from the group's waiver has been extremely well received in India and is proof of Australia's commitment to closer relations with India. We now need to go one step further.</p> <p>While the suppliers group decision lifts the ban on nuclear trade, actual trade depends on bilateral negotiation between individual members and India. The US and French deals, with Russia certain to follow suit, will collectively meet India's technology requirements.</p> <p>However, the reliable supply of uranium has still to be secured. While Canada is rumoured</p> <p>to be willing to become a supplier, Australia, with the world's largest uranium reserves, holds the key.</p> <p>Australia has an excellent record of adapting its policies to changing regional and global realities. A good example was the recognition of China by</p> <p>the Whitlam government, a visionary decision that has yielded enormous benefits to Australia, our region and the world. A change in policy in relation to uranium exports to India would be equally visionary and generate similar outcomes.</p> <p>The suppliers group decision does not preclude individual suppliers setting their own conditions for nuclear trade with India. This is what the US and France have done. Australia, too, can and should negotiate its own conditions to deal with its legitimate concerns. India's strong commitment and outstanding record in relation to non-proliferation should encourage the Rudd Government to find a win-win solution.</p> <p>Without nuclear power, India cannot meet its energy needs as it strives to lift hundreds of millions of its people out of poverty. The good news is that the more India relies on nuclear power, the greater its ability to minimise carbon emissions. Australia will be seen as a true and reliable friend if it helps India in its hour of need.</p> <p><strong>Neville Roach is chairman emeritus of the Australia-India Business Council.</strong></p><br> </div> Siddharth Varadarajanhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/07721228307097170092noreply@blogger.com1tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-19172415.post-51823228792298356472008-09-20T23:51:00.001-07:002008-09-20T23:51:50.255-07:00US-India nuclear bond? - Washington Times<div dir="ltr"><a href="http://washingtontimes.com/news/2008/sep/21/us-india-nuclear-bond/">http://washingtontimes.com/news/2008/sep/21/us-india-nuclear-bond/</a><br><br clear="all"><h1>HAWKINS: U.S.-India nuclear bond?</h1> <h3>William Hawkins<br> Sunday, September 21, 2008 </h3> <div class="dOpNT"> <br> </div> <div class="inline inline-photo inline-left"> <img src="http://media.washingtontimes.com/media/img/photos/2008/06/24/CM-062408SALHANI.jpg" alt=""> <p class="caption">Middle East nuclear renaissance?</p> </div> <p> <strong>COMMENTARY:</strong> </p> <p> House Speaker Nancy Pelosi Sept. 11 said she supports waiving House rules to speed passage of the U.S.-<a title="India" href="http://washingtontimes.com/themes/?Theme=India">India</a> nuclear trade agreement by the end of the year. "It does have support in the House," she said. The seventh anniversary of the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks, with its focus on national security, was an apt time for the speaker to talk about the pact with India. The agreement has diplomatic implications that extend far beyond even its substantial economic benefits. </p> <p>Passage of the agreement with India would be a positive contrast to the U.S. cancellation of a nuclear deal with Russia on Sept. 8. The Russian deal would have allowed Moscow to establish a lucrative business in the import and storage of spent nuclear fuel from U.S.-supplied reactors around the world. </p> <p>Given Russia's ties to rogue regimes like Iran, and questions about security at its existing nuclear sites, making it a global center for nuclear fuel storage seemed like a bad idea from its inception. The deal got a deservedly cool reception when sent to Congress for approval in May. Russia's invasion of Georgia led President George W. Bush to pull the agreement. </p> <p>The U.S.-India pact has had its American critics. Sen. Joe Biden, chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the Democratic vice-presidential candidate, raised initial concerns at an April 2006 hearing, arguing, "We must not undermine world support for the nuclear nonproliferation regime by saying that nuclear weapons are fine for our friends." Yet this is exactly what the <a title="United States" href="http://washingtontimes.com/themes/?Theme=United+States">United States</a> has done for the last 60 years, and must continue to do in the real world of global power politics. </p> <p> The United States directly helped Great Britain's nuclear development during the Cold War. France developed an independent nuclear deterrent. While this was often disquieting to American leaders, it was not considered a threat like the weapons deployed by Russia or <a title="China" href="http://washingtontimes.com/themes/?Theme=China">China</a>. Israel is believed to have nuclear arms, but Washington has rightly refused to consider this as the moral equivalent of an Iranian bomb. Treating friends and rivals differently is the essence of foreign policy. </p> <p>Mr. Biden now supports the agreement. Sen. John McCain, the Republican presidential candidate, also had some initial reservations, but on Sept. 7 hailed its approval by the 45-nation Nuclear Supplier Group (NSG). He called for the deal to "expeditiously" win Senate approval, saying it is "another building block in the partnership between our two countries." </p> <p>Because India is not a party to the Non-proliferation Treaty, it needed a waiver by the NSG. The agreement does have nonproliferation elements. India will place all future civilian nuclear reactors, and 14 of its current 22 reactors, under International Atomic Energy Agency inspection. It will also continue its moratorium on nuclear weapons tests. But it will not stop building nuclear weapons or the means to deliver them because of the dangerous geopolitical situation with which New Delhi must contend. India is situated between radical Islamic states to the west and a rising China to the east. </p> <p>The United States cannot afford to treat India as a nation inferior in standing to China, which is rapidly building both nuclear reactors and nuclear weapons. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice has said Washington understands "India would never accept a unilateral freeze or cap on its nuclear arsenal. We raised this with the Indians, but the Indians said that its plans and policies must take into account regional realities. No one can credibly assert that India would accept what would amount to an arms control agreement that did not include other key countries, like China and Pakistan." Miss Rice met with Indian Defense Minister A. K. Antony on Sept. 10 to put finishing touches on the agreement. </p> <p>Wisdom is the ability to judge how things differ on their merits. India is clearly not Iran or North Korea. India already has a fledgling nuclear arsenal and an expanding atomic energy program. India first conducted an underground nuclear test in 1974, prompted by China's entry into the nuclear club 10 years earlier. </p> <p>India then renounced the development of such weapons and as late as 1988 was calling for U.N. talks to eliminate all nuclear arms. But the rapid rise of China and the increased militancy of Pakistan heightened regional tensions. India and Pakistan conducted nuclear tests in 1998, bringing new American sanctions against both countries. The sanctions on New Delhi were lifted in 2001 as President Bush gave improving relations with India a high priority. </p> <p>The U.S.-India nuclear pact is an important step in creating a stabler diplomatic alignment in Asia that can support U.S. security interests in the region. </p> <p> William R. Hawkins is a consultant specializing in defense and trade issues. </p><br> </div> Siddharth Varadarajanhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/07721228307097170092noreply@blogger.com2tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-19172415.post-13969655525001188792008-07-15T06:25:00.001-07:002008-07-15T06:25:27.526-07:00India is hungry for our uranium<div><strong><font size="4">India is hungry for our uranium</font></strong></div> <div> </div> <div> <div class="byline">SANDY GORDON</div> <div class="date">14/07/2008 9:43:00 AM</div> <div class="date"><a href="http://www.canberratimes.com.au/news/opinion/editorial/general/india-is-hungry-for-our-uranium/810448.aspx">http://www.canberratimes.com.au/news/opinion/editorial/general/india-is-hungry-for-our-uranium/810448.aspx</a></div> <div class="date"> </div> <div class="date"> </div> <div class="summary"> <div class="summarytext">The renewed possibility of an agreement between the United States and India on civil nuclear cooperation again puts the issue of the sale of uranium by Australia to India into the Rudd Government's ''in tray''. <p>Short of energy and uranium, and with an ambitious civil-nuclear program, India is hungry for imported uranium. <p>Given India has one of the world's lowest per capita rates of energy consumption and a high economic growth rate, the country has an urgent requirement for additional sources of ''clean'' energy in order to develop without contributing overly to global warming. <p>India is working hard to develop renewable energy sources, but these cannot cope with the rapid rise in demand. It is, therefore, burning increasing amounts of low-grade coal, which it has in abundance. In these circumstances, India regards nuclear energy as an important part of its future energy mix. <p>Australian uranium is not absolutely essential to India's civil nuclear program, because other countries such as Russia, France, and even China, would provide fuel should Australia refuse. <p>Burgeoning Australian sales on to world markets will have the general effect of loosening markets, even should Australia refuse to sell directly to India. <p>But India cannot understand why Australia has refused to sell to it, while agreeing to sell to China, given what India regards as China's somewhat dubious reputation on horizontal proliferation and its lack of democratic credentials. It regards sale of uranium as an ''earnest of intent'' in circumstances in which Australia has reiterated the importance of the relationship. <p>All that is not enough in itself to justify an Australian decision to sell, but it should be weighed up in the equation. Australia also needs to be mindful of counter-proliferation demands, and Labor needs to resolve some pressing internal issues in relation to nuclear energy. <p>As to the latter, it would have been a ''bridge too far'' for the Rudd Government to have agreed to sell uranium to India in an election environment and on the back of a decision to abandon the three-mines policy. Labor was also able to make electoral capital out of the Coalition's discomfiture on nuclear power and the ''not in my backyard'' syndrome. But those exigencies of the election campaign have now passed. <p>So the key issue becomes: would an Australian agreement to sell to India significantly undermine the non-proliferation regime? <p>Given the 54-member Nuclear Suppliers Group (which includes Australia) and the US itself would have agreed to free up India's civil nuclear program should current proposals proceed, it is difficult to see how an Australian holdout would make any difference in terms of proliferation, other than helping to keep Australia's credentials pure. <p>Should India be successfully inducted into the global civil-nuclear regime, we would have what would amount to a three-tier system one in which the N5 states (the US, Russia, the UK, France and China) would be at the top as ''legitimate'' nuclear weapons states; then would come India as a ''responsible'', but not fully legitimate, nuclear weapons state; and beneath that would be Pakistan and Israel. <p>This category of ''responsible'' nuclear weapons states would have all the normal strictures against horizontal proliferation applying to it, since its members would effectively have acceded to the IAEA non-proliferation regime. <p>Membership of the second tier would have the additional benefit of enhancing civil-nuclear safety regimes. This is an important issue for India, which cannot avoid constructing reactors near heavily populated areas, however, the existence of such a category could also be seen as an incentive to proliferate or at least as the removal of the existing disincentive built around the effective isolation from global civil nuclear trade. <p>There is also a wider argument concerning India's induction into the civil nuclear regime that goes beyond proliferation and greenhouse concerns. <p>India's rise as a responsible Asian power will greatly depend on the relationships it forges with the US and its allies such as Australia and Japan. An India left out of the civil nuclear regime would be less likely to support the current treaty regime and its objectives. And, given India's imminent rise as an important Asian strategic and economic power, this could have considerable impact on the regime itself. <p>So it makes sense for the Rudd Government to support India's induction into the global civil nuclear regime. <p>Dr Sandy Gordon is a visiting fellow with the Asia-Pacific College of Diplomacy at the ANU and author of India's Rise to Power. <br></p></p></p></p></p></p></p></p></p></p></p></p></p></p></p></p></p></div></div></div> Siddharth Varadarajanhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/07721228307097170092noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-19172415.post-26438487554484215722008-07-09T12:57:00.001-07:002008-07-09T12:57:04.419-07:00A New Global Defense Posture for the Second Transoceanic Era (2007)<br><br><div class="gmail_quote">---------- Forwarded message ----------<br>From: <b class="gmail_sendername">Siddharth Varadarajan</b> <<a href="mailto:svaradarajan@gmail.com">svaradarajan@gmail.com</a>><br>Date: Thu, Jul 10, 2008 at 1:26 AM<br> Subject: A New Global Defense Posture for the Second Transoceanic Era (2007)<br>To: Siddharth Varadarajan <<a href="mailto:svaradarajan@gmail.com">svaradarajan@gmail.com</a>><br><br><br>A New Global Defense Posture for the Second Transoceanic Era<br> <br>Andrew Krepinevich<br>Robert O. Work<br><br><a href="http://www.csbaonline.org/4Publications/PubLibrary/R.20070420.A_New_Global_Defen/R.20070420.A_New_Global_Defen.pdf" target="_blank">http://www.csbaonline.org/4Publications/PubLibrary/R.20070420.A_New_Global_Defen/R.20070420.A_New_Global_Defen.pdf</a><br> <br>Remaining to be seen is the impact that a growing US relationship with India will have on the<br>broader US Asian defense posture. As former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger said in 2005,<br>"Now India is, in effect, a strategic partner, not because of compatible domestic structures but<br> because of parallel security interests in Southwest Asia and the Indian ocean, and vis-à-vis<br>radical Islam."552 However, delays to a proposed deal between the United States and India over<br>US support for the development of India's commercial nuclear infrastructure prevented any<br> further deepening of the strategic ties between the two countries. However, on December 8,<br>2006, a bill proposing US-India civilian nuclear cooperation was passed by an overwhelming<br>majority in both the US House of Representatives and the Senate, ending the long period of<br> uncertainty over the fate of the deal and paving the way for improved relations between the two<br>countries.553 Given India's location in South Asia, the United States has many incentives to<br>continue to develop this strategic relationship, which may someday lead to potential new access<br> agreements and arrangements in the Indian Ocean.<br clear="all"><br></div><br> Siddharth Varadarajanhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/07721228307097170092noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-19172415.post-65588850774145340192008-07-09T12:32:00.001-07:002008-07-09T12:32:14.716-07:00CSBA -- Role of India in US dissuasion strategy for ChinaDissuasion Strategy<br>Congressional Briefing, US Capitol<br>May 6, 2008<br>Bob Martinage<br>Senior Fellow, CSBA<br><a href="http://www.csbaonline.org/4Publications/PubLibrary/S.20080506.Dissuasion_Strateg/S.20080506.Dissuasion_Strateg.pdf">http://www.csbaonline.org/4Publications/PubLibrary/S.20080506.Dissuasion_Strateg/S.20080506.Dissuasion_Strateg.pdf</a><br clear="all"> <a href="http://csbaonline.org/4Publications/PubLibrary/B.20080326.A_Cooperative_Stra/B.20080326.A_Cooperative_Stra.pdf">http://csbaonline.org/4Publications/PubLibrary/B.20080326.A_Cooperative_Stra/B.20080326.A_Cooperative_Stra.pdf</a><br> <br>US should exploit the manifold concerns/<br>grievances of China's neighbors to both deepen<br>and diversify America's alliance network in Asia<br><br>Dissuade PRC from investing in<br>"disruptive" capabilities by<br>channeling investment into<br> relatively non-threatening areas<br>– Facilitate India's development of a bluewater<br>navy (or otherwise increase the<br>perceived threat to PRC SLOCs) to<br>encourage PRC investment in bluewater<br>capabilities sooner, more<br> vigorously, and on a larger scale than<br>might otherwise be the case<br>– Ratchet up the perceived threat to<br>China's home waters posed by US<br>attack submarines, encouraging the<br>PLA to shift more resources into<br> coastal ASW capabilities<br><br>Dissuade PRC from investing<br>in "disruptive" capabilities by<br>channeling investment into<br>relatively non-threatening<br>areas (continued)<br>– Expand US base-access<br>agreements in Central Asia to<br> compel the PLA to invest in more<br>air defenses in Western/Northern<br>military districts<br><br><br> Siddharth Varadarajanhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/07721228307097170092noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-19172415.post-87700907250210059722007-10-02T17:03:00.001-07:002007-10-02T17:03:57.673-07:00The new Aipac -- India lobby<div id="article"> <div style="padding-left: 10px;"> <h6> THE NEW AIPAC? </h6> <h1>Forget the Israel Lobby. The Hill's Next Big Player Is Made in India.</h1> <p><font size="2"> <div id="byline">By Mira Kamdar</div> Sunday, September 30, 2007; Page B03 </font></p><p> </p></div> <div id="article_body" style="padding-left: 10px;"> <p> The fall's most controversial book is almost certainly "The <a href="http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/related/topic/Israel?tid=informline" target="">Israel</a> Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy," in which political scientists John Mearsheimer and Stephen Walt warn that Jewish Americans have built a behemoth that has bullied policymakers into putting Israel's interests in the <a href="http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/related/topic/Middle+East?tid=informline" target="">Middle East</a> ahead of America's. To Mearsheimer and Walt, AIPAC, the main pro-Israel lobbying group, is insidious. But to more and more Indian Americans, it's downright inspiring. </p> <p>With growing numbers, clout and self-confidence, the Indian American community is turning its admiration for the Israel lobby and its respect for high-achieving Jewish Americans into a powerful new force of its own. Following consciously in AIPAC's footsteps, the <a href="http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/related/topic/India?tid=informline" target="">India</a> lobby is getting results in Washington -- and having a profound impact on U.S. policy, with important consequences for the future of <a href="http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/related/topic/Asia?tid=informline" target="">Asia</a> and the world. </p> <table id="content_column_table" align="right" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" width="238"><tbody><tr><td width="10"><br></td><td width="228"> <div class="sidebar"> <h2>TOOLBOX</h2> <div class="sidebarcontent"> <div class="sidebarColumn"> <a href="javascript:void(0);" onclick="article_fontSizer('small')"><img src="http://media3.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/article/images/font_resize_small.gif" alt="" align="absbottom" border="0" height="14" width="9"> </a><a href="javascript:void(0);" onclick="article_fontSizer('medium')"><img 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Additionally, entries that are unsigned or contain "signatures" by someone other than the actual author will be removed. Finally, we will take steps to block users who violate any of our posting standards, terms of use or privacy policies or any other policies governing this site. Please review the <a href="http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/liveonline/delphi/delphirules.htm">full rules</a> governing commentaries and discussions. You are fully responsible for the content that you post. </div> </div> </div> </td></tr></tbody></table> <div id="body_after_content_column"> <p> "This is huge," enthused Ron Somers, the president of the U.S.-India Business Council, from a posh hotel lobby in <a href="http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/related/topic/Philadelphia?tid=informline" target=""> Philadelphia</a>. "It's the <a href="http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/related/topic/Berlin+Wall?tid=informline" target="">Berlin Wall</a> coming down. It's <a href="http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/related/topic/Richard+Nixon?tid=informline" target=""> Nixon</a> in <a href="http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/related/topic/China?tid=informline" target="">China</a>." </p> <p> What has Somers so energized is a landmark nuclear cooperation deal between India and the United States, which would give India access to U.S. nuclear technology and deliver fuel supplies to India's civilian power plants in return for placing them under permanent international safeguards. Under the deal's terms, the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty -- for decades the cornerstone of efforts to limit the spread of nuclear weapons -- will in effect be waived for India, just nine years after the Clinton administration slapped sanctions on <a href="http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/related/topic/New+Delhi?tid=informline" target="">New Delhi</a> for its 1998 nuclear tests. But the Bush administration, eager to check the rise of China by tilting toward its massive neighbor, has sought to forge a new strategic alliance with India, cemented by the civil nuclear deal. </p> <p>On the U.S. side, the pact awaits nothing more than one final up-or-down vote in Congress. (In India, the situation is far more complicated; India's left-wing parties, sensitive to any whiff of imperialism, have accused Prime Minister <a href="http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/related/topic/Manmohan+Singh?tid=informline" target="">Manmohan Singh</a> of surrendering the country's sovereignty -- a broadside that may yet scuttle the deal.) On <a href="http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/related/topic/Capitol+Hill?tid=informline" target="">Capitol Hill</a>, despite deep divisions over <a href="http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/related/topic/Iraq?tid=informline" target=""> Iraq</a>, immigration and the outsourcing of American jobs to India, Democrats and Republicans quickly fell into line on the nuclear deal, voting for it last December by overwhelming bipartisan majorities. Even lawmakers who had made nuclear nonproliferation a core issue over their long careers, such as <a href="http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/related/topic/Dick+Lugar?tid=informline" target="">Sen. Richard Lugar (R-Ind.)</a>, quickly came around to <a href="http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/related/topic/George+W.+Bush?tid=informline" target=""> President Bush</a>'s point of view. Why? </p> <div id="inline-ad" style="margin-bottom: 4px; padding-right: 10px; float: left;"><div><img src="http://media3.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/hp/img/ad_label_leftjust.gif" alt="ad_icon" border="0" height="13" width="100"></div> </div><p> The answer is that the India lobby is now officially a powerful presence on the Hill. The nuclear pact brought together an Indian government that is savvier than ever about playing the Washington game, an Indian American community that is just coming into its own and powerful business interests that see India as perhaps the single biggest money-making opportunity of the 21st century. </p> <p>The nuclear deal has been pushed aggressively by well-funded groups representing industry in both countries. At the center of the lobbying effort has been Robert D. Blackwill, a former U.S. ambassador to India and deputy national security adviser who's now with a well-connected Republican lobbying firm, Barbour, Griffith &amp; Rogers LLC. The firm's Web site touts Blackwill as a pillar of its "India Practice," along with a more recent hire, Philip D. Zelikow, a former top adviser to Secretary of State <a href="http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/related/topic/Condoleezza+Rice?tid=informline" target="">Condoleezza Rice</a> who was also one of the architects of the Bush administration's tilt toward India. The <a href="http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/related/topic/Confederation+of+Indian+Industry?tid=informline" target="">Confederation of Indian Industry</a> paid Blackwill to lobby various U.S. government entities, according to the <a href="http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/related/topic/The+Boston+Globe?tid=informline" target="">Boston Globe</a>. And India is also paying a major Beltway law firm, Venable LLP. </p> <p> The U.S.-India Business Council has lavished big money on lobbyists, too. With India slated to spend perhaps $60 billion over the next few years to boost its military capabilities, major U.S. corporations are hoping that the nuclear agreement will open the door to some extremely lucrative opportunities, including military contracts and deals to help build nuclear power plants. According to a recent <a href="http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/related/topic/Massachusetts+Institute+of+Technology?tid=informline" target="">MIT</a> study, <a href="http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/related/topic/Lockheed+Martin+Corporation?tid=informline" target=""> Lockheed Martin</a> is pushing to land a $4 billion to $9 billion contract for more than 120 fighter planes that India plans to buy. "The bounty is enormous," gushed Somers, the business council's president. </p> <p>So enormous, in fact, that Bonner & Associates created an India lobbying group last year to make sure that U.S. companies reap a major chunk of it. Dubbed the Indian American Security Leadership Council, the group was underwritten by Ramesh Kapur, a former trustee of the <a href="http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/related/topic/Democratic+National+Committee?tid=informline" target="">Democratic National Committee</a>, and Krishna Srinivasa, who has been backing <a href="http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/related/topic/U.S.+Republican+Party?tid=informline" target="">GOP</a> causes since his 1984 stint as co-chair of Asian Americans for Reagan-Bush. The council has, oddly, "recruited groups representing thousands of American veterans" to urge Congress to pass the nuclear deal. </p> <p>The India lobby is also eager to use Indian Americans to put a human face -- not to mention a voter's face and a campaign contributor's face -- on its agenda. "Industry would make its business case," Somers explained, "and Indian Americans would make the emotional case." </p> <p>There are now some 2.2 million Americans of Indian origin -- a number that's growing rapidly. First-generation immigrants keenly recall the humiliating days when India was dismissed as an overpopulated, socialist haven of poverty and disease. They are thrilled by the new respect India is getting. Meanwhile, a second, American-born generation of Indian Americans who feel comfortable with activism and publicity is just beginning to hit its political stride. As a group, Indian Americans have higher levels of education and income than the national average, making them a natural for political mobilization. </p> <p>One standout member of the first generation is Sanjay Puri, who founded the U.S. India Political Action Committee in 2002. (Its acronym, USINPAC, even sounds a bit like AIPAC.) He came to the United States in 1985 to get an MBA at <a href="http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/related/topic/The+George+Washington+University?tid=informline" target="">George Washington University</a>, staying on to found an information-technology company. A man of modest demeanor who wears a lapel pin that joins the Indian and American flags, Puri grew tired of watching successful Indian Americans pony up money just so they could get their picture taken with a politician. "I thought, 'What are we getting out of this?', " he explains. </p> <p>In just five years, USINPAC has become the most visible face of Indian American lobbying. Its Web site boasts photos of its leaders with President Bush, Senate Majority Leader <a href="http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/related/topic/Harry+Reid?tid=informline" target="">Harry Reid</a>, and presidential candidates from <a href="http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/related/topic/Fred+Thompson+%28Politician%29?tid=informline" target=""> Fred Thompson</a> to <a href="http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/related/topic/Barack+Obama?tid=informline" target="">Barack Obama</a>. The group pointedly sports a <a href="http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/related/topic/New+Hampshire?tid=informline" target=""> New Hampshire</a> branch. It can also take some credit for ending the Senate career of <a href="http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/related/topic/Virginia?tid=informline" target="">Virginia</a> Republican <a href="http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/related/topic/George+Allen?tid=informline" target=""> George Allen</a>, whose notorious taunt of "macaca" to a young Indian American outraged the community. Less publicly, USINPAC claims to have brought a lot of lawmakers around. "You haven't heard a lot from Dan Burton lately, right?" Puri asked, referring to a Republican congressman from <a href="http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/related/topic/Indiana?tid=informline" target="">Indiana</a> who has long been perceived as an India basher. </p> <p> USINPAC is capable of pouncing; witness the incident last June when Obama's campaign issued a memo excoriating <a href="http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/related/topic/Hillary+Clinton?tid=informline" target="">Hillary Rodham Clinton </a> for her close ties to wealthy Indian Americans and her alleged support for outsourcing, listing the <a href="http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/related/topic/New+York?tid=informline" target="">New York</a> senator's affiliation as "D- <a href="http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/related/topic/Punjab?tid=informline" target="">Punjab</a>." Puri personally protested in a widely circulated open letter, and Obama quickly issued an apology. "Did you see? That letter was addressed directly to Sanjay," Varun Mehta, a senior at <a href="http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/related/topic/Boston+University?tid=informline" target="">Boston University</a> and USINPAC volunteer, told me with evident admiration. "That's the kind of clout Sanjay has." </p> <p> Like many politically engaged Indian Americans, Puri has a deep regard for the Israel lobby -- particularly in a country where Jews make up just a small minority of the population. "A lot of Jewish people tell me maybe I was Jewish in my past life," he jokes. The respect runs both ways. The American Jewish Committee, for instance, recently sent letters to members of Congress supporting the U.S.-India nuclear deal. </p> <p>"We model ourselves on the Jewish people in the United States," explains Mital Gandhi of USINPAC's new offshoot, the U.S.-India Business Alliance. "We're not quite there yet. But we're getting there." </p> <p> <a href="mailto:miraukamdar@gmail.com" target="">miraukamdar@gmail.com</a> </p> <p> <i>Mira Kamdar, a fellow at the World Policy Institute and the Asia Society, is the author of "Planet India: How the Fastest-Growing Democracy is Transforming America and the World."</i> </p> </div> </div> </div><br> Siddharth Varadarajanhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/07721228307097170092noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-19172415.post-14900559115592763252007-06-15T07:05:00.001-07:002007-06-15T07:05:25.490-07:00U.S. presidential campaign and India<div><strong><font color="#0000ff" size="4"><a href="http://www.hindu.com/2007/06/11/stories/2007061103341100.htm">http://www.hindu.com/2007/06/11/stories/2007061103341100.htm</a></font></strong></div> <div><strong><font color="#0000ff" size="4">Hindu June 11 2007</font></strong></div> <div><strong><font color="#0000ff" size="4"></font></strong> </div> <div><strong><font color="#0000ff" size="4">U.S. presidential campaign and India </font></strong></div> <p align="justify">Derek Chollet <p> <table width="100%" bgcolor="#d0f0ff" border="0"> <tbody> <tr> <td><i>The strong U.S.-India relationship has deep support from both Republicans and Democrats. </i></td></tr></tbody></table> <p align="justify"> <p align="justify"> <p align="justify">WITH THE U.S. 2008 presidential campaign in full swing, nearly 20 Republican and Democratic contenders (and possibly more to join soon) are already crisscrossing the country and outlining their policy positions and platforms. This frenzy of campaigning even seems early for most Americans, but for those abroad — in India and elsewhere — it is worth asking: how does this matter to us? <p align="justify">All American presidential elections are consequential, but the next one seems more so. For the first time in over 50 years, no incumbent President or Vice President is in the race, making this a truly open contest to be the first post-Bush, post-9/11 President. The next President — whether Republican or Democrat — will have an opportunity to assess the successes and failures of the Bush years, and then change course accordingly. <p align="justify">It is fair to expect that after 2009, the world will witness a major readjustment of American foreign policy across many issues. <p align="justify">Every new administration spends its first few years dealing with the difficult inheritance of its predecessor, and Mr. Bush's successor will have his or her hands full — from winding down the disastrous Iraq war to reversing the animosity toward the U.S. around the world. Most analysts concede that when it comes to America's place in the world, Mr. Bush's successor will face the most difficult circumstances in U.S. history. That's why it's so significant that one of the good news stories a new U.S. administration will inherit is a relationship with India that is stronger than ever before. <p align="justify">For this reason, the U.S.' relationship with India will not be a major issue in the 2008 campaign. So far, the subject has hardly been mentioned at all. But it's fair to ask: what would a change in administration, especially to a Democratic one, mean for India? There are some who believe that because of Democratic concerns about nuclear proliferation (the former U.S. Ambassador, Robert Blackwill, derides them as nonproliferation "ayatollahs") and trade issues, a Democratic victory in November 2008 would somehow be bad for India or set our relationship back. <p align="justify">There is always a temptation for a new President to make his mark by doing the opposite of his predecessor. George W. Bush did this with his "ABC" — anything but Clinton — attitude after he took office, and the next Democrat in the White House will have plenty of incentive to return the favour. But importantly, the U.S. relationship with India was an exception to this in 2001, and there are powerful reasons to expect the same in 2009. <p align="justify">Importantly, the strong U.S.-India relationship has deep support from both Republicans and Democrats. While many Bush officials like to herald their work as opening a new era in U.S.-India relations, most Democrats see the past seven years as a continuation of the course set by President Bill Clinton in the late 1990s. To be sure, steps such as the nuclear deal are historic breakthroughs, and these have strong support from most Democrats — especially the dominant presidential contenders. The fact is that the strong U.S.-India relationship is one of the great bipartisan achievements since the end of the Cold War. At a moment where American politics is so soured by partisanship, that's no small feat. <p align="justify"><font class="subsectionhead" color="red" size="3">Trade issues <p align="justify"></p></font> <p align="justify">While trade issues remain a point of anxiety for many Democratic constituents and politicians — and the campaign might produce some heated rhetoric — there is broad recognition of how important the economic relationship with India is. The Democratic presidential contenders recognise that outsourcing is a fact of the global economy, and instead of talking about ending trade or building economic walls with India, they talk about ensuring that the government does more to help those who suffer most. In fact, one could argue that because of their credibility with labour unions and working Americans, Democrats are better positioned to put U.S,-India trade relations on a solid footing. <p align="justify">Democrats have also raised concerns about the deep problems of India's neighbour, Pakistan. The Bush administration has pursued unprecedented cooperation with Islamabad — showering Musharraf with $10 billion in aid since 2002 — in exchange for cooperation in fighting terrorism. Yet most Democrats believe such cooperation has been too episodic, and that the peace deals Islamabad recently signed with pro-Taliban elders in western Pakistan have amounted to a failed policy and a Musharraf retreat. Democrats are concerned over negative trend lines in Pakistan — the lack of democracy, rising anti-Americanism, and deep social tensions. And they are alarmed that the vast majority of U.S. assistance money to Pakistan's military is going to weapons that are more appropriate for confrontation with India than rooting out Al-Qaeda. A new administration would reassess this policy and look for ways to fix it. <p align="justify">But most important, Democratic presidential contenders (and those who would staff their administrations) realise that in a world where the U.S. has far fewer friends and seems more isolated than ever before, the U.S.-Indian partnership can be a foundation for greater American engagement in Asia and beyond. <p align="justify">They believe in working to give India the place of leadership it deserves as the world's largest democracy — whether by including it on the U.N. Security Council, or as a founding member of a new "Alliance of Democracies." <p align="justify">In short, no serious Democrat is talking about undoing the great work the past two Presidents have done to strengthen U.S.-Indian relations. If anything, they are planning for a more ambitious agenda. So as one of the most interesting American presidential elections unfolds, America's friends in India should watch with close interest — and with the confidence in our strong partnership. <p align="justify"><i>(Derek Chollet is a senior fellow at The Center for a New American Security and served in the State Department during the Clinton Administration.)</i></p></p></p></p></p></p></p></p></p></p></p></p> </p></p></p></p></p></p> Siddharth Varadarajanhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/07721228307097170092noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-19172415.post-74180908519910333492007-05-30T07:31:00.001-07:002007-05-30T07:31:35.158-07:00China, nuclear technology, and a US sale<br clear="all"> <div id="story"> <div class="pubdate">from the May 30, 2007 edition - <a href="http://www.csmonitor.com/2007/0530/p03s01-usfp.html">http://www.csmonitor.com/2007/0530/p03s01-usfp.html</a></div> <h1>China, nuclear technology, and a US sale</h1> <h2 class="sub">Critics of a deal to sell China cutting-edge reactors hope to stall it in Congress by questioning the sale's taxpayer-backed financing. </h2> <div class="author"><span class="byline">By <a href="http://www.csmonitor.com/cgi-bin/encryptmail.pl?ID=CDE1F2EBA0C3ECE1F9F4EFEE&url=/2007/0530/p03s01-usfp.html">Mark Clayton</a></span><span class="staffline"> | Staff writer of The Christian Science Monitor </span></div> <div class="storybody"> <div class="storycontent"> <p>China has its heart set on buying a cutting-edge US design for a nuclear-power reactor, and the Bush administration has said it is willing to sell because the transaction will mean jobs for Americans and pave the way for a "nuclear [power] renaissance in the US." </p> <p>But critics of the mammoth $5 billion-plus sale are raising concerns that China might not use the advanced technology strictly for peaceful purposes, perhaps intending to "reverse engineer" pieces of it for military purposes. </p> <p>That worry surfaced this month in a letter four members of Congress sent to Defense Secretary Robert Gates. The May 18 letter asked whether the sale of four nuclear-power reactors to China, approved by the administration in December, could end up enhancing Beijing's military, including its ability to produce nuclear fuel for bombs and increase the stealthiness of its submarines. </p> <p>"This transaction presents potential security concerns that Congress will have to consider," wrote Reps. Jeff Fortenberry (R) of Nebraska, Ed Royce (R) of California, Christopher Smith (R) of New Jersey, and Diane Watson (D) of California. All serve on foreign or international relations committees of the House of Representatives. </p> <p>The sale of US civilian nuclear technology to China has long been a matter of contention. The debate is intensifying now because Westinghouse Electric Co. is expected within weeks to apply for up to $5 billion in loans from the US Export-Import Bank to finance the sale of the reactors to China. When it comes, the application will trigger a review by Congress, where critics of the deal hope to raise enough questions about it to hold it up, perhaps for good. </p> <p>If approved, the deal would be the largest by far in the history of the bank, a taxpayer-supported entity charged with creating and sustaining jobs by financing sales of US goods to international buyers. </p> <p class="divvy">Besides security, an array of concerns</p> <p>Though security concerns are paramount, any congressional hearings on the deal are likely to address the following sensitive topics, as well: </p> <p>•Financing of the sale. Should US taxpayers be financing a multibillion-dollar loan to China at a time when China is running a massive trade surplus with the US? What do the taxpayers, who by some estimates contributed at least $300 million to Westinghouse Electric's advanced reactor design, get out of the deal – especially considering that a Japanese firm now owns 77 percent of Westinghouse? </p> <p>•Technology transfer. China reportedly will get most of the new AP1000 technology, the latest US reactor design, as part of the sale. Some nonproliferation experts say the design of the reactor's coolant pump is of particular concern, and that China might be able to reverse-engineer it for use on its nuclear submarines. Westinghouse spokesman Vaugn Gilbert, though, says the company is bound by a federal technology transfer agreement "that precludes certain elements of that pump technology from being provided to China – therefore we will not be providing it." </p> <p>Experts are concerned about the technology transfer issue and whether the sale will compromise America's technological lead on nuclear-power systems for subs. </p> <p>"You're building an infrastructure that can be used and retooled to help out in [China's] naval reactor sector – and they do want this for nuclear subs," says Henry Sokolski, executive director of the Nonproliferation Policy Education Center, a think tank on nuclear-policy issues. </p> <p>Because China is already a nuclear-weapon nation, others don't see a problem with sharing US light-water power-reactor technology, a design considered less useful for making bomb fuel. But they do have other worries. </p> <p>"Our concern is more about whether the US should be supporting building a commercial nuclear infrastructure when there are serious questions about whether the Chinese regulatory system [for nuclear-waste disposal] can do this safely," says Edwin Lyman, a nonproliferation expert at the Union of Concerned Scientists, an environmental group. </p> <p class="divvy">A boon to US industry?</p> <p>Westinghouse and administration officials say the sale is economically justified and concerns about technology transfer unwarranted.</p> <p>"This deal ... would affirm that the US remains a leader in the design and construction of civilian nuclear-power plants," said David Pumphrey, a deputy assistant secretary at the Department of Energy (DOE) in February testimony before the US-China Economic and Security Review Commission. It would also create "some 5,500 new jobs in the US," he said. He echoed DOE Secretary Samuel Bodman, who spoke in December of the deal's potential to "spur development of a nuclear renaissance in the US." </p> <p>Westinghouse's Mr. Gilbert says a key benefit is simply getting the new design working the first time in China, thereby working out any glitches and lowering costs for at least 10 new plants in the US that would use the same design. </p> <p>To some, however, it's unclear how much the US benefits or whether the technology will help China's military. Others question whether the deal will create enough US jobs to merit billions in public financing. </p> <p>"You've got the Japanese making most of the big parts, [and] the Chinese doing at least half the construction and absorbing all the technology to do it themselves later on," Mr. Sokolski says. "I fail to see any boon to US industry." </p> <p>"We don't think these economic impact and jobs estimates are done very well," says Thea Lee, policy chief for the AFL-CIO, who sits on the advisory board of Export-Import Bank. "It's been our sense that the bank's process of verifying such claims is very inadequate and that there's a lot of phony job-padding going on." </p> <p>Westinghouse officials say the deal will "load Westinghouse design centers" in Pennsylvania and other states with work and create positions in 20 states – to the tune of about 5,000 jobs. </p> <p>Though the deal doesn't sit all that well with Lawrence Wortzel, a commissioner with the US-China Economic and Security Review Commission, he does not favor blocking it. </p> <p>"While I have reservations about the financing and technology transfer to third parties, I still wouldn't recommend taking action to block the sale," he says, noting that China certainly has the money to finance the deal itself and has a huge trade surplus with the US. </p></div> <div class="factbox"></div> <div><a href="http://www.csmonitor.com/2007/0530/p03s01-usfp.html"><font color="#800080">Full HTML version of this story which may include photos, graphics, and related links</font></a></div></div></div> Siddharth Varadarajanhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/07721228307097170092noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-19172415.post-75292279130192674932007-04-22T00:46:00.001-07:002007-04-22T00:46:09.254-07:00The Return of Reprocessing<div>Nuclear Wasteland</div> <div> </div> <div>IEEE article on the return of reprocessing</div> <div> </div> <div> </div> <div><a href="http://www.spectrum.ieee.org/print/4891">http://www.spectrum.ieee.org/print/4891</a></div> <div> </div> <div> </div> <div> </div> <div> </div> <div> </div> <div> <style> .articlecolumn, .section { width: 500px; } .figurecolumn { clear: both; margin-top: 10pt; padding: 10pt; } .sidebarcolumn { clear: both; margin-top: 10pt; padding: 10pt; } table.graphic { float: none; margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto; } body { margin: 10pt; } @media print { .printicon { display: none; } } </style> <table width="500" border="0"> <tbody> <tr> <td width="50%"><a class="printicon" href="javascript:printArticle();"></a> </td> <td width="50%"> <div id="sponsoredby"><a id="sponsoredby" href="http://spectrum.ieee.org/"></a> </div></td></tr></tbody></table> <div class="articlecolumn" style="WIDTH: 501px; HEIGHT: 9029px"> <div id="pageheading">Nuclear Wasteland</div>By: <span class="by"><span class="name">Peter Fairley</span> </span> <div class="section"> <table class="graphic" cellspacing="0" cellpadding="0" width="10" border="0"> <tbody> <tr> <td><img class="graphic" src="http://www.spectrum.ieee.org/images/feb07/images/nuc01.jpg"> <div class="credits"><font color="#c0c0c0">PHOTO:Roger Ressmeyer/Corbis </font></div></td></tr> <tr> <td> <div class="caption"> <p><font color="#c0c0c0"><span class="captiontitle">BLUE GLOW OF SUCCESS</span>: Fuel assemblies cool in a water pond at the French nuclear complex at La Hague. The blue light is generated by Cherenkov radiation, which arises from a particle's traveling through a medium faster than the speed of light in that medium </font></p></div></td></tr></tbody></table> <p></p> <p></p> <p>For roughly a quarter century there has been a hiatus in nuclear-plant construction in Europe and North America. Now new plants are being built in France, Finland, and Russia, and new reactor proposals are gathering steam in the United States, the United Kingdom, and Canada. But to undergo a true resurgence—which many analysts argue is necessary to help reduce global greenhouse gas emissions—the nuclear power industry needs a coherent plan for dealing with its reactors' radioactive and toxic leftovers. </p> <p>Burying the waste is a slow, politically painful process that leaves much to be desired. The long-planned U.S. repository under Yucca Mountain in Nevada has been immensely controversial. Yet if built as currently planned, it may be too small when it finally opens to accommodate all the high-level waste that has piled up in the country during half a century of commercial nuclear energy. </p> <p>Lately, nuclear advocates, particularly in the United States, say they've found a better solution, or at least a path to one. It's based on the recycling and reuse of spent nuclear fuel, known as fuel reprocessing in the industry's jargon. Reprocessing breaks down fuel chemically, recovering fissionable material for use in new fuels. Thus, there is less highly radioactive material that needs to be sealed in caskets, buried deep underground, or otherwise permanently isolated from humankind. </p> <p>"If we do reprocessing and recycle, we can increase the capacity of Yucca Mountain 100-fold," says Phillip Finck, a nuclear engineer at Argonne National Laboratory, in Illinois. Suddenly, instead of being crammed full on its opening day, Yucca Mountain would be able to handle everything the industry could throw at it until 2050 or beyond, staving off searches for additional Yucca Mountains. </p> <p>As it happens, there's an ideal test case with which to evaluate that enticing proposition: France, which never backed away from nuclear energy and which has long relied on reprocessing as the linchpin of its power reactor fuel system. </p> <p>The French experience clearly does show that reprocessing need not be the dangerous mess that other countries, including the United States, have made of it [see photo, "Blue Glow of Success"]. The U.S. military used reprocessing for several decades to separate plutonium from spent fuels, providing fissionable material for bombs. The result was widespread contamination—which has been in some cases irremediable—in the central Washington desert and the South Carolina coastal plain. </p> <p>France, in contrast, now reprocesses well over 1000 metric tons of spent fuel every year without incident at the La Hague chemical complex, at the head of Normandy's wind-blasted Cotentin peninsula. La Hague receives all the spent fuel rods from France's 59 reactors. The sprawling facility, operated by the state-controlled nuclear giant Areva, has racked up a good, if not unblemished, environmental record. </p> <p>The United States now claims to have a way of eliminating reprocessing's other major liability: the risk of spreading a supply of raw materials for bomb making. The United States officially banned reprocessing of spent fuel for power reactors in 1977, during the administration of President Jimmy Carter, who feared that proliferation of reprocessing technology would make it too easy for wayward nations or even terrorist groups to obtain the raw material for bombs. But in recent years, the U.S. Department of Energy engineers, including Finck, have developed an approach that they claim is more resistant to terrorist misuse, thereby mitigating concerns about nuclear security and proliferation. The result is that, three decades later, pressure is mounting for another look at reprocessing. The U.S. government is already supplying recycled fuels to one commercial reactor and planning tests of new proliferation-resistant reprocessing technologies.</p> <p>Nevertheless, although it may be safe to proceed with reprocessing, France's experience suggests that reprocessing as done now is not ready to catalyze a full-blown nuclear renaissance. The problem in a nutshell is that without breeder reactors, which can break down the most long-lived elements in nuclear waste, reprocessing comes nowhere near achieving Finck's 100-fold reduction in that waste. </p> <p>France's engineers tried harder than those in any other country to build and run breeder reactors reliably at a commercial scale, but ultimately they failed. The result is that even in France—the best real-world model of what reprocessing can accomplish—the technology remains a tantalizing but only partial solution to the problem of high-level nuclear waste. </p> <p></p></div> <div class="section"> <p>Reprocessing got its start in the early 1940s, when Manhattan Project scientists sought a way to isolate pure plutonium. According to Richard Rhodes, author of The Making of the Atomic Bomb (Simon & Schuster, 1986), the chemist Glenn Seaborg, the discoverer of plutonium, came up with the basic concept. A carrier molecule grabs onto plutonium that's in a particular chemical state. That allows the carrier and the plutonium to be separated from the rest of the spent fuel. Further chemistry releases the carrier, leaving a solution of nearly pure plutonium. </p> <p>It was a risky endeavor from the start because of the volatile, intensely radioactive materials involved. When it was scaled up at the Hanford Nuclear Reservation in Washington state to obtain the quantities of plutonium needed for bombs, immense concrete bunkers were built to house the operations [see "The Atomic Fortress That Time Forgot," <i>IEEE Spectrum</i>, April 2006]. The workers called them Queen Marys, after the British ocean liner, the world's biggest at the time. Inside, all the processing steps were done entirely by remote control, with technicians peering through thick windows at the machinery that moved materials through the chemical tanks. It was all part of what Bertrand Goldschmidt, an eminent French chemist who worked with Seaborg, called "the astonishing American creation in three years"—a network of laboratories and factories equivalent in size to the whole U.S. auto industry.</p> <p>France's Commissariat à l'Énergie Atomique (CEA), a government organization, commissioned its first reprocessing plant in 1958 at Marcoule, in the south, to supply weapons-grade plutonium for the country's nascent atomic bomb program. It added an initial reprocessing unit at La Hague for the same purpose in the early 1960s. The equipment running today, however, dates mostly to a massive upgrade and expansion begun in the 1970s and 1980s. France cut a deal with five countries—Belgium, Germany, Japan, the Netherlands, and Switzerland—to finance the modernization of La Hague. In exchange, France agreed to reprocess those countries' spent fuel and return their separated plutonium, so as to reduce high-level waste volumes and provide additional fresh nuclear fuel. Today, the Areva Group, a spin-off of the CEA, runs La Hague as well as other French fuel-cycle installations and builds reactors via a subsidiary it co-owns with Siemens. </p> <p>Even some of the nuclear industry's most tenacious opponents acknowledge that the result is a technical marvel. The leader of Greenpeace France's antinuclear program, Yannick Rousselet, says he no longer cites technical challenges in his criticism of Areva. "In the past," Rousselet says, "the antinuclear movement tried to say that they would not succeed with reprocessing. But they succeeded. To be honest, at least in terms of the technical aspects, it works." </p> <p>Activists such as Rousselet had reason to doubt La Hague's chemistry, essentially the same as the separation process developed by the Manhattan Project. It has proved an ecological, occupational, and humanitarian disaster nearly everywhere else. Spills and explosions at reprocessing plants in the United States, Russia, and Britain have polluted rivers and contaminated hundreds of thousands of acres. Britain's Sellafield reprocessing complex, on England's Cumbrian coast, was shuttered in April 2005 after safety authorities discovered that 83 cubic meters of highly radioactive liquids had spilled during a period of nine months. </p> <p>La Hague, in contrast, has never had a serious accident or spill. It does intentionally release relatively small amounts of radioactive substances into the air and water of the adjacent English Channel, whose strong currents were a key attraction of the La Hague site—behavior that Rousselet calls irresponsible and unwarranted. But the amounts released are below licensed levels and are dropping. </p> <p>Eric Blanc, the marine engineer turned chemical plant operator who serves as La Hague's deputy director, tells the growing stream of visiting U.S. politicos and utility executives that La Hague's neighbors experience an annual radiation dose below 0.02 millisieverts—roughly equivalent to the dose of solar radiation the visitors receive on their transatlantic flights. La Hague's 5000 workers absorb less radiation than they would if they were employed at a nuclear power plant. </p> <p></p></div> <div class="section"> <p>LA Hague takes exposure seriously, nevertheless. Inside the plant, there's a bit of the atmosphere of a James Bond movie. Protection suits and respirators hang on the walls. Scores of workers in white jumpsuits sit at computer screens in a central control room, while others control radiation-resistant robots or dexterous telemanipulators to guide, clean, or repair the equipment. The robots are in the thick of the action, and the danger lies safely isolated behind walls and leaded-glass windows 1 to 2 meters thick in workshops that have not seen a human in two decades of heavy-industrial operation. </p> <p>Reprocessing at La Hague takes place in two independent but interconnected lines. At the front end of each line, robotic assemblies lift spent fuel-rod bundles weighing 500 kilograms from armored shipping casks and suspend them in 9-meter-deep pools of water. The fuel bundles are at 300 °C; after cooling for four to five years, the fuel elements are fed into the plant's processing workshops to be chewed up, dissolved in nitric acid, and run through a series of chemical separation baths. The chemistry is fundamentally the 63-year-old Purex process developed in the Manhattan Project—Purex stands for "plutonium-uranium extraction"—but Areva says the separation equipment employed is more compact than its predecessors and generates less waste. </p> <p>The major products of the separation are uranium and plutonium. The former, consisting of the isotopes U-235 and U-238, constitutes 95 percent of the spent fuel. The plutonium yield is just a little more than 1 percent. Most of the uranium is shipped to an Areva plant in southern France and, at the moment, stockpiled. Some analysts predict that uranium prices will eventually justify more reuse of La Hague's uranium; but for now, utilities find it cheaper to use fuel freshly made from uranium ores and enriched to the precise isotopic composition they need. As for the plutonium, it is shipped across France to the Rhône Valley, where Areva's Marcoule fuel plant blends it with uranium and fabricates it into fuel for French reactors. </p> <p>The final step in the process encapsulates the high-level waste, which consists mainly of acids and solvents from the Purex process plus dangerous, extremely radioactive leftovers from the spent fuel, including isotopes of curium, cesium, and iodine. This step is called vitrification. Technicians operating remote manipulators drop the toxic blend into a bath of borosilicate glass heated to 1150 °C, then dole out the molten mix into 180-liter stainless-steel canisters. Think of a huge glass paperweight with radioactive matter inside instead of colored swirls. But this particular glass is not fragile, Blanc explains. That's the point: the glass is supposed to immobilize the isotopes, isolating them from the environment, like bugs in amber, for thousands of years. </p> <p>Once processed, two bundles totaling 528 fuel rods yield one vitrification canister 1.3 meters tall and a bit less than half a meter in diameter, plus another steel canister of similar size holding the compacted metal fuel rods. Even the largest of France's reactors, which can produce 1300 megawatts, generate just 20 canisters of high-level waste per year. According to Areva, it's about a factor of 10 reduction in the mass of highly radioactive waste needing to be stored under the most stringent conditions, and a four- or fivefold reduction in volume relative to leaving a plant's spent fuel unseparated [see flowchart, " <a href="http://www.spectrum.ieee.org/images/feb07/images/nucf2.pdf"><font color="#800080">The French Nuclear System</font></a>"].</p> <p></p></div> <div class="section"> <p>Despite its record of technical success, La Hague's business lost much of its shine during the past decade. By the mid-1990s, France's European partners were rethinking the wisdom of their investment in La Hague and, one by one, stopped shipping their spent fuel. From its 1997 to 1998 peak of 1700 metric tons per year, La Hague's throughput sharply decreased by 2003 to an average of 1100 metric tons per year. In part, France's partners were responding to grassroots concerns about the security of spent fuel and plutonium shipments [see sidebar, "The Terrorist Threat"]. But the ultimate cause for the slump traces back to the demise of the next-generation reactors designed to consume La Hague's plutonium, the so-called fast breeders. </p> <p>All reactors get their heat from bundles of rods filled with a fissile fuel. The rods are inserted into a core in close proximity to each other, enabling neutrons radiating from the fuel in each rod to split heavy atoms of uranium or plutonium in neighboring rods, thereby generating more neutrons, which split more atoms, and so on. In most conventional power reactors, water or graphite is employed as a moderator to slow down the neutrons, thus rendering them more likely to be absorbed by U-235 atoms, knocking out more neutrons. That is necessary because the concentration of fissionable material in the fuel is low, just a few percent. In contrast, breeder reactor fuel contains a high fraction of fissionable material, so that a moderator is not required. </p> <p>There is an additional potential advantage to the breeder reactor. By surrounding the fuel rods in its core with a jacket of U‑238, which is not fissionable by slow neutrons, the reactor can produce power and simultaneously "breed" new plutonium faster than the plutonium in the fuel rods is consumed. The U‑238 atoms capture neutrons to form fissile plutonium 239. </p> <p>The reason for expanding La Hague in the 1980s was to produce a first load of plutonium fuel for what was to be a fleet of breeder reactors. Energy analysts, alarmed by the oil-supply manipulations of the 1970s, had predicted a rush into nuclear power that would exhaust uranium reserves in a matter of decades. "We were projecting that by 2010 nothing but fast [breeder] reactors would be built," recalls one such analyst, Evelyne Bertel, an expert in nuclear fuel cycles at the Organisation for Economic Co‑operation and Development's Nuclear Energy Agency, in Paris. </p> <p>The United States and the Soviet Union both mounted major efforts to develop breeder reactors during the 1950s and 1960s. But it fell to France, after Carter took the United States out of the reprocessing and breeding game, to design and build the first commercial prototype. </p> <p>In 1972, a consortium of companies led by the French utility Electricité de France (EDF) started work on the Superphénix. There were countless challenges. Above all was keeping the breeder's densely packed core from overheating, which could cause the fuel to melt and possibly even explode. Because the heat flux is so high in a breeder and absorption of neutrons by a moderator is undesirable, reactor designers faced a limited choice of coolants. In practice, almost all breeder designers have opted for liquid metals that are notoriously hard to handle. Liquid sodium, used in the Superphénix, is extremely corrosive and ignites explosively on contact with oxygen or water. </p> <p>Starting in the mid-1980s, the Superphénix suffered a series of sodium leaks. Meanwhile the nuclear industry peaked and uranium prices crashed, eliminating the imperative to switch to plutonium fuel. The reactor went through several shutdowns and restarts before the French government finally pulled the plug for good in 1998. By then the reactor had run just 174 days at its full 1250-MW design capacity. A French government investigation in 2000 estimated that the project had cost about €9 billion (US $11.8 billion). </p> <p>French industry players often blame politics for the Superphénix debacle. François Mitterrand, then president, held power through a coalition with France's staunchly antinuclear Green Party. However, the technical problems are undeniable. "The experience of Superphénix demonstrated that France built a nonmature technology," says Bertel. </p> <p>With breeder reactors out of the picture for the foreseeable future, France tried to find a new role for La Hague's plutonium. The solution was to re-engineer Areva's fuel assembly plant at Marcoule, originally designed to make fuel bundles for the Superphénix, to instead produce plutonium-enriched fuel elements for conventional reactors. By blending plutonium and depleted uranium, in a ratio of 8 percent to 92 percent, the plant created so-called mixed-oxide, or MOX, fuel, which can be substituted for enriched uranium fuel after just minor modifications to a conventional reactor. Today MOX fuel provides close to 10 percent of France's nuclear power generation and is also used in Belgium, Germany, Japan, and Switzerland. </p> <p>The downside is that spent MOX fuel is even tougher to transport, store, and reprocess than regular used fuel. Spent MOX fuel contains four to five times as much plutonium, increasing the risk of unexpected nuclear chain reactions, called accidental criticalities, within reprocessing plants. Spent MOX is also three times as hot as spent uranium fuel, thanks to an accumulation of transuranic isotopes such as americium and curium, making it less fit for underground storage. </p> <p>Therefore, according to a 2000 consensus report on reprocessing prepared for France's prime minister, spent MOX must cool for 150 years before it can go into an underground waste repository such as Yucca Mountain [see sidebar: "The Prickly Economics of Reprocessing"]. Meanwhile, spent MOX fuel is piling up quickly in La Hague's cooling ponds: the 543‑metric‑ton accumulation grows by 100 metric tons every year. </p> <p>The bottom line is that burning MOX fuel makes economic sense only as the beginning of a larger process that ends with incineration in a breeder reactor, and no sense at all as an end in itself. Most of France's reprocessing customers, seeing little future for nuclear energy amid the antinuclear demonstrations of the 1980s and 1990s, accordingly saw no future for breeders either. In that context, Bertel says, pulling away from reprocessing and MOX fuel made perfect sense. As she puts it, "If you are stuck with the spent MOX fuel, why bother?" </p> <p>The French government and EDF remain invested in the country's nuclear future and therefore classify La Hague's spent MOX as a strategic reserve of plutonium to jump-start future breeder reactors. This eternal hope is, in fact, an essential justification for France's fuel cycle. Japan shares France's vision and built its own reprocessing plant using Areva's designs, which started up last year; the plant is expected to eventually supply Japanese reactors with MOX fuel. </p> <p></p></div> <div class="section"> <p>France and Japan suddenly look less isolated in their reprocessing strategy, thanks to U.S. President George W. Bush. Early last year, Bush singled out France's nuclear program for a rare bit of cross-Atlantic praise, telling the American people in a Saturday radio chat that reprocessing will "allow us to produce more energy, while dramatically reducing the amount of nuclear waste." Surprisingly, Bush has endorsed reprocessing as not only a means of handling domestic nuclear waste but as a bold response to proliferation as well. </p> <p>Turning a conventional argument on its head, Bush is saying that the risk of additional countries' using reprocessing to arm nuclear weapons can be lower, not greater, if the United States reprocesses. Under his proposed Global Nuclear Energy Partnership (GNEP), nations with "secure, advanced nuclear capabilities" would guarantee a steady supply of nuclear fuel to non-nuclear-weapons countries that agree to return the resulting spent fuel and the plutonium within for reprocessing, forgoing reprocessing plants of their own. </p> <p>But many proliferation experts worry that Bush's plan could backfire. It's not clear that many countries will agree to forgo reprocessing, letting others do the work for them, while they themselves agree to take back the noxious wastes. If participation in GNEP is disappointing, the program could end up encouraging rather than impeding the spread of reprocessing technology—Areva, for one, is plainly interested in licensing its technology. </p> <p>Whether or not GNEP attracts any takers, a movement toward reprocessing is already well established in the United States. U.S. utilities are getting their first taste of MOX fuel today, thanks to former President Bill Clinton, whose Energy Department in 1997 authorized the fabrication of surplus weapons-grade plutonium into MOX fuel for use in U.S. power plants. Clinton's DOE also awarded a contract to an Areva-led consortium to build a MOX fabrication plant at the DOE's Savannah River, S.C., site. While awaiting construction of the MOX plant—beset by lawsuits that have delayed its projected start date from 2009 to as late as 2015—Bush's first energy secretary, Spencer Abraham, gave Areva permission to produce a first load of MOX at Marcoule. The resulting fuel assemblies began producing power at Duke Power's Catawba, S.C., plant last year. (Abraham, by the way, has since signed on as chairman of Areva's U.S. subsidiary, Areva Enterprises.)</p> <p>Since Bush's high-profile endorsement of reprocessing last year, nuclear players within and around the Energy Department have been lobbying Congress to support the next step toward full integration of plutonium into the U.S. nuclear industry: a reprocessing demonstration plant. The demo is needed to prove, at large scale, a reprocessing scheme called Urex+, developed at Argonne National Laboratory to be more proliferation-resistant than La Hague's. Urex+ coextracts plutonium together with other transuranic elements present in spent fuel. Such isotopes can be "burned" in a breeder reactor but would complicate the job of any would-be bomb maker, because they contaminate the explosive material somewhat. </p> <p>The DOE's Spent Nuclear Fuel Recycling Program Plan, sent to Congress this past May, also calls for a demonstration of a breeder reactor fueled by Urex+. In fact, as with France's fuel cycle, the DOE plan is hard to defend unless several such breeder reactors are built. Without them, high-level transuranic waste would become a growing annoyance in the United States, much like the MOX bundles building up in La Hague's cooling ponds. Burton Richter, a Nobel laureate who leads the DOE's science panel on nuclear waste separations (and also serves on the board of Areva Enterprises), acknowledges that breeder reactors are DOE's endgame. "Everybody is in agreement that the right system ultimately results in multiple recycles in fast [breeder] reactors, so that's where things are going," Richter says. </p> <p>With visions of nuclear electricity "too cheap to meter" long gone, the case for breeder reactors has shifted from creation of new fuels to management of spent fuels. Without breeder reactors, the case for reprocessing is less than compelling. Considered in isolation, the economic arguments for and against reprocessing are a wash. Most of the arguments concerning security and terrorism, too, seem moot. But until or unless breeder reactors are commercialized that can truly burn up all the residual fissile material found in spent fuels, reprocessing will simply concentrate high-level waste in a form that's hotter and harder to handle, exchanging one nuclear waste headache for another. </p></div> <h2>About the Author</h2> <div class="bio"> <p>Contributing Editor Peter Fairley has reported for <i>IEEE Spectrum</i> from Bolivia, Beijing, and Paris.</p></div> <h2>To Probe Further</h2> <p>A recent report to address recycling of nuclear fuels, critically, is "Managing Spent Fuels in the United States: The Illogic of Reprocessing," by Frank von Hippel. It is also available online at <a href="http://www.fissilematerials.org/"> http://www.fissilematerials.org</a>. "Economic Forecast Study of the Nuclear Power Option," a report to France's Prime Minister on the economics of reprocessing, was published in July 2000: <a href="http://fire.pppl.gov/eu_fr_fission_plan.pdf"> http://fire.pppl.gov/eu_fr_fission_plan.pdf</a>.</p> <p>MIT's 2003 study, "The Future of Nuclear Power," is at <a href="http://web.mit.edu/nuclearpower">http://web.mit.edu/nuclearpower</a>. </p> <p>Greenpeace France's "Stop Plutonium" Web site is <a href="http://www.greenpeace.fr/stop-plutonium/en">http://www.greenpeace.fr/stop-plutonium/en</a>.</p> <p>The U.S. Department of Energy sent a Recycling Program Plan to Congress in May 2006: <a href="http://www.gnep.energy.gov/pdfs/snfRecyclingProgramPlanMay2006.pdf">http://www.gnep.energy.gov/pdfs/snfRecyclingProgramPlanMay2006.pdf </a>.</p> <p>Areva's La Hague Web site is <a href="http://www.cogemalahague.com/">http://www.cogemalahague.com</a>.</p><br><br><br> <div class="pageheading underline">Sidebar 1</div> <div class="sidebarcolumn"> <h2>The Terrorist Threat</h2> <p> <table class="graphic" cellspacing="0" cellpadding="0" width="10" border="0"> <tbody> <tr> <td><img class="graphic" src="http://www.spectrum.ieee.org/images/feb07/images/nucf3.jpg"> <div class="credits">IMAGE: Areva </div></td></tr> <tr> <td> <div class="caption"> <p>A police-escorted truck carries pure plutonium from La Hague to Marcoule.</p></div></td></tr></tbody></table>Heightened concerns about terrorism after 9/11 have complicated the global debate over French-style reprocessing. The de facto U.S. practice of leaving spent fuel in ponds adjacent to reactors—a tempting target for terrorists—suddenly seems more questionable than ever. But pure plutonium extracted at plants such as La Hague also could be material for dirty bombs, or even an actual atomic bomb. If a country with sophisticated facilities somehow got its hands on it, just 10 kilograms might suffice for a fission bomb. </p> <p>The image of French reprocessing took a hit on 19 February 2003, when Greenpeace found a dramatic means of spotlighting the vulnerability of the supposedly top-secret plutonium shipments between La Hague and Areva's mixed-oxide (MOX) fuel plant at Marcoule: it intercepted a convoy carrying more than 138 kg of plutonium in the center of Chalon-sur-Saône, a small city in Burgundy, and invited the French media along for the show. </p> <p>Sitting in Greenpeace's storefront bureau in Cherbourg, the regional capital 20 kilometers south of the La Hague plant, Greenpeace's Yannick Rousselet recounts the disquieting ease of the operation. "We just waited in front of La Hague, and within three or four weeks we knew everything," he says. By process of elimination, Rousselet's team identified the nondescript flatbed trailers carrying plutonium casks out of La Hague week after week. The trucks pulled out with their police escort at the same time and followed a consistent route and schedule. Stopping the convoy was hardly mission impossible: the convoy rolled into town right on time; a Greenpeace activist driving ahead slowed to a stop, and 25 more activists leaped from a van blocking the opposite lane to chain themselves to the flatbed truck. Rousselet says the stunned gendarmes chaperoning the shipment stepped out of their cars, popped their trunks, and quietly retrieved their weapons and armored jackets. </p> <p>Greenpeace hired a London-based nuclear risk analysis consultancy, Large & Associates, to put a finer point on the demonstration by assessing a series of terrorism and accident scenarios. In the worst case the consultants studied, an armed group immobilizes a plutonium convoy in a highway tunnel just south of Paris with fuel tanker trucks, opens the plutonium canisters, and then ignites the tanker fuel. In the consultant's estimation, the resulting fire and a northerly breeze would send a plutonium plume over Paris, causing a death toll as high as 4700 and necessitating the permanent relocation of much of the French capital. </p> <p>Greenpeace's maneuver made good television; however, Areva defends the safety of its shipments. It says the convoys are protected by sophisticated, secret defense systems, which remained silent for Greenpeace, because the French security forces can "differentiate between a pacifist operation and a terrorist attack." —P.F. </p><br class="clear"> </div> <div class="pageheading underline">Sidebar 2</div> <div class="sidebarcolumn"> <h2>The Prickly Economics of Reprocessing</h2> <p> <table class="graphic" cellspacing="0" cellpadding="0" width="10" border="0"> <tbody> <tr> <td><img class="graphic" src="http://www.spectrum.ieee.org/images/feb07/images/nucf4.jpg"> <div class="credits">IMAGE: Frederic Pitchal/Sygma/Corbis </div></td></tr> <tr> <td> <div class="caption"> <p>A nuclear fuel canister at La Hague: the blades facilitate air cooling of the material.</p></div></td></tr></tbody></table></p> <p>Critics of nuclear fuel reprocessing in the United States often cite its cost, hoping to offer a clean economic argument unsullied by complex issues about national security, arms control, and the environment. But comparing alternative nuclear-fuel-cycle costs is a slippery business, requiring firm long-term projections of uranium prices, estimated total costs of waste disposal procedures that have not actually been implemented yet, and a credible way of factoring in R&D expenditures covered by the military.
</p> <p>In the 1970s, uranium prices were expected to go through the roof within a few decades. But that argument fell into disfavor during the last two decades of the 20th century, when nuclear construction came to a standstill worldwide. Now, with expectations of a nuclear renaissance, uranium prices have increased by a factor of more than four since 2003. Today's economists tend to discount alarmist uranium supply scenarios. Known resources are dependent on the intensity of exploration, and uranium exploration has, until recently, been meager. What's more, because uranium fuel is but a small part of total nuclear generating costs, the industry could afford to pay higher extraction costs without pricing itself out of business.
</p> <p>Mainly for those reasons, an influential 2003 report on the future of nuclear power, done at MIT, concluded that possible depletion of fuel resources "is not a pressing reason for proceeding to reprocessing and breeding for many years to come."
</p> <p>But if economics does not vindicate reprocessing, neither does it damn it. Although credible studies have concluded that reprocessing and producing mixed-oxide (MOX) fuel is several times more costly than using fresh uranium fuel, the cost penalty is small when viewed in context. In addition, studies pricing MOX fuel often underplay the significant uncertainties inherent in their calculations. The biggest is the ultimate cost of waste disposal, because no country is actually operating a final repository. As the MIT study warns, "the uncertainty in any estimate of fuel cycle costs is extremely large."
</p> <p>Benjamin Dessus, director of the Ecotech program at France's prestigious National Center for Scientific Research, says that he has concluded economics will never settle the reprocessing debate. Eight years ago, Dessus coauthored a high-profile report on the economics of reprocessing for France's then prime minister, Lionel Jospin. It concluded that phasing out reprocessing would cut France's power costs by 1.3 percent—an answer that pleased neither side in the debate.
</p> <p>"[Jospin] requested a report on economics, and we returned a report that said economics couldn't decide it," Dessus says. "He didn't want to hear that." —P.F.</p><br class="clear"> </div></div></div> Siddharth Varadarajanhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/07721228307097170092noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-19172415.post-31877004210203167912007-03-26T06:19:00.001-07:002007-03-26T06:19:34.763-07:00Military not ready for other wars<h1>Military not ready for other wars</h1> <h2>Troops in US lack resources, government says</h2> <div id="articleBodyTop"> <div id="articleBodyImageH"><span id="articleImageH"><img title="" height="273" alt="" src="http://cache.boston.com/resize/bonzai-fba/Globe_Photo/2007/03/19/1174358790_2624/410w.jpg" width="410" border="0"></span></div> </div> <p class="byline"><span>By Ann Scott Tyson, Washington Post | </span> <span class="date">March 20, 2007</span></p> <div id="articleGraphs"> <div id="page1"> <p>WASHINGTON -- Four years after the invasion of Iraq, the high and growing demand for US troops there and in Afghanistan has left ground forces in the United States short of the training, personnel, and equipment that would be vital to fight a major ground conflict elsewhere, senior US military and government officials acknowledge. </p> <div id="articleEmbed"> <div class="embed" id="articleTools"> <div class="toolsHeader">Article Tools</div> <div class="articleToolsI"> <ul id="singlepage"> <li class="print"><a href="http://www.boston.com/news/nation/washington/articles/2007/03/20/military_not_ready_for_other_wars?mode=PF"><img height="14" alt="PRINTER FRIENDLY" src="http://cache.boston.com/bonzai-fba/File-Based_Image_Resource/tool_printer.gif" width="11" border="0"> <span class="ltext"><font color="#000066">Printer friendly</font></span></a> <li class="singlepage"><a href="http://www.boston.com/news/nation/washington/articles/2007/03/20/military_not_ready_for_other_wars?page=full"><img height="14" alt="SINGLE PAGE" src="http://cache.boston.com/bonzai-fba/File-Based_Image_Resource/tool_fullpage.gif" width="9" border="0"> <span class="ltext"><font color="#000066">Single page</font></span></a> <li class="email"><a href="javascript:openWindow('http://tools.boston.com/pass-it-on?story_url=http://www.boston.com/news/nation/washington/articles/2007/03/20/military_not_ready_for_other_wars','mailit','scrollbars,resizable,width=770,height=450');"> <img height="14" alt="E-MAIL" src="http://cache.boston.com/bonzai-fba/File-Based_Image_Resource/tool_email.gif" width="11" border="0"><span class="ltext"><font color="#000066">E-mail to a friend</font></span></a> <li class="rss_context"><a href="http://www.boston.com/news/nation?mode=rss_10"><img height="14" alt="RSS FEEDS" src="http://cache.boston.com/bonzai-fba/File-Based_Image_Resource/tool_xml.gif" width="19" border="0"><span class="ltext"> <font color="#000066">Nation RSS feed</font></span></a> <li class="rss"><a href="http://www.boston.com/tools/rss"><img height="14" alt="RSS FEEDS" src="http://cache.boston.com/bonzai-fba/File-Based_Image_Resource/tool_xml.gif" width="19" border="0"><span class="ltext"><font color="#000066"> <span class="optional">Available </span>RSS feeds</font></span></a> <li class="topemail globe"><a href="http://tools.boston.com/pass-it-on/popular"><img height="14" alt="MOST E-MAILED" src="http://cache.boston.com/bonzai-fba/File-Based_Image_Resource/tool_topemail.gif" width="14" border="0"> <span class="ltext"><font color="#000066">Most e-mailed</font></span></a> <li class="reprints"><a href="http://www.globereprints.com/"><img height="14" alt="REPRINTS & LICENSING" src="http://cache.boston.com/bonzai-fba/File-Based_Image_Resource/tool_reprints.gif" width="13" border="0"><span class="ltext"> <font color="#000066">Reprints & Licensing</font></span></a> <li class="digg"><a onclick="Digg.remoteSubmit(encodeURIComponent(location.href), 'Military not ready for other wars', 'WASHINGTON -- Four years after the invasion of Iraq, the high and growing demand for US troops there and in Afghanistan has left ground forces in the United States short of the training, personnel, and equipment that would be vital to fight a major ground conflict elsewhere, senior US military and government officials acknowledge.', ''); 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return false;" href="http://del.icio.us/post"> <img title="Tag with Del.icio.us" height="13" alt="Tag with Del.icio.us" src="http://cache.boston.com/bonzai-fba/File-Based_Image_Resource/dingbat_delicious_icon.gif" width="13" vspace="1" border="0"></a> <a onclick="window.open('http://del.icio.us/post?v=4&partner=bos&noui&jump=close&url='+encodeURIComponent(location.href)+'&title='+encodeURIComponent(document.title),'delicious','toolbar=no,width=700,height=400'); return false;" href="http://del.icio.us/post"> <span class="ltext"><font color="#000066">Save this article</font></span></a> <li class="deliciousBrand"><span style="PADDING-LEFT: 35px">powered by <a href="http://del.icio.us/about/"><span class="ltext" style="PADDING-LEFT: 0px"><font color="#000066">Del.icio.us<span></span></font></span></a></span> </li></li></li></li></li></li></li></li></li></li></li></ul></div></div> <div class="embed" id="articleMoreLinks"> <div id="articleMoreLinksI"> <div class="doubleline"></div> <div class="morelinksNews"> <div class="morelinksHeader">More:</div> <ul> <li class="special"><a href="http://www.boston.com/news/globe/nation"><font color="#000066">Globe Nation stories</font></a> <span class="pipe">|</span> <li class="special"><a href="http://www.boston.com/news/nation"><font color="#000066">Latest national news</font></a> <span class="pipe">|</span> <li><a href="http://www.boston.com/news/globe/"><font color="#000066">Globe front page</font></a> <span class="pipe">|</span> <li><a href="http://www.boston.com/"><font color="#000066">Boston.com</font></a> </li></li></li></li></ul></div> <div class="morelinksEmail"> <ul><span class="morelinksHeader"><strong>Sign up for:</strong></span> <li><a href="http://www.boston.com/help/email/headlines/"><font color="#000066">Globe Headlines e-mail</font></a> <span class="pipe">|</span> <li><a href="http://www.boston.com/help/email/breaking_news/"><font color="#000066">Breaking News Alerts</font></a> </li></li></ul></div></div></div></div> <p>More troubling, the officials say, is that it will take years for the Army and Marine Corps to recover from what some officials privately have called a "death spiral," in which the ever-more-rapid pace of war-zone rotations has consumed 40 percent of their total gear, wearied troops, and left no time to train to fight anything other than the insurgencies now at hand. </p> <p>The risk to the nation is serious and deepening, senior officers warn, because the US military now lacks a large strategic reserve of ground troops ready to respond quickly and decisively to potential foreign crises, whether the internal collapse of Pakistan, a conflict with Iran, or an outbreak of war on the Korean Peninsula. Air and naval power can only go so far in compensating for infantry, artillery, and other land forces, they said. An immediate concern is that critical Army overseas equipment stocks for use in another conflict have been depleted by the recent troop increases in Iraq, they said. </p> <p>"We have a strategy right now that is outstripping the means to execute it," General Peter Schoomaker, Army chief of staff, testified before the Senate Armed Services Committee on Thursday.</p> <p>The Army's vice chief of staff, General Richard Cody, described as "stark" the level of readiness of Army units in the United States, which would be called on if another war breaks out. "The readiness continues to decline of our next-to-deploy forces," Cody told the House Armed Services Committee's readiness panel last week. "And those forces, by the way, are . . .also your strategic reserve." </p> <p>General Peter Pace, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, was asked last month by a House panel whether he was comfortable with the preparedness of Army units in the United States. He stated simply: "No . . . I am not comfortable." </p> <p>"You take a lap around the globe -- you could start any place: Afghanistan, Iran, Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Yemen, Somalia, Sudan, Venezuela, Colombia, Philippines, Malaysia, Indonesia, North Korea, back around to Pakistan, and I probably missed a few. There's no dearth of challenges out there for our armed forces," Pace warned in his testimony. He said the nation faces increased risk because of shortfalls in troops, equipment and training. </p> <p>Pace said the unexpected demand for more troops in Iraq -- from the 10 brigades that commanders projected last year they would need by the end of 2006, to the 20 brigades scheduled to be there by June -- prompted him to recommend permanently adding 92,000 troops to the Army and Marine Corps, saying it would "make a large difference in our ability to be prepared for unforeseen contingencies." </p></div> <div id="page2"> <p>Indeed, the recent increase of more than 32,000 US troops in Iraq and Afghanistan has pushed already severe readiness problems to what some officials and lawmakers consider a crisis point. Schoomaker said last week that sustaining the troop increase in Iraq beyond August would be "a challenge." The Marines' commandant, General James Conway, expressed concern to defense reporters last week that it would bring the Marine Corps "right on the margin" of breaking the minimum time at home for Marines between combat tours. US commanders in Iraq say they may need to keep troop levels elevated into early 2008. </p> <p>The troop increase has also created an acute shortfall in the Army's equipment stored overseas -- known as "prepositioned stock" -- which would be critical to outfit US combat forces quickly should another conflict erupt, officials said. </p> <p>The Army should have five full combat brigades' worth of such equipment: two stocks in Kuwait, one in South Korea, and two aboard ships in Guam and at the Diego Garcia base in the Indian Ocean. But the Army had to empty the afloat stocks to support the troop increase in Iraq, and the Kuwait stocks are being used as units rotate in and out of the country. Only the South Korea stock is close to complete, according to military and government officials. </p> <p>"Without the prepositioned stocks, we would not have been able to meet the surge requirement," Schoomaker said. "It will take us two years to rebuild those stocks. That's part of my concern about our strategic depth." </p> <p>"The status of our Army prepositioned stock . . . is bothersome," Cody said last week.</p> <p>Democratic and Republican lawmakers who received classified briefings last week on the stocks and overall Army readiness voiced alarm.</p> <p>"I'm deeply concerned," said Representative Ike Skelton, Democrat of Missouri and chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, who last week asked the Congressional Budget Office and the Government Accountability Office to investigate the stocks "as a matter of vital importance to national defense." </p> <p>Representative Solomon Ortiz, Democrat of Texas and chairman of the committee's readiness panel, said: "I have seen the classified-only readiness reports. And based on those reports, I believe that we as a nation are at risk of major failure, should our Army be called to deploy to an emerging threat." <img class="storyend" height="8" alt="" src="http://cache.boston.com/bonzai-fba/File-Based_Image_Resource/dingbat_story_end_icon.gif" width="6" border="0"></p><br clear="all"></div></div> Siddharth Varadarajanhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/07721228307097170092noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-19172415.post-23503369262449657082007-02-20T05:23:00.001-08:002007-02-20T05:23:25.479-08:00El Baradei interview on Iran<div class="ft-story-header"> <h2>FT interview: Mohamed ElBaradei</h2> <p>By Daniel Dombey</p> <p>Published: February 19 2007 21:12 | Last updated: February 19 2007 21:12</p></div> <div class="ft-story-body"> <p>On Monday, the Financial Times talked to Mohamed ElBaradei, head of the International Atomic Energy Agency ahead of a crucial week in the dispute over Iran's nuclear programme. </p> <p>A UN Security Council resolution passed last December calls on Iran to suspend uranium enrichment – which can produce both nuclear fuel and weapons grade material – by Wednesday February 21, the date that Mr ElBaradei is due to produce a report on Terhan's compliance with the Security Council's demands. </p> <div class="ad-placeholder ad-mpusky" id="ad-placeholder-mpusky"></div> <p>On Tuesday he is scheduled to meet Ali Larijani, Iran's chief nuclear negotiator. Barring a last minute breakthrough, the dispute will then return to the UN, where the US will push for additional sanctions.</p> <p>In his 40-minute interview with the FT, Mr ElBaradei made clear his doubts both about calls for more sanctions and the international community's emphasis on suspending enrichment. He says that it is far more important to dissuade Iran from pursuing enrichment on an industrial scale – a development that could be a mere six months away – since the country has already acquired considerable technical knowledge from enriching uranium in a "research and development" facility. </p> <p>This is a transcript of his conversation with the FT.</p> <p><span class="bodystrong"><strong>The importance of negotiations:</strong></span></p> <p><span class="bodystrong"><strong>FT:</strong></span> What hopes do you have that the Iran nuclear dispute will be resolved in a reasonable time period?</p> <p><span class="bodystrong"><strong>ElBaradei:</strong></span> I'm still quite hopeful because I don't see any other option, quite frankly. How long will it take to convince all the parties to go back to the negotiating table is a matter of speculation. I know however for sure that even if you go for a year or two for retaliation and counter-retaliation and more sanctions it will get worse for everybody, Iran of course, but also all other parts of the international community, specifically, in the Middle East which simply cannot afford an additional escalation which would lead to militancy and increase terrorism. So if we can avoid going through this painful process, knowing that it can never resolve the issue, and try to resolve the process going back to negotiation, that's obviously in the interest of everybody. Both sides understand that. Both sides understand that there's no other way except than to go to negotiation. It's just a question of how to get both sides to the negotiating table while saving face. It really is about saving face… </p> <p>There's a lot of efforts by everybody trying to do that right now, a lot of it is really, more [of a] drafting process, more how to present a package in a balanced way and whereby the Iranians would feel that they have not lost face and the international community would feel that their requirements had been satisfied. I came up with this idea of double, simultaneous suspension, a time out. </p> <p><span class="bodystrong"><strong>FT:</strong></span> Which would be simultaneous rather than sequential?</p> <p><span class="bodystrong"><strong>ElBaradei:</strong></span> Correct, and that would require some sort of road map to agree on that, or a timeline if you like, that Iran will take a time out from its enrichment activities as a confidence building measure. That obviously does not impact on its right because nobody is questioning its right and this is a concern of Iran that this might compromise the right. I don't think anybody is questioning the right, it's about timing and modalities of implementing fully this right in light of the confidence deficit created. And the Security Council made clear that if Iran does suspend they are ready to suspend [sanctions]. </p> <p><span class="bodystrong"><strong>FT:</strong></span> Although that was sequential, wasn't it?</p> <p><span class="bodystrong"><strong>ElBaradei: </strong></span>Yes, but really, you can say sequential a day after, it doesn't really matter if you agree in advance how this will happen, it can be simultaneous. It can even be the same day, somebody will look at it as sequential, others can look at it as simultaneous. </p> <p>As I said, it is not a major hurdle to get over that, because the stakes are just too high right now in my view to go towards a confrontation route. Sanctions were all right because the international community wanted to send a message that we are concerned and they did that, but… everybody knows that sanctions are not going to resolve the issue in and of itself. </p> <p><span class="bodystrong"><strong>Iran's failure to comply with UN demands</strong></span></p> <p><span class="bodystrong"><strong>FT: </strong></span>People expect on Wednesday you will report that Iran has not suspended because there's no sign that Iran has suspended. That's the clear expectation.</p> <p><span class="bodystrong"><strong>ElBaradei: </strong></span>Yes.</p> <p><span class="bodystrong"><strong>FT: </strong></span>So after your report there will obviously more pressure from the US to push for more sanctions. Do you think that it will be ill advised to push for more sanctions at the Security Council straight away? </p> <p><span class="bodystrong"><strong>ElBaradei:</strong></span> Obviously, short of a major change of heart, I would report that Iran has not complied with the demand of the international community to suspend. I'm going to see Mr Larijani tomorrow, who's coming to see me in Vienna. And I will continue to make a last ditch effort to try to convince them that it is in their interest to find a way to go into negotiations. If it doesn't happen and I don't see that it is going to happen overnight, I will have to report negatively. </p> <p>The Security Council resolution, the previous one, 1737 [agreed in December], indicated that if Iran did not comply they will take additional measures. It's a policy judgment, I do not want to replace myself for the Security Council's judgment, but I know for sure that even with additional sanctions, if they were to go for additional sanctions, they would still, in parallel, look for ways to get Iran to the negotiating table and in compliance with the concern of the international community that the programme is not a peaceful programme. Really the whole thing is about confidence building. </p> <p><span class="bodystrong"><strong>Sanctions</strong></span></p> <p><span class="bodystrong"><strong>FT: </strong></span>You have have real concerns about sanctions. If they begin to bite do you think they are counter productive?</p> <p><span class="bodystrong"><strong>ElBaradei: </strong></span>I have major concerns about relying on sanctions alone. Our experience without exception is that sanctions alone do not work and in most cases radicalise the regime and hurt the people who are not supposed to be hurt. So I have a major concern not about sanctions per se but sanctions alone. And sanctions have to be coupled at all time with incentives and a real search for a compromise based on face saving, based on respect. </p> <p>I mean we always forget this word respect. A lot of the problems we face, fifty per cent at least if not more, is psychological. Substance is important, but fifty per cent of it is how you approach it, how you reach out to people, how you understand where they're coming from. So I will continue to say: 'Yes, it is your prerogative to apply sanctions but sanctions alone will not do it and you need to invest as much in trying to find a solution through negotiation.'" </p> <p><span class="bodystrong"><strong>The tensions between Iran and the US</strong></span></p> <p><span class="bodystrong"><strong>FT:</strong></span> Do you think both sides have invested inadequately in negotiations?</p> <p><span class="bodystrong"><strong>ElBaradei: </strong></span>I think so. I've been on the record for saying for many years that the Iranian issue will only be resolved when the US takes a decision to engage Iran directly… The nuclear issue is the tip of the iceberg, it masks a lot of grievances, security grievances, competition for power in the Middle East, economic issues, sanctions, it has to do with human rights, support for extremist groups, there are a lot of other issues that need to be resolved. Iran could be very helpful as a stabilising force in the Middle East. The US could be very helpful in providing the security assurances that obviously lie at the heart of some of the Iranian activities. </p> <p><span class="bodystrong"><strong>Iran's mastering of nuclear technology and the next steps</strong></span></p> <p><span class="bodystrong"><strong>ElBaradei:</strong></span> Even if the Iranian programme is for peaceful purposes there is no question that at the back of their minds this is a deterrent, that it has a deterrence value as it were. So we need to understand that. I look at things also from the global security perspective. My worry primarily is that if Iran were to be pushed out of the regime, then we have another repeat of North Korea. My worry primarily [is about] if Iran were to start chipping away at an inspection authority or ability to do any inspection. And I start to worry [about] if Iran were to develop industrial capability before we at least clarify all these outstanding issues about the history and the nature of the programme. </p> <p>These are the three important issues for me from a non-proliferation point of view, much more important for me than Iran acquiring the knowledge [of how to enrich uranium]. Because even if that was relevant six months ago it is not relevant today because Iran has been running these centrifuges for at least six months. </p> <p>Yes, they might acquire a little bit more, perfecting the knowledge, but to aim at denying a country knowledge is almost impossible, to say the least. And there's a big difference between acquiring the knowledge for enrichment and developing a bomb. It is almost impossible for a country to, particularly because this right is quoted under the NPT [nuclear non-proliferation treaty], and the difference between acquiring knowledge and having a bomb is at least five to ten years away. And that's why I said the intelligence, the British, intelligence, the American intelligence, is saying that Iran is still years, five to ten years away from developing a weapon. </p> <p>We need, what is really important is to have, a proper diagnosis of the problem, assess the problem properly. My concern is that there has been a lot of hype about the Iranian issue because you need to assess it properly and then you need to address it properly, afterwards. </p> <p><span class="bodystrong"><strong>Military action</strong></span></p> <p><span class="bodystrong"><strong>ElBaradei: </strong></span>What you see right now, all this talk about the use of force, it's not only counter productive but in fact does not in any way help resolve the issue. Imagine what a regime would feel if they hear that force will be used against them, in additional to being called names, in addition to talk about regime change in the past. Even if they were not going to develop a nuclear weapon today, this would be a sure recipe for them to go down that route. </p> <p><span class="bodystrong"><strong>FT:</strong></span> And how worried are you that the US or Israel might carry out military action, an air strike?</p> <p><span class="bodystrong"><strong>ElBaradei:</strong></span> I of course cannot give hundred per cent guarantees that this will not happen because you read about this all the time. I don't know whether it is hype or if there is some kernel of truth to it. </p> <p>I know for sure that this would be catastrophic, counterproductive, whatever you called it because for a variety of reasons. </p> <p>One, I know that what we see in Iran right now is not the industrial capacity you can [use to develop a] bomb. You have small R&D at the knowledge level… to enrich uranium. And I said a hundred times you cannot bomb knowledge. </p> <p>So there is not really much to bomb. And if you [do] then [you] turn the Iranian drive or you put it in high gear for developing a nuclear weapon. We know that if you jolt a country's pride, all the factions, right, left and centre will get together and try to accelerate a programme to develop a nuclear weapon to defend themselves. </p> <p>That's classic strategic thinking in any country, whether it's a democracy, a theocracy, whatever… There is a fundamental choice people need to make, which is either you understand that there is a limit to military power, that these issues mask a sense of insecurity or even competition for dominance or influence but force is not the appropriate means to address these issues. Or [you] go for the military option and then either you'll have a repeat of North Korea or you have a repeat of Iraq and these are not our greatest achievements as civilised human beings. </p> <p><span class="bodystrong"><strong>Iran's current nuclear capacity</strong></span></p> <p><span class="bodystrong"><strong>FT:</strong></span> You talk about them having a small R&D programme. There's a certain amount of cloudiness about where they are. We know that they have two 164 centrifuge cascades above ground in the "R&D" facility at Natanz. They have also said but sometimes denied that they have two further 164 centrifuge cascades below ground in in Natanz. Is that where they are at the moment? </p> <p><span class="bodystrong"><strong>ElBaradei: </strong></span>I think that's where they are at the moment. I think they probably even have one, I'm not sure they've even installed the second one, so it is still just one, so it is still small scale,so whatever they have, what we have seen today, is not the kind of capacity that would enable them to make bombs. </p> <p><span class="bodystrong"><strong>FT:</strong></span> So have the two [cascades of centrifuges] above ground been functioning smoothly at all?</p> <p><span class="bodystrong"><strong>ElBaradei: </strong></span>They have been functioning, I think they have been functioning, they have been able to run them simultaneously, and that also shows as I said that they acquire the knowledge. </p> <p><span class="bodystrong"><strong>The UN demands for suspension of uranium enrichment</strong></span></p> <p><span class="bodystrong"><strong>ElBaradei: </strong></span>The idea… to continue to focus only on the suspension in my view is not the right approach. You can focus on suspension because it is a confidence building measure but… if I look at it from a weapons perspective there are much more important issues to me than the suspension of this. </p> <p>The ideal situation is to make sure that there is no industrial capacity, that there is full inspection, because you are asking me how much do they have underground, well I can tell you, but we are not implementing the Additional Protocol [of the NPT], so I don't have spot checks and I do not have the confidence I would have with the Additional Protocol. </p> <p><span class="bodystrong"><strong>FT: </strong></span>When did the inspectors last visit?</p> <p><span class="bodystrong"><strong>ElBaradei: </strong></span>It was last week [when] we were there. I mean the inspection is going smoothly insofar as that I think. It gives us additional authority, it's not just the spot checks. I mean spot checks are not that important, I mean frankly you go after a week, you see what's happened. But what happens is that it gives us [more insight into] R&D. For example [under the additional protocol, currently not applied by Iran, we have] authority to see manufacturing of equipment, which for now we are not able to see. Are they manufacturing more equipment to install later on, that we are not able to see at the moment. </p> <p><span class="bodystrong"><strong>Top priorities</strong></span></p> <p><span class="bodystrong"><strong>ElBaradei:</strong></span> My three priorities as I said are [for] Iran not to go to industrial capacity until the issues are settled, confidence is built, we need full inspection, involving additional protocol, and at all costs I would like to see Iran not moving out of the [treaty based non-proliferation] system. That would set a terrible precedent and I do not want them to come back in a couple of years and say: 'Good morning gentlemen, we have nuclear weapons.' </p> <p><span class="bodystrong"><strong>The prospects of Iran achieving industrial scale enrichment.</strong></span></p> <p><span class="bodystrong"><strong>FT: </strong></span>If you define industrial capacity as a cascade of 3,000 centrifuges or more, since if that was fully functioning it would take a year to get enough fissile material for a bomb, how far away do you think they are at the current stage of progress? </p> <p><span class="bodystrong"><strong>ElBaradei: </strong></span>I think they are still far away</p> <p><span class="bodystrong"><strong>FT:</strong></span> A year, two years?</p> <p><span class="bodystrong"><strong>ElBaradei: </strong></span>It's difficult, I really like not to take numbers, to speculate, but away from what, from developing the three thousand [centrifuges]?</p> <p><span class="bodystrong"><strong>FT: </strong></span>From getting three thousand functioning smoothly.</p> <p><span class="bodystrong"><strong>ElBaradei: </strong></span>I don't know, it could be a year, it could be six months. It could be a year, but we need to remember but as long as even they have 3,000 [centrifuges], as long as these 3,000 are under [NPT] safeguards, they cannot go beyond five per cent, people forget that… it's really a risk assessment more of tomorrow more than it is of today… </p> <p><span class="bodystrong"><strong>The choices ahead</strong></span></p> <p><span class="bodystrong"><strong>ElBaradei: </strong></span>I don't judge intention. It's very difficult to judge. And you know it very much on which kind of environment you create in the region. If you create an environment in which Iran feels isolated, in which Iran is subject to further sanctions, then some of these worst case scenarios could take place, because then you would put the hard liners in the driver's seat, you would make the country feel more and more insecure and then some of these scenarios could happen. </p> <p>If there is another narrative, based on engagement, based on dialogue, based on reconciling differences, based on stabilising Iraq, stabilising Lebanon, opening up a trade agreement with the Iranians based on providing [them] with nuclear technology, western technology, as the six party offer [tabled last year by EU foreign policy chief Javier Solana on behalf of the UK, France, Germany, the US, China and Russia] promises, then this progression could be quite different, because first of all Iran would not necessarily fear that they would be attacked. </p> <p><span class="bodystrong"><strong>FT </strong></span>So the US needs to give security guarantees?</p> <p><span class="bodystrong"><strong>ElBaradei: </strong></span>Oh yes, absolutely, then we should also stop calling names and threaten regime change. And of course if we give them all the technology they need then of course it's costly anyway [to pursue their own uranium enrichment], even if they wanted to. However, we need to explore all these options… </p> <p>Iran sees enrichment.. sooner or later as a strategic goal because they feel that this will bring them power, prestige and influence. They feel that this will bring them into the company of some of the large and influential [states], the 12, 13 countries with enrichment processing, even if they don't have a weapon, and to change that perception you need to then to look into the whole regional and global security position, because unfortunately a lot of that is true. A nuclear capability is a nuclear deterrent in many ways… </p> <p>When you see here in the UK the programme for modernising Trident, which basically gets the UK far into the 21st century with a nuclear deterrent, it is difficult then for us to turn around and tell everybody else that nuclear deterrents are really no good for you, it does not increase your security, because all the weapon states, without exception, are either modernising, or thinking about developing new weapons not only for deterrence purpose, but actually usable [ones]. Statements have been made during the last couple of years about possible actual use, such as mini-nukes, bunker buster. So the environment is do as I say not do as I say and that is not sustainable. </p> <p><span class="bodystrong"><strong>What Iran needs to begin negotiations</strong></span></p> <p><span class="bodystrong"><strong>FT: </strong></span>Your 'time out' idea is deliberately vague. Would it be enough for the Iranians to suspend enrichment activities since the resolution calls on them to do more?</p> <p><span class="bodystrong"><strong>ElBaradei: </strong></span>I think the resolution talks about if they suspend enrichment-related activities, [then] they will suspend sanctions. They ask them to do a host of other things, but suspension of sanctions is linked to the enrichment. And yes, there is a part of constructive ambiguity because I would like to leave people room for manoeuvre to negotiate the details. </p> <p>I cannot replace myself for governments, it is governments to negotiate the details, but it is encouraging that I have not seen anyone so far reject the idea. Everyone so far is saying we like this but we want to add this or that or the other. I still think it's very much an idea that's alive and kicking. President Putin recently came in support of it, the Germans, the French said that this mutual suspension is a good idea. The Americans also did not reject it so far although they said that the Security Council resolution is clear. That's fine, but somebody needs to take it and translate it into a working solution. </p> <p><span class="bodystrong"><strong>FT:</strong></span> Have you seen any solid or substantial response from the Iranians? I know that they didn't make a big noise on Revolution Day [which Iran celebrates on11 February]. </p> <p><span class="bodystrong"><strong>ElBaradei: </strong></span>That was frankly quite positive, because all the expectations were that they were going to announce that they were going to go for the 3,000 centrifuges and maybe some other stuff. </p> <p>They did not do that and I think the president [Mahmoud Ahmadi-Nejad] said he would make that announcement in April. That to me is an effort to reach out. It's a moderate reaction, frankly. So we still have this window of opportunity, but the window of opportunity is frankly until our board meets. </p> <p>Even if my report is coming out this week, I can still add and reverse judgements there until the 6th of March. So we have a window that is not very long, but still I would still like to see something happening before the board because once I go to the board then you go into this sort of autopilot process, the board would react, the Security Council would react, it then makes things much more difficult. </p> <p><span class="bodystrong"><strong>The US</strong></span></p> <p><span class="bodystrong"><strong>FT: </strong></span>How constructive has the US been?</p> <p><span class="bodystrong"><strong>ElBaradei: </strong></span>The US has been helpful in joining the six party offer. That took a lot of time and was a step in the right direction. I still hope that eventually the IS will be able to get into direct contact with Iran about the regional issues and not only the nuclear issue because they are very much linked, the connection between the regional issue and the nuclear issue are very much linked because they are all about security, we should not delude ourselves about that. </p> <p>The US building up of military force in the Gulf, I think it's not only [because of] the nuclear issue, it's.. Iraq, it's… Afghanistan, Gulf protection, we have seen that over time, people flexing muscles, and the Iranians have been making parades. </p> <p>But flexing muscles and showing how much force you have, it's part of the game, but… the issues at hand are not going to be resolved by shows of force and frankly a lot of issues we are facing in the Middle East today are absolutely immune to any resolution through the use of force… </p> <p>I am all for dialogue, as I am all from negotiation, not because this is a soft approach, but I know if you engage people you moderate their behaviour. If you isolate them you radicalise them. That's why I always say if you have a problem sit and talk it over but if you continue to think that dialogue is the icing on the cake and I will only do it if people are behaving well you might have to wait for very long. </p> <p><span class="bodystrong"><strong>North Korea</strong></span></p> <p><span class="bodystrong"><strong>FT: </strong></span>Some people see the agreement on North Korea as a re-enactment of the Agreed Framework [the 1994 nuclear deal between the US and Pyongyang] but this time North Korea had nuclear weapons. So was it a mistake for the US to walk away? </p> <p><span class="bodystrong"><strong>ElBaradei: </strong></span>I leave it to the US government and the public to judge that. People refer to this agreement as the son of the Agreed Framework. Hopeful, it's a legitimate son, hopefully it will allow us to go forward. I have a lot on my plate for me now, while I'm still doing this job, to reminisce and say what we have done wrong. </p> <p>We have done a lot of things wrong on this and many issues but the important thing is to focus on the future. I think this is a step in the right direction. It is not the ideal solution. Korea should not have had nuclear weapons. We have mismanaged nuclear North Korea to the point where they have a nuclear weapon so that's why I say we do not want a repeat of it in Iran… </p> <p>And it is not ideal because we are going to deal [with] inspection in an incremental way, but the world is not black and white, as long as we are talking and not bombing each other, I think that is positive. </p> <p></p></div> <p class="copyright"><a href="http://www.ft.com/servicestools/help/copyright"><font color="#003399">Copyright</font></a> The Financial Times Limited 2007<br clear="all"><br>-- <br>Siddharth Varadarajan<br>Associate Editor <br>The Hindu<br>I.N.S. Building, Rafi Marg<br>New Delhi - 1<br><br>Telephone: +91-11-2371-5426<br>Fax: +91-11-2371-8158<br>Mobile: +91-98111-60260<br><br>The Hindu: <a href="http://www.thehindu.com">http://www.thehindu.com </a><br>My personal website: <a href="http://svaradarajan.blogspot.com">http://svaradarajan.blogspot.com</a> </p> Siddharth Varadarajanhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/07721228307097170092noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-19172415.post-3271306671226687722006-10-31T04:36:00.001-08:002006-10-31T04:36:47.651-08:00US seeking favorable development of Korean nuclear issue <br><font face="sans-serif" size="4"><b><i>US seeking favorable development of Korean nuclear issue </i></b></font> <br><font face="sans-serif" size="2"><i> People's Daily </i> </font> <br> Oct 30, 2006<br> <br><font face="sans-serif" size="2">The nuclear test conducted by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) is a shift from secrecy to openness for the country on its possession of nuclear arms. Superficially, the nuclear test is of some concern to the United States, but it is quite possible that the United States may be the biggest beneficiary of the DPRK test. </font> <br> <br><font face="sans-serif" size="2">Nuclear non-proliferation is not the US' goal </font> <br> <br><font face="sans-serif" size="2">In the US national security strategy, the prevention of nuclear proliferation is simply a way to ensure national security. The US is not absolutely against nuclear proliferation; its possession of nuclear weapons is proof of this. It benefits from international cooperation in developing its own nuclear weapons. Sharing its nuclear knowledge is a form of proliferation. The Manhattan Project, for instance, was a joint nuclear research program between the US, Britain and Canada and the atomic bomb was partially built with the help of these wartime allies. Britain continued to research nuclear weapons and Canada did not. The United States' missile defense project with Japan is another such project to share nuclear knowledge. This is nuclear knowledge proliferation; the key is with whom it is shared. </font> <br> <br><font face="sans-serif" size="2">The United States has no lingering points of contention with Britain and France over the development of their nuclear program, because it believes that western democratic countries, even with nuclear weapons, pose no danger to US security. The US has also accepted the fact that Israel has nuclear weapons, though Israel has refused to confirm or deny this. If Israel does in fact have nuclear weapons, this will presumably be a deterrence to attack from other countries in the region. This would be a boon for the US too as political and military pressures could be shared, increasing the security of the United States. </font> <br> <br><font face="sans-serif" size="2">After the eastern democratic nation of India tested nuclear weapons, the US quickly realized that imposing sanctions was not the best direction to take. It chose instead to find ways to encourage India to be a responsible nuclear power and to help India develop into one of the economic superpowers of the 21st century. It even wanted to develop a civilian nuclear power program with India. This was in violation of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. </font> <br> <br><font face="sans-serif" size="2">India established a nuclear program not to defend against or attack the US, Russia, Britain, China, France or even Pakistan. India has three to seven times the amount of conventional weapons that Pakistan has. It is Pakistan that needs nuclear weapons. It is clear that the United States' deliberate violation of the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty was a move to contain other nations. US assistance to India is a kind of nuclear proliferation, vertical proliferation. </font> <br> <br><font face="sans-serif" size="2">This clearly indicates that nuclear non-proliferation is not America's strategic objective. Its strategic goal is national security. The US helped India to help curb the rise of autocratic nations. As long as the US needs anti-terrorism support, the US will keep Pakistan on side as a non-NATO ally and give it billions of dollars of support. It no longer worries about the impact of a nuclear Pakistan on the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. It will not concern itself with the legitimacy of the Pakistani government, or investigate the legal liabilities of Abdul Qadeer Khan, the father of the Pakistani atomic bomb. </font> <br> <br><font face="sans-serif" size="2">In America's eyes, nuclear proliferation is classified into the acceptable and the unacceptable. The former benefits US security, the latter does not. When US allies break or bend nuclear rules, they are not opposed. When its rivals have nuclear weapons, the US takes a pragmatic approach. When nations not allied to the US have nuclear arms, the US faces reality and gradually grows to value its relationship with those other countries, ultimately trying to incorporate them into its global strategy. </font> <br> <br><font face="sans-serif" size="2">US seeks advantageous position in region </font> <br> <br><font face="sans-serif" size="2">It is important to understanding the United States' long-term utilitarian attitude toward non-proliferation, which is quite different to China's staunch opposition to any form of nuclear proliferation. China needs to grasp the US's agenda in the DPRK following nuclear testing and predict the possible evolution of US policy on the Korean Peninsula. </font> <br> <br><font face="sans-serif" size="2">The United States has had to register its objection to the DPRK's nuclear test to be politically correct. China perceives this as part of the US' overall strategy in the region. The US has been monitoring the DPRK"s nuclear development for a long time and suspected DPRK of having nuclear weapons as early as a decade ago. It was fully prepared for the DPRK to take this step, and may already be resigned to the DPRK becoming a nuclear power. </font> <br> <br><font face="sans-serif" size="2">The United States abandoned talks with DPRK at the end of last year. The US imposed economic sanctions on the DPRK and found reasons for the DPRK to be excluded from Six-Party talks. In the meantime, it asked China to share the responsibility of a nuclear DPRK, despite the fact that DPRK claims it was pressure from the US that forced it to develop nuclear weapons. Considering the difficulty of the mission, the requests of the United States are bound to drive a wedge between China and North Korea. The Bush administration's sanctions have caused the DPRK to believe that talks with the US have become impossible. The US is remolding North Korea's foreign policy by taking positive measures to induce the DPRK to conduct nuclear tests, imposing sanctions under the multilateral framework of the UN and weakening China's influence on North Korea. </font> <br> <br><font face="sans-serif" size="2">The United States is also making strategic use of Japan and South Korea in the Korean nuclear issue. In recent years, the relationship between the United States and South Korea has weakened. South Korea insists on its Sunshine Policy for North Korea. South Korean people are more and more dissatisfied about the United States over the issue. The DPRK nuclear test will isolate the two neighboring countries, which is beneficial the US. </font> <br> <br><font face="sans-serif" size="2">The next president must adjust policy on DPRK </font> <br> <br><font face="sans-serif" size="2">America is confident that North Korea would not forfeit its nuclear arms and knows that a war is not a political possibility. It has to resolve the issue peaceful means, but needs to ensure the DPRK becomes a responsible nuclear state. North Korea claims it will not be the first to use nuclear weapons, that it will not sell or proliferate nuclear weapons or technology and that it is not involved in international terrorist activities. </font> <br> <br><font face="sans-serif" size="2">The UN Security Council adopted Resolution 1718 to impose sanctions on DPRK. As long as the DPRK guarantees its nuclear weapons are only for self-defense purpose, it will have no trouble with the US, at least until the next President of the United States is sworn in. </font> <br> <br><font face="sans-serif" size="2">The US-led war in Iraq and the sanctions the Bush administration has imposed on the DPRK have affected North Korea's awareness of security; relations between the two countries have seriously deteriorated. Hopefully the next president of the United States will adjust its policy and hold talks with the DPRK. </font> <br> <br><font face="sans-serif" size="2">North Korea has boosted its confidence in terms of security and will be more willing to interact with the US, as it is still being isolated by the broader international community. This is North Korea's position now but US will ultimately lift the sanctions it has imposed on the DPRK. The US will seek favorable development in the regional situation. </font> <br> <br><font face="sans-serif" size="2">By People's Daily Online </font><br><font face="sans-serif" size="2"><br></font> Siddharth Varadarajanhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/07721228307097170092noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-19172415.post-1157642023688359522006-09-07T08:13:00.000-07:002006-09-07T08:13:50.443-07:00Containment with Chinese Characteristics<span style="font-size:0;"></span><div><div style="MARGIN: 0.5em"><table cellspacing="0" cellpadding="0" width="100%" border="0"><tbody><tr><td><span style="font-size:0;">ontainment with Chinese Characteristics</span></td></tr><tr><td><span style="font-size:0;">Beijing Hedges against the Rise of India </span></td></tr><tr><td><span style="font-size:0;">By Christopher Griffin</span></td></tr><tr><td><span style="font-size:0;">Posted: Thursday, September 7, 2006</span></td></tr><tr><td><img height="5" src="http://beta.blogger.com/" width="1" border="0" /></td></tr><tr><td><span style="font-size:0;">ASIAN OUTLOOK</span> </td></tr><tr><td><span style="font-size:0;">AEI Online </span></td></tr><tr><td><span style="font-size:0;">Publication Date: September 7, 2006</span></td></tr><tr><td><img height="10" src="http://beta.blogger.com/" width="1" border="0" /></td></tr><tr><td><span style="font-size:0;"><p><em><a title="Containment with Chinese Characteristics" style="TEXT-DECORATION: none"><img alt="Asian Outlook" src="http://beta.blogger.com/" align="left" border="0" /><img alt="Download file" src="http://beta.blogger.com/" border="0" /> <strong>This <em>Asian</em> <em>Outlook</em> is available here as an Adobe Acrobat PDF.</strong></a></em></p><p><em>Although China and India have announced that their relationship is important enough to "reshape the world,"[1] Beijing views its increasingly important ties with Delhi as a means to manage India's growing strength. China has combined traditional strategic balancing and diplomatic engagement in an effort to set its own terms for India's emergence as a great power. Without American support, India is at risk of being boxed in by Beijing's containment strategy. </em></p><p>In an impressive display of whirlwind diplomacy, China and India have just negotiated a series of major agreements: a strategic partnership in May 2005, a memorandum on energy cooperation in January 2006, and a memorandum of understanding on military relations in May 2006. Chinese observers point to these agreements as proof that Beijing and Delhi refuse "to become sacrifices of contention between big powers" and that "neither of them has seen the growth of the other side as a threat but, instead, as a development opportunity for itself."[2] </p><p>But all is not as it seems in Asia. Indeed, the more one follows Sino-Indian relations, the more it appears that Beijing has ripped a page from what it perceives as the U.S. playbook for containing a rising power. The <em>People's Daily</em> recently summarized U.S. policy toward China:</p><blockquote style="MARGIN-TOP: 0px; MARGIN-BOTTOM: 0px"><p dir="ltr" style="MARGIN-RIGHT: 0px">There have been two tendencies in the United States in the formulation of its China policy, one holding China as a potential rival that must be contained on all sides; the other believing China's momentum is irreversible. . . . [It must therefore] be engaged to play a "responsible" and "constructive" role. Washington's China policy in recent years has turned out a combination of the two, while its [recent] acts are all-sided containments under the cloak of engagement words.[3] </p></blockquote><p>As frustrating as Beijing finds this perceived policy of "all-sided containments under the cloak of engagement," it has found the approach increasingly useful in its own relationship with India. </p><p><strong><em>Hindi-Chini Bhai Bhai</em>?</strong></p><p>The modern Sino-Indian relationship opened on an optimistic note that is difficult to recall today. When Beijing and Delhi established formal relations in 1950, each had recently finished bitter struggles for independence and then stood at the vanguard of a global post-colonial movement. The implications of this sea change in international affairs appeared so profound that Indian prime minister Jawaharlal Nehru found it necessary to introduce a new concept to describe relations among nonaligned states: Panchsheel, widely known as the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence. </p><p>The Chinese government embraced the concept (which appears in both countries' diplomatic statements to this day), and the Sino-Indian relationship was celebrated as forming the nucleus of a new world order. Indeed, the Indian media were encouraged by Nehru's government to use the term "Hindi-Chini bhai bhai," or "India and China are brothers," to describe the relationship. </p><p>Tensions simmered, however, beneath the smooth façade of Sino-Indian relations. The Panchsheel principles were just the introduction to a territorial settlement between Beijing and Delhi that did not resolve several major disputes, largely concerning the McMahon Line negotiated in 1914 to establish a border between British India, de facto independent Tibet, and the Republican Chinese government (which signed the agreement but did not ratify it). Nehru considered an important part of India's stature that the McMahon Line stand, while the Communist Chinese government considered it an effort to enjoy the gains of an imperial British land grab. </p><p>Conflict broke out in October 1962, when the dispute over the Sino-Indian border in the area of Aksai Chin (near Kashmir and under Chinese control but claimed by India) and Arunachal Pradesh (east of Bhutan and under Indian control but claimed by China) erupted into warfare. After clearing the Indian Army from Arunachal Pradesh, the Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA) withdrew and established a line of control along India's claimed border.[4] China achieved all its goals in this conflict, known as the Sino-Indian War. Possession of Aksai Chin secured a direct supply route between Tibet and Xinjiang, while Nehruvian delusions of grandeur lay safely in shambles--so much so that one scholar ventured that China's "strategy as it unfolded after 1959 was designed not so much to gain possession of a few thousand miles of mountainous territory . . . as to erode India's position as a power of some consequence on the Asian scene."[5] </p><p>For the next two decades, China consolidated its 1962 victory against India by supporting strategic proxies against Indian interests, most notably in its support of Pakistan during the 1965 and 1971 Indo-Pakistani wars. Chinese policy was characterized by declarations to the effect that "should the Indian expansionists dare to launch aggression against Pakistan, the Chinese government and people will, as always, firmly support the Pakistani government and people."[6] </p><p>While the declarations of Chinese support could not save Pakistan from repeated humiliations in its fights with India, they drew lines that Delhi knew it could not cross in its fights with Islamabad without possibly triggering Chinese intervention. Meanwhile tensions along the border kept Indian forces diverted to the contested northern front, especially Arunachal Pradesh, a remote territory enveloped on three sides by foreign frontiers and dependent upon supplies delivered through the 21-kilometer-wide Siliguri Corridor. Also, beginning at some point in the 1980s, China initiated covert support for Pakistan's nuclear weapons program. </p><p>In the 1980s, however, Sino-Indian relations began to thaw as the leadership in Beijing sought to distance itself from both the Soviet and American Cold War camps, leading to the launch of an "omnidirectional" foreign policy in Asia. This modified approach toward the subcontinent was reflected in China's diminished verbal support for Pakistan during a near-outbreak of Indo-Pakistani hostilities over Kashmir, and likewise when the Chinese government gradually backed out of its support for Sri Lanka and Nepal during Indian disputes with those countries in 1987 and 1988.[7] Indeed, it appeared that Beijing was ready to recognize Indian ascendance in what it increasingly viewed as the strategic backwater of Southeast Asia.[8] </p><p><strong>Nuclear Breakout, Nuclear Deal</strong></p><p>China's new approach toward India ran into trouble after 1991, when a newly reformed Indian economy recovered from crisis and entered a period of rapid growth, allowing Delhi to climb the ranks of international arms importers quickly. While India's economic dynamism put pressure on the Sino-Indian relationship, the tipping point came on May 11, 1998, when the Indian government detonated three nuclear devices in the first of a series of tests conducted by Delhi and Islamabad that month. </p><p>The tests revealed the suspicions that Beijing and Delhi continued to harbor. In an explanatory letter that then-Indian prime minister Atal Behari Vajpayee sent to world leaders, he specifically referred to China ("an overt nuclear weapons state . . . which committed armed aggression against India in 1962") as a reason for the Indian bomb.[9] Senior Chinese statesman Qian Qichen responded that "international condemnation [of the tests] is totally justified" and pointed out that "[w]hat is particularly unacceptable is that India has gone so far as claiming that it conducted the nuclear tests because of China's threat."[10] The <em>People's Liberation Army Daily</em> added that the nuclear tests have "further exposed [India's] ambition of seeking regional hegemony in the military sphere."[11]</p><p>While Qian condemned India's nuclear tests, the Chinese government used its presidency of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) to craft an international condemnation. UNSC Resolution 1172 called for India and Pakistan to scrap their nuclear weapons programs and join the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty as non-nuclear weapons states. The resolution was far harsher than a U.S.-drafted statement of the four other permanent members of the UNSC.[12]</p><p>Despite its condemnation of India's nuclear weapons program, China declined to impose any sanctions on either India or Pakistan, still viewing the latter as a useful balancer on the subcontinent while Beijing entered into a period of diplomatic rapprochement with Delhi that concluded with Vajpayee's June 2003 state visit to Beijing. </p><p>The likely explanation for China's Janus-faced handling of the 1998 South Asian nuclear breakout was that while it felt threatened by India's nuclear program, it also recognized that the tests had set the diplomatic ball rolling by pulling America into the region, a process that continued through the 1999 Kargil Crisis, the September 11 terrorist attacks against the United States, and the near-outbreak of war between India and Pakistan following a December 2001 attack against India's parliament. </p><p>Although India and China trumpeted Vajpayee's 2003 visit to Beijing as proof of progress, the progress between the two countries was overtaken by a pair of bilateral agreements announced by India and the United States in the summer of 2005. The June 28 "New Framework for the U.S.-India Defense Relationship" overturned longstanding Chinese assumptions about India's regional power and its ties to Washington, and the July 18 Joint Statement pledged the United States to aid India's civil nuclear power program. </p><p>China met the July 2005 nuclear deal with muddled hostility, as the Chinese government sought to criticize it without undercutting its newly improved relationship with India. On July 25, the foreign ministry stated that Beijing hoped "the relevant cooperation between [the United States] and India will be conducive to safeguarding the regional peace and stability in Asia."[13] The party mouthpiece the <em>People's Daily</em> meanwhile repeated criticism of the nuclear deal from American analysts, arguing that Washington viewed its relationship with India as a way to pressure China.[14]</p><p>The Chinese government has been remarkably conciliatory toward the nuclear deal, signaling that it will not veto its approval in the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), where its opposition could pose a major setback. The apparent logic behind China's moderation on the nuclear deal is Beijing's perception that any adverse strategic consequences of U.S.-Indian nuclear cooperation could be counteracted through similar support of Pakistan's civil nuclear program. </p><p>A March 2006 <em>People's Daily</em> article indicated that Beijing retains the option of acting through strategic proxies[15] to undercut any gains that the United States and its allies make as a result of the nuclear deal: "The agreement will have its 'rippling' effect, which means that Pakistan, which has a similar position as India on the nuclear issue, may make similar demands and Iran may feel even more resentful of this 'double principle' in the current nuclear dispute."[16] </p><p>Within a month of issuing this veiled threat, reports surfaced that Beijing had entered into talks with Islamabad on supplying a 2,000-megawatt nuclear power plant.[17] And China is in a strong position to press its case for cooperation with Pakistan--Beijing can make approval of its support for Pakistan a basic condition for supporting the U.S.-Indian nuclear deal at the NSG, a necessary step for Indian-American cooperation. China has thus set the stage for itself and its proxies to retain regional strategic ascendancy.[18]</p><p><strong>Ties that Bind: Military Contacts and the Contested Border</strong></p><p>While China is moving to contain the fallout from the U.S.-Indian nuclear deal, it is also working to maintain its longstanding conventional military superiority over Indian forces, despite the latter's recent gains. The central elements of this effort have been a combination of bilateral agreements that will give Beijing better access to India's evolving military, and unilateral moves intended to strengthen its own position along the countries' contested border and in the Indian Ocean. </p><p>Despite the global media focus on the nuclear deal in the summer of 2005, Beijing was far more concerned with a less-noted agreement signed between Indian defense minister Pranab Mukherjee and U.S. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld. The June 28 "New Framework for the U.S.-India Defense Relationship" committed Washington and Delhi to cooperation in thirteen substantive areas such as joint operations, intelligence sharing, and technology transfer.[19]</p><p>The New Framework is disconcerting to the Chinese government because it represents a major step forward in the development of U.S.-Indian defense cooperation that has accelerated since the September 11 terrorist attacks. The United States and India now organize regular exercises in which their militaries conduct sophisticated operations such as at-sea refueling, landing helicopters on ships at sea, and mixed force-on-force mock engagements. </p><p>The lesson of this cooperative experience for the United States and India has been that while the latter seeks to maintain its strategic autonomy, it needs American support if it is to break away from its longstanding role as a client of Russian arms--a position that left it operating the same weapons as most of its neighbors, including China--and as a player on the wrong side of the growing technological gap between the American defense industrial base and the rest of the world.[20] </p><p>Closer Indian ties to the United States defense establishment have tremendous implications for the military balance in Asia. They have first meant that the United States is moving closer to recognizing India as what the Bush administration calls a "responsible, democratic nation" that can be entrusted with responsibility for security in the Indian Ocean if U.S. forces are ever called to deploy rapidly to other theaters. And while the global superpower is inviting India to develop a dominant maritime position, Delhi's ever closer relationship with Washington will enhance its ability to do so. </p><p>Indian leaders are keen to use the strategic partnership with the United States to introduce into India advanced U.S. technology, learn America's most successful operational practices, and give India the chance to integrate its widely dispersed military into an effectively unified force. Defense industrial ties with the United States promise to make this transformation sustainable over the long term as Delhi collaborates with Washington in the design and production of new generations of weapons systems.[21] </p><p>Chinese observers have not let these developments pass without comment. On July 7, 2005, the <em>People's Daily</em> published an article titled "Washington Draws India in against China," in which it declared that the New Framework was "partly intended to diminish China's influence in this region and to safeguard and expand U.S. strategic interest [<em>sic</em>] in Asia."[22] </p><p>The article continued by pointing out that the provisions for defense industrial cooperation are "of special significance given the fact that the United States on the one hand presses the European Union to keep [its] arms embargo on China and urges Israel to cancel arms sales to China while on the other hand sign[ing] a wide-ranging defense agreement with India." Despite China's rapidly developing defense industrial base, it cannot help but acknowledge its losses in being largely cut off from American, European, and Israeli markets, especially while India has access. </p><p>The first component of China's response to these adverse developments has been to seek new routes to Delhi through political agreements that will permit greater Chinese observation of the Indian military. Most important is a memorandum of understanding (MoU) that Mukherjee signed with Cao Gangchuan, China's minister of national defense, in May 2006. The MoU commits the two countries to a regimen of joint military exercises, collaboration in counterterrorism, anti-piracy, and search-and-rescue efforts, as well as regular military exchanges.[23] </p><p>Upon signing the MoU, Mukherjee drew the guarded conclusion that India's "ties with China have reached a certain degree of maturity. . . [We] are striving to address our differences in a proactive and purposeful manner without allowing them to affect the comprehensive development of our relationship."[24] Other Chinese assessments have been more sanguine, as characterized by the <em>People's Daily</em> commentary that the MoU will "foster a favorable international and regional situation, and provide a strategic foundation for mutual trust" with the opportunity for India to use the framework to "play a very important and positive role in maintaining peace in the Asia-Pacific region and across the world."[25] </p><p>One Indian analyst pointed out the source of this divergence in views when he observed that the agreement appears to have three major implications for the Chinese side that Delhi does not share:</p><blockquote style="MARGIN-TOP: 0px; MARGIN-BOTTOM: 0px"><p>One, China has taken the growing ties between India and the United States more seriously than it took the 1998 nuclear blasts by India. Two, the MoU is undoubtedly a Chinese initiative to seek a better understanding of the thinking within the Indian armed forces. And three, the MoU will not assist in a speedier resolution of the border dispute. . . China's only way of determining the progress of military relations between India and the U.S. is by having formal ties with the Indian defense ministry.[26]</p></blockquote><p>Seen in this light, it is not surprising that Beijing should be satisfied with the arrangement. And the American experience of military ties with China in the 1990s indicates that Delhi will find its new partnership a flawed one. The Sino-American relationship has been plagued by a lack of reciprocal transparency, as China sought to gain greater access to technical components of the U.S. military without raising the curtain on its own forces.[27] India may find China an eager partner at the negotiating table, but if it looks beneath China's "cloak of engagement words," it may yet find a pattern of containment. </p><p>That pattern appears to be emerging first along the Sino-Indian border, where China is bolstering its military position by upgrading its infrastructure. This move is strategic because although China has always enjoyed a position with strong operational superiority over India along the contested areas in Aksai Chin and Arunachal Pradesh, it is sensitive to the gradual deterioration of its position in the Indian Ocean as Delhi develops new generations of weapons systems with American support. </p><p>The strategic consequences of India's growing naval power are clear. Every additional barrel of oil that China imports leaves Beijing more vulnerable to a disruption of the sea lanes. If Delhi's naval modernization effort turns the Indian Ocean into India's ocean, the risk for Beijing may grow unacceptable. In response, it appears that just as Beijing has long leveraged its claims against Indian-controlled territory in Arunachal Pradesh to legitimize its occupation of Aksai Chin, it may now leverage its superiority along the Sino-Indian border to remind Delhi of the costs of conflict on the Indian Ocean. </p><p>The July 1 opening of a railway linking Beijing and Lhasa is the most important symbol of this Chinese strategy. This new link strengthens Beijing's grasp on Tibet: the number of ethnic Han Chinese arriving in Lhasa, where Chinese already outnumber Tibetans, has increased since the opening of the railway, and the PLA has also significantly enhanced its ability to deliver heavy weapons and logistical material to the region in the event of either a domestic disturbance or a conflict with India. Although one Chinese researcher has suggested that the "Indians' worries [are] unnecessary because a country's military strategy depends on its political intent," Beijing's position in Asia has benefited from reminding Delhi of China's superiority along the border.[28] </p><p>China is also redressing the Indian Ocean balance directly through the "string of pearls" strategy. In recent years, Beijing has developed port facilities in Chittagong, Bangladesh; Sittwe, Burma (Myanmar); and Gwadar, Pakistan.[29] China has launched each of these developments through bilateral trade promotion agreements under which it pays most of the costs of dredging deep water ports, but it is also an element of a naval balancing strategy, as demonstrated by a Chinese-run radar station on Burma's Coco Islands and the development of naval facilities in the Gwadar ports. </p><p>The potential drama surrounding these developments has not fully played out, but it is clear that despite recent bilateral summits in which the Chinese and Indian governments have exchanged pleasantries on cooperation to end border tensions, the dispute is unlikely to be resolved in the foreseeable future.[30] This will remain the case so long as China is able to bolster its strategic proxy Pakistan by strengthening its hold along the Indo-Tibetan border while developing a hedge against India's growing naval power.[31] </p><p><strong>The Race for Resources</strong></p><p>The aspect of Sino-Indian relations that has received the most attention in recent years is the simultaneous sprint for energy supplies. China and India each face a triple bind in the energy market: their rapid growth rates ( 9.1 percent and 6.1 percent annual GDP growth over the last decade, respectively) that fuel energy demand; their inefficient energy use that requires more additional energy input per percentage growth of GDP than more developed countries; and their dependence upon on foreign products to satisfy their energy demands (40 percent and 70 percent of crude oil consumption from imports, respectively).[32] </p><p>Energy needs have driven China and India to a series of bidding wars for energy assets across the globe, experiences that have been especially sour for India. In a bid for Kazakhstan's third largest commercial oil producer in August 2005, China outbid India when Kazakh authorities allowed Beijing to make an additional offer after the final official bid.[33] Two months later, a Chinese oil firm beat out its Indian competitor when Beijing offered to back up the commercial bid with some $2 billion in development aid (Delhi had offered a paltry $200 million aid package).[34] And in December 2005, Burma decided to build a natural gas pipeline to Yunnan Province in China rather than across Bangladesh to India, reflecting a combination of Bangladeshi indecision on the terms of the deal and Rangoon's preference to foster trade with Beijing.[35] </p><p>Although Beijing came out on top of all of the Sino-Indian gas and oil bidding wars, each fight nonetheless resulted in inflated prices for the assets that China eventually got, leading the two countries to consider joint bids for energy assets. The two sides tested the waters of cooperation in December 2004, when Chinese and Indian oil firms made a successful joint bid for a set of fields in Canada, setting the stage for a January 2006 "Memorandum for Enhancing Cooperation in the Field of Oil and Natural Gas" that permits joint bids on energy assets in third countries.[36] </p><p>Although it was an Indian initiative, the memorandum is a major victory for the Chinese government, as Delhi acquiesced to playing the role of "junior partner" in Beijing's globe-trotting campaign to secure energy resources. In addition to its symbolic significance, the new partnership means that as India and China enter into joint energy deals with third countries, they will develop common interests in the survival of what are--more often than not--unsavory regimes. Indeed, instead of creating a stable source of energy supplies, these deals are more likely to entangle India into disputes it might prefer to avoid. </p><p>While the logic that India should concede to joining the opponents it cannot beat is compelling, it is also weakens Delhi's position vis-à-vis Beijing.</p><p><strong>Institutionalizing Chinese Leadership</strong></p><p>Since 2001, China has pursued an increasingly ambitious strategy of using regional forums to solidify its role as primus inter pares in Asia. This presents an even greater strategic challenge for India than energy arrangements. </p><p>The Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) is the most important forum to Beijing's regional strategy. Founded under China's leadership in June 2001 as a means to coordinate cooperation among China, Russia, and the central Asian republics, the SCO was quickly marginalized by the success of the U.S.-led war in Afghanistan later that year and the rapid development of security ties between Washington and several SCO members.[37]</p><p>Despite this setback, the SCO has reemerged in recent years as a significant actor as American energies have been sapped by the war in Iraq. The statement adopted at the June 2005 SCO Astana Summit formally marked the organization's rebound as a Sino-centric bloc when the member states called for Washington to establish a timeline for withdrawal from central Asia, followed immediately by Uzbek president Islam Karimov's eviction of U.S. forces from the Karshi-Kanabad airbase in southern Uzbekistan.</p><p>In the same month that SCO members delivered the Astana statement, the organization also welcomed India into the organization as an observer. Indian relations with the SCO have since been cool. While member states look at using the body as a nexus for collaboration on a wide range of political and security activities, Indian officials have repeatedly clarified that while "India is keenly interested in all activities focused on socio-economic development," it does not extend the range of cooperative fields beyond those.[38] </p><p>The divide between Chinese and Indian views was on full display when Indian prime minister Manmohan Singh neglected to attend the June 2006 SCO summit in Shanghai, indicating in the words of one observer that "India was simply too important for a guest appearance, in contrast to Iran and Pakistan, which sent their presidents . . . [and] that India does not have the compulsions of a Mahmoud Ahmadinejad--in the doghouse internationally and desperate to say his piece on any available America-skeptic platform--or a Pervez Musharraf--a client of the Chinese leadership and looking to it to get some sort of parity with India in the Nuclear Supplier's Group."[39] </p><p>While Singh's hands-off approach to the SCO may demonstrate a plausible strategy for maximizing the benefits and minimizing the costs of membership in the organization, it comes up short in light of China's recent gains as an observer in the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), a body founded in 1985 that also includes Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, the Maldives, Pakistan, Nepal, and Bhutan. </p><p>In contrast to the SCO invitation for Indian membership, the SAARC invitation to China was the result of a diplomatic debacle in which the regional politics played out as "India against the rest."[40] When Delhi tried to forestall the granting of observer status to China at the Dhaka Summit last year, Nepal (then receiving Chinese military assistance in the wake of an Indian arms embargo) made China's observership a condition for supporting Afghanistan's entry into the organization, a position that received broad support, especially from Pakistan.[41] </p><p>The consequence of Delhi's capitulation is that India gained a seat in a Sino-centric, anti-American organization in exchange for giving China access to a body that is desperately looking for an additional player to challenge India's preeminence in South Asia. India's embarrassment in the SAARC membership process in 2005 will likely be a precursor to a permanent loss of influence in the organization. </p><p>China's most ambitious project for regional leadership to date was its 2005 effort to transform the proposed East Asian Summit (EAS) into a Chinese-led outgrowth of the ASEAN+3 arrangement between the Association of Southeast Asian Nations members and Japan, China, and South Korea. Tokyo sought Australian and Indian participation in the meeting, a move that received support from Southeast Asia. When the Japanese proposal prevailed, Beijing quickly moved to invite Russian participation, an acknowledgement that if China could not lead the organization, it should be downgraded to serve as a regional "talk shop." The EAS experience is a perfect example of China's strategy of combining organizations (such as the SCO) that tie India down with those that leave it behind altogether. </p><p>The latter component of China's strategy is most vividly displayed in the United Nations Security Council, in which Beijing uses its position as the sole permanent member state from Asia to guarantee that its regional competitors, Japan and India, are denied access.[42] It is possible that Security Council reform will be carried out--especially if the United States can avoid maneuvering itself into a position of de facto opposition to India's bid for membership--but only when China feels that the political consequences of unilaterally blocking progress are too risky. </p><p>In sum, China has effectively engaged the regional organizations of Asia as useful bodies through which it can alternately bring India closer to the Sino-centric fold or minimize India's voice at more critical forums. The closest that India has come to posing a credible response has been with the support of Japan, Southeast Asia, and the United States at a distance during the 2005 EAS debate. </p><p><strong>Caveats and Conclusions</strong></p><p>If China's recent behavior toward India can be best explained as a containment strategy designed to guarantee that India rises on China's terms, this conclusion should be qualified somewhat. </p><p>The most important caveat is that it is not obvious that the Chinese government is acting with a unified strategy. It is possible that policy toward each of the areas discussed here is being crafted independently by separate divisions of the Chinese bureaucracy. We know, however, that in recent years, China's strategy toward India has moved up the policymaking food chain in Beijing.[43] Although a well-articulated "India strategy" may not have existed for much of China's recent history, it is inconceivable that most Chinese action today does not serve an increasingly well-defined set of goals, and it is difficult to ascertain a more likely one than that which this paper has suggested.[44] </p><p>Americans should also recognize a divergence between China's economic and security interests with India; we have the same problem with Beijing. As trade between China and India grows, the relationship will develop the defining characteristic of the Sino-American relationship: tremendous gains from cooperative economic development are matched by growing stakes in bilateral disputes.[45] This trend neither foreordains nor forestalls strategic competition, but it will continue to complicate Sino-Indian relations. </p><p>If China is pursuing a containment strategy against India, it has achieved some early key victories: guaranteeing that Pakistan will maintain rough nuclear parity on the subcontinent, co-opting Indian foreign policy interests through energy collaboration, and establishing a strong leadership position in regional political forums. </p><p>For American policymakers, this trend suggests that despite noted atmospheric improvements in the Sino-Indian relationship, efforts to launch a new era of Hindi-Chini bhai bhai will ultimately falter on the longstanding disputes between the countries.[46] In contrast, Indian-American ties can benefit from India's long-term need for U.S. support if it is to effectively respond to China's containment policy.</p><p>The various fields of Sino-Indian competition are multifaceted and intersect with American interests at many junctures. Therefore, there are countless opportunities for an American role. Washington should strive to:</p><ul><li>Drive as hard a bargain as possible at the NSG. Pakistan is not India: it has sold nuclear plans wholesale to such rogue states as Libya and North Korea and is perennially unstable. If Sino-Pakistani nuclear cooperation cannot be avoided, it should be on strictly safeguarded terms. </li><li>Continue to support India's military modernization by lowering licensing restrictions on arms exports to Delhi. The purpose should not be to fuel a Sino-Indian arms race, but to dissuade China from pursuing a path of revanchism that will unite other Asian countries against it in collaboration with the United States. </li><li>Maintain energy cooperation as a major plank of the U.S.-Indian relationship. India's efforts to secure energy resources through overseas acquisitions are inefficient, and history predicts that they will be ineffective. India could benefit most from cooperation to upgrade its energy processing and distribution infrastructure. </li><li>Consider greater American participation in Asian regional forums. SAARC has already indicated that it would welcome Washington to an observer's seat, a move that would help balance Beijing's newfound influence with the body. A U.S.-led effort to reinvigorate a more inclusive body such as the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation would also provide an alternative to Chinese leadership in Asia. </li></ul><p>These policies could improve America's position in Asia and avoid some of the worst possible outcomes of Sino-Indian competition. As American policymakers debate Washington's proper role in shaping India's rise to great power status, they should keep in mind that Beijing has already chosen a leading role for itself. </p><p><em>Christopher Griffin is a research associate at AEI. Intern Shivani Kota provided research assistance, and editorial assistant Evan Sparks worked with Mr. Griffin to edit and produce this</em> Asian Outlook<em>.</em> </p><p><strong></strong></p><p><strong>Notes</strong></p><p>1. John Lancaster, "India, China Hoping to 'Reshape the World' Together," <em>Washington Post</em>, April 12, 2005.</p><p>2. Shih Chun-yu, "China and India Explore New Type of Relationship between Big Powers," <em>Ta Kung Pao</em>, July 11, 2006. </p><p>3. "One Must Be Responsible for His Threats," <em>Renmin Ribao</em> [People's Daily], February 28, 2005.</p><p>4. The reasons for China's withdrawal while maintaining its territorial claims remain in dispute. Beijing claims that it was to demonstrate the country's sincere desire to settle the dispute through negotiation. Indian analysts suspect that the Chinese leadership calculated that by maintaining claims to Arunachal Pradesh, it would have a bargaining chip for negotiations over the more valued Aksai Chin. Also, the PLA had simply reached its logistical limits in the harsh terrain. </p><p>5. Nancy Jetly, "Sino-Indian Relations: Old Legacies and New Vistas," <em>China Report</em> 30, no. 2 (April-June 1994): 220.</p><p>6. Waheguru Pal Singh Sidhu and Jing-dong Yuan, <em>China and India: Cooperation or Conflict</em> (London: Lynne Rienner, 2003), 19.</p><p>7. Ibid. </p><p>8. Susan L. Shirk, "One-Sided Rivalry: China's Perceptions and Policies toward India," <em>The India-China Relationship: What the United States Needs to Know</em>, eds. Francine R. Frankel and Harry Harding, (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2004), 75 and 81. </p><p>9. Strobe Talbott, <em>Engaging India: Diplomacy, Democracy, and the Bomb</em> (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2004), 53.</p><p>10. "Qian: Nuclear Arms Race Likely if India Doesn't Stop Tests," Zhongguo Xinwen She [Chinese News Service], May 19, 1998.</p><p>11. "What Is the Intention of Wantonly Engaging in Military Ventures," <em>Jiefangjun Bao</em> [People's Liberation Army Daily], May 19, 1998.</p><p>12. Strobe Talbott, <em>Engaging India</em>, 74-75, 80.</p><p>13. D. S. Rajan, "China: Views on Manmohan Singh-Bush Joint Statement," South Asia Analysis Group, August 8, 2005, available at <a onclick="return top.js.OpenExtLink(window,event,this)" href="http://www.saag.org//papers15/paper1490.html" target="_blank">http://www.saag.org//papers15/paper1490.html</a> (accessed on August 31, 2006).</p><p>14. Lu Yansong, "Short-Sighted Nuclear Deal," <em>Renmin Ribao</em>, August 19, 2005.</p><p>15. For the best discussion of China's use of strategic proxies as an instrument of foreign policy, see Justin Bernier, "China's Strategic Proxies," <em>Orbis</em> 47, no. 4 (Fall 2003): 629-643.</p><p>16. "Behind U.S.-India Nuclear Cooperation," <em>Renmin Ribao</em>, March 4, 2006.</p><p>17. "Pak, China to Sign Nuclear Deal," <em>Asian Age</em>, April 11, 2006.</p><p>18. Mohan Malik, "China Opposes U.S. Nuclear Deal for Fear of 'Losing' Influence," <em>Force</em>, May 21, 2006.</p><p>19. Embassy of the United States to India, "New Framework for the U.S.-India Defense Relationship," news release, June 28, 2005, available at <a onclick="return top.js.OpenExtLink(window,event,this)" href="http://newdelhi.usembassy.gov/ipr062805.html" target="_blank">http://newdelhi.usembassy.gov/ipr062805.html</a> (accessed on August 19, 2006).</p><p>20. The notable exception in the region is Pakistan, which is a longstanding arms client of the United States. Indian strategists view each new arms sale to Islamabad as a betrayal, a continuing source of tension in bilateral relations. </p><p>21. Christopher Griffin, "What India Wants," <em>Armed Forces Journal</em> 143, no. 10 (May 1, 2006): 16-17.</p><p>22. "Washington Draws India in against China," <em>Renmin Ribao</em>, July 7, 2005, available at <a onclick="return top.js.OpenExtLink(window,event,this)" href="http://english.people.com.cn/20050707/print20050707_194676.html" target="_blank">http://english.people.com.cn/20050707/print20050707_194676.html</a> (accessed on August 14, 2006). </p><p>23. Christopher Griffin, "What India Wants," 17-18.</p><p>24. Sridhar Kumarawami, "Pranab Spells Out Look East Policy," <em>Asian Age</em>, June 12, 2006.</p><p>25. "China and India Cooperate to Find a Win-Win Path," <em>Renmin Ribao</em>, June 8, 2006. </p><p>26. Pravin Sawhney, "New Initiative," <em>Force</em>, June 13, 2006, available at <a onclick="return top.js.OpenExtLink(window,event,this)" href="http://www.forceindia.net/june/bottomline.asp" target="_blank">http://www.forceindia.net/june/bottomline.asp</a>(accessed on August 29, 2006).</p><p>27. Kurt Campbell and Richard Weitz, "The Limits of U.S.-China Military Cooperation, Lessons from 1995–1990," <em>The Washington Quarterly</em> 29, no. 1 (Winter 2006-2006): 169-186.</p><p>28. Hu Liang, "Expert Claims to Enhance Sino-Indian Relations," <em>Ta Kung Pao</em>, July 7, 2006.</p><p>29. For more on China's maritime strategy in the Indian Ocean, see Christopher J. Pehrson, <em>String of Pearls: Meeting the Challenge of China's Rising Power Across The Asian Littoral</em> (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2006), 3-7. </p><p>30. Symbolizing the strength of the dispute was a recent international conference in New Delhi at which the Chinese consul general interrupted Mukherjee's remarks to announce that "China never invaded India! . . . It is untrue and irresponsible to say that China invaded India." "General Consul: China Never Invaded India," <em>Renmin Ribao</em>, September 8, 2005. </p><p>31. Pravin Sawhney, "New Initiative."</p><p>32. GDP figures are from the World Bank's World Development Indicators online database, available at <a onclick="return top.js.OpenExtLink(window,event,this)" href="http://devdata.worldbank.org/wdi2006/contents/home.htm" target="_blank">http://devdata.worldbank.org/wdi2006/contents/home.htm</a>. For crude oil imports data, see "PRC, India State-Run Firms Discuss Joint Bids for Oil Assets in Kazakhstan," Agence France Presse, June 8, 2006. </p><p>33. Indrajit Basu, "India Discreet, China Bold in Oil Hunt," Asia Times Online, September 29, 2005, available at <a onclick="return top.js.OpenExtLink(window,event,this)" href="http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/GI29Df01.html" target="_blank">www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/GI29Df01.html</a> (accessed on May 5, 2006).</p><p>34. Amitav Ranjan, "Let's Shop for Oil, Gas Together: India, China," <em>Indian Express</em>, August 24, 2005, available at <a onclick="return top.js.OpenExtLink(window,event,this)" href="http://www.indianexpress.com/res/web/pIe/full_story.php?content_id=76875" target="_blank">www.indianexpress.com/res/web/pIe/full_story.php?content_id=76875</a> (accessed on May 5, 2006).</p><p>35. Anand Kumar, "Myanmar-Petrochina Agreement: A Setback to India's Quest for Energy Security," South Asia Analysis Group, January 19, 2006, available at <a onclick="return top.js.OpenExtLink(window,event,this)" href="http://saag.org//papers17Q681.html" target="_blank">http://saag.org//papers17Q681.html</a> (accessed on May 5, 2006).</p><p>36. "China, India Sign Energy Agreement," China Daily Online, January 13, 2006, available at <a onclick="return top.js.OpenExtLink(window,event,this)" href="http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/english/doc/2006-01/13/content_511871.htm" target="_blank">www.chinadaily.com.cn/english/doc/2006-01/13/content_511871.htm</a> (accessed on August 28, 2006).</p><p>37. Mohan Malik, <em>Dragon on Terrorism: Assessing China's Tactical Gains and Strategic Losses Post-September 11</em> (Carlisle, PA: Institute for Strategic Studies, 2002), 33-35.</p><p>38. "India Supports Basic SCO Principles: Official," Xinhua, June 13, 2006.</p><p>39. "Game in Shanghai--Ignore SCO, but not Central Asia," <em>Pioneer</em>, June 17, 2006. </p><p>40. "China or Bust--SAARC in a Spin," <em>The News International</em> (Pakistan), November 13, 2005. </p><p>41. "Countering India," <em>Asian Age</em>, November 17, 2005.</p><p>42. Mohan Malik, "Security Council Reform: China Signals Its Veto," <em>World Policy Journal </em>22, no. 1 (Spring 2005): 19-29.</p><p>43. Susan L. Shirk, "One-Sided Rivalry," 86-88.</p><p>44. Mohan Malik has also proposed a containment strategy explanation of Beijing's behavior towards India in his essay "China's Strategy of Containing India," published on February 6, 2006, by the Power and Interest News Report, available at <a onclick="return top.js.OpenExtLink(window,event,this)" href="http://www.pinr.com/report.php?ac=view_printable&report_id=434&languageid=1" target="_blank">http://www.pinr.com/report.php?ac=view_printable&amp;report_id=434&languageid=1</a>(accessed on September 3, 2006).</p><p>45. Trade has already shot up from $117.4 million in 1987 to $11.3 billion last year--a ninety-six-fold increase. Trade is expected to reach $100 billion by 2015, which is tremendous progress compared to recent growth but still paltry compared to the Sino-Japanese bilateral trade sum of $184.4 billion in 2005. "Sino-Indian Trade Could Reach $100 Billion by 2015," Agence France Presse, May 12, 2006; "India, China to Register Trade of 20 Bn US Dollars by 2007," Xinhua, March 16, 2006; Waheguru Pal Singh Sidhu and Jing-dong Yuan, <em>China and India</em>, 25.</p><p>46. For an overview of Indian perceptions on improved Sino-Indian relations, see Julie A. MacDonald et al., <em>Perspectives on China: A View from India</em> (McLean, VA: Booz Allen Hamilton, 2005), 25-29.</p></span></td></tr><tr><td><img height="10" src="http://beta.blogger.com/" width="1" border="0" /></td></tr><tr><td colspan="2"><img height="20" src="http://beta.blogger.com/" width="1" /></td></tr><tr><td colspan="2"><span style="font-size:0;">Related Links</span></td></tr><tr><td colspan="2"><img height="3" src="http://beta.blogger.com/" width="1" /></td></tr><tr><td colspan="2"><table cellspacing="0" cellpadding="0" border="0"><tbody><tr><td><a onclick="return top.js.OpenExtLink(window,event,this)" href="http://www.aei.org/publications/pubID.24428/pub_detail.asp" target="_blank"><span style="font-size:0;">U.S.-India Nuclear Cooperation</span></a></td></tr><tr><td colspan="2"><img height="2" src="http://beta.blogger.com/" width="1" /></td></tr><tr><td><a onclick="return top.js.OpenExtLink(window,event,this)" href="http://www.aei.org/news/newsID.23033/news_detail.asp" target="_blank"><span style="font-size:0;">Towards an East Asian Strategy</span></a></td></tr><tr><td colspan="2"><img height="2" src="http://beta.blogger.com/" width="1" /></td></tr><tr><td><a onclick="return top.js.OpenExtLink(window,event,this)" href="http://www.aei.org/publications/contentID.20050429112455825/default.asp" target="_blank"><span style="font-size:0;">Asian Outlook</span></a></td></tr><tr><td colspan="2"><img height="2" src="http://beta.blogger.com/" width="1" /></td></tr><tr><td><a onclick="return top.js.OpenExtLink(window,event,this)" href="http://www.aei.org/publications/contentID.20050310031529849/default.asp" target="_blank"><span style="font-size:0;">Outlook Series</span></a></td></tr><tr><td colspan="2"><img height="2" src="http://beta.blogger.com/" width="1" /></td></tr></tbody></table></td></tr></tbody></table><br /><br />Available on the AEI website at <a onclick="return top.js.OpenExtLink(window,event,this)" href="http://www.aei.org/publications/pubID.24873/publication.asp" target="_blank">http://www.aei.org/publications/pubID.24873/publication.asp</a><br /><br /></div></div><br /><br />--<br />Siddharth Varadarajan<br />Associate Editor<br />The Hindu<br />I.N.S. Building, Rafi Marg<br />New Delhi - 1<br /><br />Telephone: +91-11-2371-5426<br />Fax: +91-11-2371-8158<br />Mobile: +91-98111-60260<br /><br />The Hindu: <a href="http://www.thehindu.com">http://www.thehindu.com</a><br />My personal website: <a href="http://svaradarajan.blogspot.com">http://svaradarajan.blogspot.com</a>Siddharth Varadarajanhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/07721228307097170092noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-19172415.post-1152708968611736442006-07-12T05:56:00.000-07:002006-07-12T05:56:08.710-07:00US wants Central Asia economic corridor set up<p class="mobile-post">Dawn<br />12 July 2006<br />http://www.dawn.com/2006/07/12/top9.htm</p><p class="mobile-post">By Our Correspondent</p><p class="mobile-post">WASHINGTON, July 11: US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice<br />underscored the importance of establishing an economic link between<br />Central Asia and India through Pakistan and Afghanistan when she met<br />Foreign Minister Khurshid Mahmud Kasuri, the State Department said.</p><p class="mobile-post">Briefing journalists on Monday's meeting between Mr Kasuri and Ms<br />Rice, the department's spokesman said both the countries "have an<br />interest in building up those economic ties from Central Asia down<br />through Afghanistan and Pakistan into India" and Ms Rice and Mr Kasuri<br />"talked about the importance of developing that economic<br />infrastructure".</p><p class="mobile-post">Spokesman Sean McCormack said both Pakistan and Afghanistan also<br />understand that for "realizing the full potential of this economic<br />integration," they must continue their common fight against terrorism.</p><p class="mobile-post">The spokesman indicated that the Rice-Kasuri meeting primarily<br />focused on growing tension between Kabul and Islamabad which is<br />affecting the global war on terrorism.</p><p class="mobile-post">Secretary Rice briefed Mr Kasuri on her recent meeting with Afghan<br />President Hamid Karzai and told him that both Afghanistan and Pakistan<br />have a shared interest in the stability and security and also in<br />economic prosperity of each other, Mr McCormack said.</p><p class="mobile-post">He said the US was working with Pakistan and Afghanistan to address<br />their security concerns "on trilateral basis," endorsing the Pakistani<br />position that all issues concerning the war on terror should be<br />discussed in a trilateral forum.</p><p class="mobile-post">Asked if Ms Rice agrees that Afghanistan and Pakistan should not<br />discuss their differences publicly, Mr McCormack said: "Certainly, we<br />would encourage them, if they have any differences, to work them out<br />and try to resolve them before they become a matter of public<br />discussion."</p><p class="mobile-post">He, however, acknowledged that Mr Kasuri and Afghan Foreign Minister<br />Rangin Dadfar Spanta were "ministers in their own right and they are<br />going to speak their mind in public".</p>Siddharth Varadarajanhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/07721228307097170092noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-19172415.post-1152706044755000742006-07-12T05:07:00.000-07:002006-07-12T05:07:24.890-07:00Trade plan would allow nuclear sales to India<span style="font-weight: bold;">Trade plan would allow nuclear sales to India</span><br>Critics call deal bad foreign policy<br><br>By Farah Stockman, Globe Staff | July 3, 2006 | Boston Globe<br><a href="http://www.boston.com/news/world/asia/articles/2006/07/03/trade_plan_would_allow_nuclear_sales_to_india/?p1=email_to_a_friend"> http://www.boston.com/news/world/asia/articles/2006/07/03/trade_plan_would_allow_nuclear_sales_to_india/?p1=email_to_a_friend</a><br><br>WASHINGTON -- Over the past six years, the largest consortium of businesses in India spent more than $1 million on fact-finding trips to India for US members of Congress, their staff, and spouses, and on lobbying Congress to pass a law that would fundamentally change India's relationship with the United States. <br><br>Last week, the efforts of the New Delhi-based Confederation of Indian Industry and a simultaneous lobbying campaign by American industrial companies paid off: Two key congressional committees approved a controversial plan to allow trade with India involving nuclear technology and other sensitive areas. <br><br>If the full Congress approves the plan, the deal would cement a historic new US-India alliance and open the doors to billions of dollars worth of high-tech and military sales to the South Asian nation. India will become the only country in the world to gain access to sensitive US nuclear technology without signing the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and agreeing to give up its nuclear arsenal. In return, India would tighten its export controls and place some of its nuclear reactors under international inspections. <br><br>Supporters of the plan say it is a ``win-win" proposal, increasing business ties with one of the world's fastest-growing economies and strengthening nuclear safeguards in India at the same time.<br><br>But critics say billion-dollar business interests -- in the United States as well as India -- have trumped the decades-old policy of trying to get India to give up its nuclear weapons program. They point to the massive, behind-the-scenes lobbying effort by the Confederation and US businesses as proof. <br><br>``It is clear that business interests and US defense contractors and former US officials involved in South Asia policy have been working hard to push this deal," said Daryl Kimball, executive director of the Arms Control Association. ``History has shown that US nonproliferation policy has consistently been compromised by interests in maintaining good relations or expanding business ties." <br><br>President Bush backed the proposal as a way to allow India to buy civilian nuclear reactors from the West, helping it feed its ever-growing needs for power without resorting to pollution-prone conventional power plants. Bush administration officials say the deal also provides a host of strategic advantages, including building a lasting friendship with a rapidly growing democracy in Asia, as a check on China's growing influence. <br><br>But few deny that the prospect of business opportunities worth billions of dollars helped fuel the deal. For Indian entrepreneurs, it is an opportunity to make money on privatized nuclear power plants and buy high-tech equipment that has been restricted for decades. For US businesses, it is a chance to invest in India's rapidly growing energy sector, to sell supplies to Indian nuclear reactors, and -- for the first time -- to have a shot at large-scale military contracts. <br><br>The legislation approved by the committees would lift prohibitions on civilian nuclear trade with India. Selling nuclear equipment to India has been off-limits since it developed and tested a nuclear weapon in 1974 outside the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. Poor relations and intermittent s anctions have prevented other kinds of military trade. <br><br>``I believe that all things being equal, we will get a considerable portion of the $20 [billion] to $40 billion in acquisition that the Indians plan on making by 2020," said Raymond Vickery, a senior adviser to the US-India Business Council, the US counterpart to the New Delhi-based Confederation, which is carrying out its own extensive lobbying effort. <br><br>Vickery said that congressional approval of the deal would give Lockheed Martin a reasonable chance to get a $4 billion to $9 billion contract to supply 126 combat fighter planes to India's Navy, a contract that India would have been unlikely to approve while sanctions were in place. <br><br>Westinghouse, whose nuclear division is based in Western Pennsylvania, could help India build a civilian nuclear reactor, and Atlanta-based General Electric would be well-placed to get a contract to supply India's reactors with nuclear fuel, Vickery said. <br><br>The business prospects have spurred the US-India Business Council, which represents 200 US businesses operating in India, to hire heavyweight lobbying firm Patton Boggs to work on the issue and hold strategy meetings about how to approach skeptics on Capitol Hill. Reports on the expenses of the American group's lobbying on India have not been filed. <br><br>But one of the quietest and most persistent efforts to influence Congress on India policy has come from the Confederation of Indian Industry, which represents some of India's most profitable companies. The group was among the top international organizations paying for congressional travel between 2000 and 2005, even though they were not registered to lobby at the time, according to a review of congressional disclosure records conducted by the Center for Public Integrity, a nonprofit research organization in Washington. <br><br>During that period, they paid more than $538,000 in travel expenses for trips by 19 Congress members, 11 spouses, and 58 congressional staffers, according to the records.<br><br>The group spent the most money on travel for Representative Jim McDermott, a Washington Democrat, and his staffers, whose four trips to India cost about $40,955. McDermott, a cofounder of the Congressional Caucus on India and Indian Americans, has not taken a formal position on the India nuclear proposal, according to his spokesman, Michael DeCesare. <br><br>DeCesare said the 2004 trip to India was intended to discuss AIDS in workplaces, and McDermott was not approached at that time on the nuclear issue.<br><br>Foreign organizations and governments are allowed to lobby the US government, but they must register with federal officials. <br><br>Of the 50 members serving on the House Foreign Relations Committee, eight had trips to India paid for by the Confederation, traveling or sending a staffer. One of the eight, Representative Barbara Lee, a California Democrat, voted against the proposal last week when the committee overwhelmingly approved the deal. <br><br>In April 2005, the Confederation registered to lobby for the first time, paying Barbour Griffith & Rogers , a well-connected lobbying firm, $520,000 to lobby US government agencies, including Congress, the White House, the State Department, and the Department of Defense. <br><br>Robert Blackwill , who served as ambassador to India and deputy national security adviser under Bush, was hired by the firm to run the effort. A former foreign policy staffer for Senator Chuck Hagel assisted. In September 2005, the embassy of India also hired the firm, paying $240,000. <br><br>Businesses on both sides of the ocean have advocated closer US-India ties for years. But the issue of India's nuclear program always got in the way.<br><br>``It was like a cinder in our eye," said Frank Wisner , another former ambassador to India who once served as chairman of the US-India Business Council. <br><br>Indian officials said the legislative deal will send a signal to businesses of a lasting alliance between the two countries and give a legal framework to their new relationship.<br><br>``There are going to be opportunities for investment and infrastructure and energy that are mind-boggling," said Raminder Jassal, deputy chief of mission at the Indian Embassy. <br><br>For decades, the United States and India distrusted one another. During the Cold War, India refused to take sides and embraced a socialist economy.<br><br>After its 1974 test, India refused US demands to sign the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, which gives five countries, including the United States, a right to retain nuclear weapons but prohibits others from developing them. <br><br>US efforts to contain India's nuclear program carried a price for US businesses. For instance, General Electric had to stop supplying nuclear fuel to Indian reactors.<br><br>By the early 1990s, when India moved to a more capitalist economy, trade flourished. But in 1998, India tested a nuclear device again and Congress responded by cutting off everything from the sales of high-powered computers to World Bank loans and engine parts for India's emerging space program. Indians resented the US sanctions, feeling as though the United States refused to acknowledge their country had become a world power. <br><br>President Clinton took steps to repair the relationship, but Bush has taken the effort further. He lifted the 1998 restrictions on India and launched a dialogue about military and economic cooperation, including a forum with American and Indian executives. <br><br>In 2005, Bush hosted Prime Minister Manmohan Singh of India at the White House and announced that he would initiate civilian nuclear cooperation . Siddharth Varadarajanhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/07721228307097170092noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-19172415.post-1151936336428737822006-07-03T07:18:00.000-07:002006-07-03T07:18:57.416-07:00Last Stand: The military's problem with Bush's Iran policy (Sy Hersh) <table class="printables" border="0" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" width="100%"> <tbody><tr> <td> <a name="top"></a> <table class="white" border="0" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" width="100%"> <tbody><tr> <td colspan="3" class="black" height="16" width="100%"><img src="http://www.newyorker.com/images/spacer.gif" alt="" border="0" height="1" hspace="0" vspace="0" width="1"></td> </tr> <tr> <td class="black" width="1"><img src="http://www.newyorker.com/images/spacer.gif" alt="" border="0" height="1" hspace="0" vspace="0" width="1"></td><td class="white" valign="top"> <div class="body"> <table border="0" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" width="100%"> <tbody><tr> <td> <div class="printableheader"> <a href="http://www.newyorker.com/main/start/"><img src="http://www.newyorker.com/images/printable_logo.gif" alt="" border="0" hspace="0" vspace="0"></a> <br> <img src="http://www.newyorker.com/images/spacer.gif" alt="" border="0" height="5" hspace="0" vspace="0" width="5"><br> <img src="http://www.newyorker.com/images/headers/he_fact.gif" alt="" border="0" hspace="0" vspace="0"><br> <img src="http://www.newyorker.com/images/rubrics/ru_ANNALS_OF_NATIONAL_SECURITY.gif" alt="" border="0" hspace="0" vspace="0"><br> <div class="title">LAST STAND</div> <div class="author">by SEYMOUR M. HERSH</div> <div class="summary">The military's problem with the President's Iran policy.</div> <div class="issuepublish">Issue of 2006-07-10<br>Posted 2006-07-03<br> <br> </div> </div> </td> </tr> </tbody></table> <div class="printablecontent"> <p class="descender">On May 31st, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice announced what appeared to be a major change in U.S. foreign policy. The Bush Administration, she said, would be willing to join Russia, China, and its European allies in direct talks with Iran about its nuclear program. There was a condition, however: the negotiations would not begin until, as the President put it in a June 19th speech at the U.S. Merchant Marine Academy, "the Iranian regime fully and verifiably suspends its uranium enrichment and reprocessing activities." Iran, which has insisted on its right to enrich uranium, was being asked to concede the main point of the negotiations before they started. The question was whether the Administration expected the Iranians to agree, or was laying the diplomatic groundwork for future military action. In his speech, Bush also talked about "freedom for the Iranian people," and he added, "Iran's leaders have a clear choice." There was an unspoken threat: the U.S. Strategic Command, supported by the Air Force, has been drawing up plans, at the President's direction, for a major bombing campaign in Iran.</p> <p>Inside the Pentagon, senior commanders have increasingly challenged the President's plans, according to active-duty and retired officers and officials. The generals and admirals have told the Administration that the bombing campaign will probably not succeed in destroying Iran's nuclear program. They have also warned that an attack could lead to serious economic, political, and military consequences for the United States. </p> <p>A crucial issue in the military's dissent, the officers said, is the fact that American and European intelligence agencies have not found specific evidence of clandestine activities or hidden facilities; the war planners are not sure what to hit. "The target array in Iran is huge, but it's amorphous," a high-ranking general told me. "The question we face is, When does innocent infrastructure evolve into something nefarious?" The high-ranking general added that the military's experience in Iraq, where intelligence on weapons of mass destruction was deeply flawed, has affected its approach to Iran. "We built this big monster with Iraq, and there was nothing there. This is son of Iraq," he said.</p> <p>"There is a war about the war going on inside the building," a Pentagon consultant said. "If we go, we have to <span class="italic">find</span> something." </p> <p>In President Bush's June speech, he accused Iran of pursuing a secret weapons program along with its civilian nuclear-research program (which it is allowed, with limits, under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty). The senior officers in the Pentagon do not dispute the President's contention that Iran intends to eventually build a bomb, but they are frustrated by the intelligence gaps. A former senior intelligence official told me that people in the Pentagon were asking, "What's the evidence? We've got a million tentacles out there, overt and covert, and these guys"—the Iranians—"have been working on this for eighteen years, and we have nothing? We're coming up with jack shit." </p> <p>A senior military official told me, "Even if we knew where the Iranian enriched uranium was—and we don't—we don't know where world opinion would stand. The issue is whether it's a clear and present danger. If you're a military planner, you try to weigh options. What is the capability of the Iranian response, and the likelihood of a punitive response—like cutting off oil shipments? What would that cost us?" Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld and his senior aides "really think they can do this on the cheap, and they underestimate the capability of the adversary," he said. </p> <p>In 1986, Congress authorized the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to act as the "principal military adviser" to the President. In this case, I was told, the current chairman, Marine General Peter Pace, has gone further in his advice to the White House by addressing the consequences of an attack on Iran. "Here's the military telling the President what he can't do <span class="italic">politically</span>"—raising concerns about rising oil prices, for example—the former senior intelligence official said. "The J.C.S. chairman going to the President with an economic argument—what's going on here?" (General Pace and the White House declined to comment. The Defense Department responded to a detailed request for comment by saying that the Administration was "working diligently" on a diplomatic solution and that it could not comment on classified matters.)</p> <p>A retired four-star general, who ran a major command, said, "The system is starting to sense the end of the road, and they don't want to be condemned by history. They want to be able to say, 'We stood up.' "</p> <img src="http://www.newyorker.com/images/spacer.gif" alt="" border="0" height="18" hspace="0" vspace="0" width="18"><br> <p class="descender">The military leadership is also raising tactical arguments against the proposal for bombing Iran, many of which are related to the consequences for Iraq. According to retired Army Major General William Nash, who was commanding general of the First Armored Division, served in Iraq and Bosnia, and worked for the United Nations in Kosovo, attacking Iran would heighten the risks to American and coalition forces inside Iraq. "What if one hundred thousand Iranian volunteers came across the border?" Nash asked. "If we bomb Iran, they cannot retaliate militarily by air—only on the ground or by sea, and only in Iraq or the Gulf. A military planner cannot discount that possibility, and he cannot make an ideological assumption that the Iranians wouldn't do it. We're not talking about victory or defeat—only about what damage Iran could do to our interests." Nash, now a senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, said, "Their first possible response would be to send forces into Iraq. And, since the Iraqi Army has limited capacity, it means that the coalition forces would have to engage them."</p> <p>The Americans serving as advisers to the Iraqi police and military may be at special risk, Nash added, since an American bombing "would be seen not only as an attack on Shiites but as an attack on all Muslims. Throughout the Middle East, it would likely be seen as another example of American imperialism. It would probably cause the war to spread."</p> <p>In contrast, some conservatives are arguing that America's position in Iraq would improve if Iran chose to retaliate there, according to a government consultant with close ties to the Pentagon's civilian leaders, because Iranian interference would divide the Shiites into pro- and anti-Iranian camps, and unify the Kurds and the Sunnis. The Iran hawks in the White House and the State Department, including Elliott Abrams and Michael Doran, both of whom are National Security Council advisers on the Middle East, also have an answer for those who believe that the bombing of Iran would put American soldiers in Iraq at risk, the consultant said. He described the counterargument this way: "Yes, there will be Americans under attack, but they are under attack now." </p> <p>Iran's geography would also complicate an air war. The senior military official said that, when it came to air strikes, "this is not Iraq," which is fairly flat, except in the northeast. "Much of Iran is akin to Afghanistan in terms of topography and flight mapping—a pretty tough target," the military official said. Over rugged terrain, planes have to come in closer, and "Iran has a lot of mature air-defense systems and networks," he said. "Global operations are always risky, and if we go down that road we have to be prepared to follow up with ground troops."</p> <p>The U.S. Navy has a separate set of concerns. Iran has more than seven hundred undeclared dock and port facilities along its Persian Gulf coast. The small ports, known as "invisible piers," were constructed two decades ago by Iran's Revolutionary Guards to accommodate small private boats used for smuggling. (The Guards relied on smuggling to finance their activities and enrich themselves.) The ports, an Iran expert who advises the U.S. government told me, provide "the infrastructure to enable the Guards to go after American aircraft carriers with suicide water bombers"—small vessels loaded with high explosives. He said that the Iranians have conducted exercises in the Strait of Hormuz, the narrow channel linking the Persian Gulf to the Arabian Sea and then on to the Indian Ocean. The strait is regularly traversed by oil tankers, in which a thousand small Iranian boats simulated attacks on American ships. "That would be the hardest problem we'd face in the water: a thousand small targets weaving in and out among our ships." </p> <p>America's allies in the Gulf also believe that an attack on Iran would endanger them, and many American military planners agree. "Iran can do a lot of things—all asymmetrical," a Pentagon adviser on counter-insurgency told me. "They have agents all over the Gulf, and the ability to strike at will." In May, according to a well-informed oil-industry expert, the Emir of Qatar made a private visit to Tehran to discuss security in the Gulf after the Iraq war. He sought some words of non-aggression from the Iranian leadership. Instead, the Iranians suggested that Qatar, which is the site of the regional headquarters of the U.S. Central Command, would be its first target in the event of an American attack. Qatar is a leading exporter of gas and currently operates several major offshore oil platforms, all of which would be extremely vulnerable. (Nasser bin Hamad M. al-Khalifa, Qatar's ambassador to Washington, denied that any threats were issued during the Emir's meetings in Tehran. He told me that it was "a very nice visit.") </p> <p>A retired American diplomat, who has experience in the Gulf, confirmed that the Qatari government is "very scared of what America will do" in Iran, and "scared to death" about what Iran would do in response. Iran's message to the oil-producing Gulf states, the retired diplomat said, has been that it will respond, and "you are on the wrong side of history." </p> <img src="http://www.newyorker.com/images/spacer.gif" alt="" border="0" height="18" hspace="0" vspace="0" width="18"><br> <p class="descender">In late April, the military leadership, headed by General Pace, achieved a major victory when the White House dropped its insistence that the plan for a bombing campaign include the possible use of a nuclear device to destroy Iran's uranium-enrichment plant at Natanz, nearly two hundred miles south of Tehran. The huge complex includes large underground facilities built into seventy-five-foot-deep holes in the ground and designed to hold as many as fifty thousand centrifuges. "Bush and Cheney were dead serious about the nuclear planning," the former senior intelligence official told me. "And Pace stood up to them. Then the world came back: 'O.K., the nuclear option is politically unacceptable.' " At the time, a number of retired officers, including two Army major generals who served in Iraq, Paul Eaton and Charles Swannack, Jr., had begun speaking out against the Administration's handling of the Iraq war. This period is known to many in the Pentagon as "the April Revolution." </p> <p>"An event like this doesn't get papered over very quickly," the former official added. "The bad feelings over the nuclear option are still felt. The civilian hierarchy feels extraordinarily betrayed by the brass, and the brass feel they were tricked into it"—the nuclear planning—"by being asked to provide all options in the planning papers."</p> <p>Sam Gardiner, a military analyst who taught at the National War College before retiring from the Air Force as a colonel, said that Rumsfeld's second-guessing and micromanagement were a fundamental problem. "Plans are more and more being directed and run by civilians from the Office of the Secretary of Defense," Gardiner said. "It causes a lot of tensions. I'm hearing that the military is increasingly upset about not being taken seriously by Rumsfeld and his staff." </p> <p>Gardiner went on, "The consequence is that, for Iran and other missions, Rumsfeld will be pushed more and more in the direction of special operations, where he has direct authority and does not have to put up with the objections of the Chiefs." Since taking office in 2001, Rumsfeld has been engaged in a running dispute with many senior commanders over his plans to transform the military, and his belief that future wars will be fought, and won, with airpower and Special Forces. That combination worked, at first, in Afghanistan, but the growing stalemate there, and in Iraq, has created a rift, especially inside the Army. The senior military official said, "The policymakers are in love with Special Ops—the guys on camels." </p> <p>The discord over Iran can, in part, be ascribed to Rumsfeld's testy relationship with the generals. They see him as high-handed and unwilling to accept responsibility for what has gone wrong in Iraq. A former Bush Administration official described a recent meeting between Rumsfeld and four-star generals and admirals at a military commanders' conference, on a base outside Washington, that, he was told, went badly. The commanders later told General Pace that "they didn't come here to be lectured by the Defense Secretary. They wanted to tell Rumsfeld what their concerns were." A few of the officers attended a subsequent meeting between Pace and Rumsfeld, and were unhappy, the former official said, when "Pace did not repeat any of their complaints. There was disappointment about Pace." The retired four-star general also described the commanders' conference as "very fractious." He added, "We've got twenty-five hundred dead, people running all over the world doing stupid things, and officers outside the Beltway asking, 'What the hell is going on?' "</p> <p>Pace's supporters say that he is in a difficult position, given Rumsfeld's penchant for viewing generals who disagree with him as disloyal. "It's a very narrow line between being responsive and effective and being outspoken and ineffective," the former senior intelligence official said. </p> <p>But Rumsfeld is not alone in the Administration where Iran is concerned; he is closely allied with Dick Cheney, and, the Pentagon consultant said, "the President generally defers to the Vice-President on all these issues," such as dealing with the specifics of a bombing campaign if diplomacy fails. "He feels that Cheney has an informational advantage. Cheney is not a renegade. He represents the conventional wisdom in all of this. He appeals to the strategic-bombing lobby in the Air Force—who think that carpet bombing is the solution to all problems." </p> <img src="http://www.newyorker.com/images/spacer.gif" alt="" border="0" height="18" hspace="0" vspace="0" width="18"><br> <p class="descender">Bombing may not work against Natanz, let alone against the rest of Iran's nuclear program. The possibility of using tactical nuclear weapons gained support in the Administration because of the belief that it was the only way to insure the destruction of Natanz's buried laboratories. When that option proved to be politically untenable (a nuclear warhead would, among other things, vent fatal radiation for miles), the Air Force came up with a new bombing plan, using advanced guidance systems to deliver a series of large bunker-busters—conventional bombs filled with high explosives—on the same target, in swift succession. The Air Force argued that the impact would generate sufficient concussive force to accomplish what a tactical nuclear warhead would achieve, but without provoking an outcry over what would be the first use of a nuclear weapon in a conflict since Nagasaki.</p> <p>The new bombing concept has provoked controversy among Pentagon planners and outside experts. Robert Pape, a professor at the University of Chicago who has taught at the Air Force's School of Advanced Air and Space Studies, told me, "We always have a few new toys, new gimmicks, and rarely do these new tricks lead to a phenomenal breakthrough. The dilemma is that Natanz is a very large underground area, and even if the roof came down we won't be able to get a good estimate of the bomb damage without people on the ground. We don't even know where it goes underground, and we won't have much confidence in assessing what we've actually done. Absent capturing an Iranian nuclear scientist and documents, it's impossible to set back the program for sure." </p> <p>One complicating aspect of the multiple-hit tactic, the Pentagon consultant told me, is "the liquefaction problem"—the fact that the soil would lose its consistency owing to the enormous heat generated by the impact of the first bomb. "It will be like bombing water, with its currents and eddies. The bombs would likely be diverted." Intelligence has also shown that for the past two years the Iranians have been shifting their most sensitive nuclear-related materials and production facilities, moving some into urban areas, in anticipation of a bombing raid.</p> <p>"The Air Force is hawking it to the other services," the former senior intelligence official said. "They're all excited by it, but they're being terribly criticized for it." The main problem, he said, is that the other services do not believe the tactic will work. "The Navy says, 'It's not our plan.' The Marines are against it—they know they're going to be the guys on the ground if things go south." </p> <p>"It's the bomber mentality," the Pentagon consultant said. "The Air Force is saying, 'We've got it covered, we can hit all the distributed targets.' " The Air Force arsenal includes a cluster bomb that can deploy scores of small bomblets with individual guidance systems to home in on specific targets. The weapons were deployed in Kosovo and during the early stages of the 2003 invasion of Iraq, and the Air Force is claiming that the same techniques can be used with larger bombs, allowing them to be targeted from twenty-five thousand feet against a multitude of widely dispersed targets. "The Chiefs all know that 'shock and awe' is dead on arrival," the Pentagon consultant said. "All except the Air Force."</p> <p>"Rumsfeld and Cheney are the pushers on this—they don't want to repeat the mistake of doing too little," the government consultant with ties to Pentagon civilians told me. "The lesson they took from Iraq is that there should have been more troops on the ground"—an impossibility in Iran, because of the overextension of American forces in Iraq—"so the air war in Iran will be one of overwhelming force." </p> <img src="http://www.newyorker.com/images/spacer.gif" alt="" border="0" height="18" hspace="0" vspace="0" width="18"><br> <p class="descender">Many of the Bush Administration's supporters view the abrupt change in negotiating policy as a deft move that won public plaudits and obscured the fact that Washington had no other good options. "The United States has done what its international partners have asked it to do," said Patrick Clawson, who is an expert on Iran and the deputy director for research at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, a conservative think tank. "The ball is now in their court—for both the Iranians and the Europeans." Bush's goal, Clawson said, was to assuage his allies, as well as Russia and China, whose votes, or abstentions, in the United Nations would be needed if the talks broke down and the U.S. decided to seek Security Council sanctions or a U.N. resolution that allowed for the use of force against Iran. </p> <p>"If Iran refuses to re-start negotiations, it will also be difficult for Russia and China to reject a U.N. call for International Atomic Energy Agency inspections," Clawson said. "And the longer we go without accelerated I.A.E.A. access, the more important the issue of Iran's hidden facilities will become." The drawback to the new American position, Clawson added, was that "the Iranians might take Bush's agreeing to join the talks as a sign that their hard line has worked."</p> <p>Clawson acknowledged that intelligence on Iran's nuclear-weapons progress was limited. "There was a time when we had reasonable confidence in what we knew," he said. "We could say, 'There's less time than we think,' or, 'It's going more slowly.' Take your choice. Lack of information is a problem, but we know they've made rapid progress with their centrifuges." (The most recent American intelligence estimate is that Iran could build a warhead sometime between 2010 and 2015.)</p> <p>Flynt Leverett, a former National Security Council aide for the Bush Administration, told me, "The only reason Bush and Cheney relented about talking to Iran was because they were within weeks of a diplomatic meltdown in the United Nations. Russia and China were going to stiff us"—that is, prevent the passage of a U.N. resolution. Leverett, a project director at the New America Foundation, added that the White House's proposal, despite offering trade and economic incentives for Iran, has not "resolved any of the fundamental contradictions of U.S. policy." The precondition for the talks, he said—an open-ended halt to all Iranian enrichment activity—"amounts to the President wanting a guarantee that they'll surrender before he talks to them. Iran cannot accept long-term constraints on its fuel-cycle activity as part of a settlement without a security guarantee"—for example, some form of mutual non-aggression pact with the United States. </p> <p>Leverett told me that, without a change in U.S. policy, the balance of power in the negotiations will shift to Russia. "Russia sees Iran as a beachhead against American interests in the Middle East, and they're playing a very sophisticated game," he said. "Russia is quite comfortable with Iran having nuclear fuel cycles that would be monitored, and they'll support the Iranian position"—in part, because it gives them the opportunity to sell billions of dollars' worth of nuclear fuel and materials to Tehran. "They believe they can manage their long- and short-term interests with Iran, and still manage the security interests," Leverett said. China, which, like Russia, has veto power on the Security Council, was motivated in part by its growing need for oil, he said. "They don't want punitive measures, such as sanctions, on energy producers, and they don't want to see the U.S. take a unilateral stance on a state that matters to them." But, he said, "they're happy to let Russia take the lead in this." (China, a major purchaser of Iranian oil, is negotiating a multibillion-dollar deal with Iran for the purchase of liquefied natural gas over a period of twenty-five years.) As for the Bush Administration, he added, "unless there's a shift, it's only a question of when its policy falls apart."</p> <p>It's not clear whether the Administration will be able to keep the Europeans in accord with American policy if the talks break down. Morton Abramowitz, a former head of State Department intelligence, who was one of the founders of the International Crisis Group, said, "The world is different than it was three years ago, and while the Europeans want good relations with us, they will not go to war with Iran unless they know that an exhaustive negotiating effort was made by Bush. There's just too much involved, like the price of oil. There will be great pressure put on the Europeans, but I don't think they'll roll over and support a war." </p> <p>The Europeans, like the generals at the Pentagon, are concerned about the quality of intelligence. A senior European intelligence official said that while "there was every reason to assume" that the Iranians were working on a bomb, there wasn't enough evidence to exclude the possibility that they were bluffing, and hadn't moved beyond a civilian research program. The intelligence official was not optimistic about the current negotiations. "It's a mess, and I don't see any possibility, at the moment, of solving the problem," he said. "The only thing to do is contain it. The question is, What is the redline? Is it when you master the nuclear fuel cycle? Or is it just about building a bomb?" Every country had a different criterion, he said. One worry he had was that, in addition to its security concerns, the Bush Administration was driven by its interest in "democratizing" the region. "The United States is on a mission," he said.</p> <p>A European diplomat told me that his government would be willing to discuss Iran's security concerns—a dialogue he said Iran offered Washington three years ago. The diplomat added that "no one wants to be faced with the alternative if the negotiations don't succeed: either accept the bomb or bomb them. That's why our goal is to keep the pressure on, and see what Iran's answer will be." </p> <p>A second European diplomat, speaking of the Iranians, said, "Their tactic is going to be to stall and appear reasonable—to say, 'Yes, but . . .' We know what's going on, and the timeline we're under. The Iranians have repeatedly been in violation of I.A.E.A. safeguards and have given us years of coverup and deception. The international community does not want them to have a bomb, and if we let them continue to enrich that's throwing in the towel—giving up before we talk." The diplomat went on, "It would be a mistake to predict an inevitable failure of our strategy. Iran is a regime that is primarily concerned with its own survival, and if its existence is threatened it would do whatever it needed to do—including backing down."</p> <p>The Iranian regime's calculations about its survival also depend on internal political factors. The nuclear program is popular with the Iranian people, including those—the young and the secular—who are most hostile to the religious leadership. Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, the President of Iran, has effectively used the program to rally the nation behind him, and against Washington. Ahmadinejad and the ruling clerics have said that they believe Bush's goal is not to prevent them from building a bomb but to drive them out of office. </p> <p>Several current and former officials I spoke to expressed doubt that President Bush would settle for a negotiated resolution of the nuclear crisis. A former high-level Pentagon civilian official, who still deals with sensitive issues for the government, said that Bush remains confident in his military decisions. The President and others in the Administration often invoke Winston Churchill, both privately and in public, as an example of a politician who, in his own time, was punished in the polls but was rewarded by history for rejecting appeasement. In one speech, Bush said, Churchill "seemed like a Texan to me. He wasn't afraid of public-opinion polls. . . . He charged ahead, and the world is better for it." </p> <img src="http://www.newyorker.com/images/spacer.gif" alt="" border="0" height="18" hspace="0" vspace="0" width="18"><br> <p class="descender">The Israelis have insisted for years that Iran has a clandestine program to build a bomb, and will do so as soon as it can. Israeli officials have emphasized that their "redline" is the moment Iran masters the nuclear fuel cycle, acquiring the technical ability to produce weapons-grade uranium. "Iran managed to surprise everyone in terms of the enrichment capability," one diplomat familiar with the Israeli position told me, referring to Iran's announcement, this spring, that it had successfully enriched uranium to the 3.6-per-cent level needed to fuel a nuclear-power reactor. The Israelis believe that Iran must be stopped as soon as possible, because, once it is able to enrich uranium for fuel, the next step—enriching it to the ninety-per-cent level needed for a nuclear bomb—is merely a mechanical process. </p> <p>Israeli intelligence, however, has also failed to provide specific evidence about secret sites in Iran, according to current and former military and intelligence officials. In May, Prime Minister Ehud Olmert visited Washington and, addressing a joint session of Congress, said that Iran "stands on the verge of acquiring nuclear weapons" that would pose "an existential threat" to Israel. Olmert noted that Ahmadinejad had questioned the reality of the Holocaust, and he added, "It is not Israel's threat alone. It is a threat to all those committed to stability in the Middle East and to the well-being of the world at large." But at a secret intelligence exchange that took place at the Pentagon during the visit, the Pentagon consultant said, "what the Israelis provided fell way short" of what would be needed to publicly justify preventive action. </p> <p>The issue of what to do, and when, seems far from resolved inside the Israeli government. Martin Indyk, a former U.S. Ambassador to Israel, who is now the director of the Brookings Institution's Saban Center for Middle East Policy, told me, "Israel would like to see diplomacy succeed, but they're worried that in the meantime Iran will cross a threshold of nuclear know-how—and they're worried about an American military attack not working. They assume they'll be struck first in retaliation by Iran." Indyk added, "At the end of the day, the United States can live with Iranian, Pakistani, and Indian nuclear bombs—but for Israel there's no Mutual Assured Destruction. If they have to live with an Iranian bomb, there will be a great deal of anxiety in Israel, and a lot of tension between Israel and Iran, and between Israel and the U.S."</p> <img src="http://www.newyorker.com/images/spacer.gif" alt="" border="0" height="18" hspace="0" vspace="0" width="18"><br> <p class="descender">Iran has not, so far, officially answered President Bush's proposal. But its initial response has been dismissive. In a June 22nd interview with the <span class="italic">Guardian</span>, Ali Larijani, Iran's chief nuclear negotiator, rejected Washington's demand that Iran suspend all uranium enrichment before talks could begin. "If they want to put this prerequisite, why are we negotiating at all?" Larijani said. "We should put aside the sanctions and give up all this talk about regime change." He characterized the American offer as a "sermon," and insisted that Iran was not building a bomb. "We don't want the bomb," he said. Ahmadinejad has said that Iran would make a formal counterproposal by August 22nd, but last week Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, Iran's supreme religious leader, declared, on state radio, "Negotiation with the United States has no benefits for us."</p> <p>Despite the tough rhetoric, Iran would be reluctant to reject a dialogue with the United States, according to Giandomenico Picco, who, as a representative of the United Nations, helped to negotiate the ceasefire that ended the Iran-Iraq War, in 1988. "If you engage a superpower, you feel you are a superpower," Picco told me. "And now the haggling in the Persian bazaar begins. We are negotiating over a carpet"—the suspected weapons program—"that we're not sure exists, and that we don't want to exist. And if at the end there never was a carpet it'll be the negotiation of the century." </p> <p>If the talks do break down, and the Administration decides on military action, the generals will, of course, follow their orders; the American military remains loyal to the concept of civilian control. But some officers have been pushing for what they call the "middle way," which the Pentagon consultant described as "a mix of options that require a number of Special Forces teams and air cover to protect them to send into Iran to grab the evidence so the world will know what Iran is doing." He added that, unlike Rumsfeld, he and others who support this approach were under no illusion that it could bring about regime change. The goal, he said, was to resolve the Iranian nuclear crisis. </p> <p> Mohamed ElBaradei, the director general of the I.A.E.A., said in a speech this spring that his agency believed there was still time for diplomacy to achieve that goal. "We should have learned some lessons from Iraq," ElBaradei, who won the Nobel Peace Prize last year, said. "We should have learned that we should be very careful about assessing our intelligence. . . . We should have learned that we should try to exhaust every possible diplomatic means to solve the problem before thinking of any other enforcement measures." </p> <p> He went on, "When you push a country into a corner, you are always giving the driver's seat to the hard-liners. . . . If Iran were to move out of the nonproliferation regime altogether, if Iran were to develop a nuclear weapon program, we clearly will have a much, much more serious problem." <img src="http://www.newyorker.com/images/dingbat.gif" alt="" border="0" hspace="0" vspace="0"></p> <br> <br> </div> </div> </td><td class="black" width="1"><img src="http://www.newyorker.com/images/spacer.gif" alt="" border="0" height="1" hspace="0" vspace="0" width="1"></td> </tr> <tr> <td colspan="3" class="black" height="16" width="100%"><img src="http://www.newyorker.com/images/spacer.gif" alt="" border="0" height="1" hspace="0" vspace="0" width="1"></td> </tr> </tbody></table> </td> </tr> </tbody></table> <table border="0" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0"> <tbody><tr> <td><noscript><img src="/images/stats/zag.gif?Log=1&URL=/javascript_disabled" border="0" width="1" height="1"></noscript><br></td> </tr> </tbody></table> Siddharth Varadarajanhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/07721228307097170092noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-19172415.post-1148897294915436952006-05-29T03:08:00.000-07:002006-05-29T03:08:20.200-07:00Dragon-elephant ties no zero-sum game<div style="width: 600px; background-color: rgb(255, 255, 255); padding-bottom: 10px;" align="left"><img src="http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/image_e/logo_cdcomcn_1.gif" height="55" width="410"></div><div style="width: 600px; background-color: rgb(255, 255, 255);" align="left"> <div id="title"> <p class="a-black-1"><a href="http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/china.html" class="a-black-1">CHINA</a><strong> / <span class="">National</span> </strong> </p> </div></div><div style="width: 600px; background-color: rgb(255, 255, 255); padding-bottom: 10px; padding-left: 10px;" align="left"> <span style="font-size: 18pt; font-family: Verdana,Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif;">Dragon-elephant ties no zero-sum game</span><br> <span style="font-size: 9pt; font-family: Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif;"> (Media Release)<br> Updated: 2006-05-29 09:33</span> <span style="font-size: 11pt; font-family: Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif;"> <p>Expressing its commitment to a multi-polar world, India has assured China that it is not pursuing a "balance of power" policy and is not being used to "contain" China. </p><p>Ahead of Indian Defence Minister Pranab Mukherjee's visit to China starting Sunday, Indian Ambassador to Beijing Nalin Surie said: "On our part let me say that India does not pursue a balance of power policy, nor has it done so in the past. Our commitment to a multi-polar world is of long standing and a basic principle of independent India's foreign policy." </p><p>"If there are more centres of economic activity, if there are more centres of political influence, if there are varied founts of culture, the more diversified the world order and regional order become, the greater the interaction among peoples and countries and the greater will be the chance of maintaining peace and security," he said. </p><p>"India seeks an international environment which is supportive of and contributes to her developmental goals," he said in a major foreign policy speech here at the prestigious Peking University on the occasion of the ongoing 10-day "India Festival". "Let me underline that diversity and tolerance are the hallmark and enduring strength of India and Indian civilization." </p><p>At the same time, the world has recognized India's emergence as a responsible nuclear weapon state and this has required India to shoulder additional regional and global responsibility, Surie said, while assuring Beijing that New Delhi is not being used to "contain" China. </p><p>His remarks came amid fears expressed by the opponents of the Indo-US nuclear deal which, they claim, is aimed at containing China. </p><p>However, Surie acknowledged that the rapid development of India-China bilateral relations in recent years and "our rapid economic development has understandably begun to elicit worldwide interest, comparison and comment". </p><p>"Analysts, writers and commentators in the international media and even some academics have now begun essaying us as rivals and competitors and picking favourites from the two," he noted. </p><p>"There is no doubt a self serving element in this effort... It will benefit neither of our peoples to see our relations as a zero-sum game. Our developing bilateral relations are not a zero sum game. They are a positive sum game not only for both our countries but for Asia and I believe for the whole world," he said. </p><p>India and China together can be a great force for good, for development, for peace and common prosperity," Surie said. </p><p>"Cooperation between the two most populous and among the fastest growing economies in the world is also important for peace in the region, in Asia and the world," he said. "We have undoubtedly had a difficult phase in our relationship in the past. But that is behind us," Surie said, referring to the 1962 conflict as well as other differences between New Delhi and Beijing. </p><p>"This is clearly reflected in the June 2003 Declaration and April 2005 Joint Statement signed by our prime ministers. There is growing space for both our countries as they develop and integrate further into the global economy," he said as both Indian and Chinese governments are jointly celebrating 2006 as the "India-China Friendship Year". </p><p>Commenting on the current trends in India-China ties, Surie said they were developing and moving in the right direction. "We are engaged in the process of improving them further. While we are on this path it will be important not to be thrown off-track by rhetorical or motivated questions and scenarios of who will win - the dragon or the elephant." He acknowledged a series of high-level visits has helped ratchet the quality of the relationship to a higher plane. </p><p>On the vexed border issue, Surie noted that the two special representatives, appointed in 2003 to explore from the political perspective of the overall bilateral relationship the framework of a boundary settlement, have started work on the second phase of their work in right earnest. </p><p>"The second phase has now begun in right earnest. In this phase it is the expectation that the Special Representatives will draw up an agreed framework for the resolution of the boundary based on the agreed political parameters and guiding principles," he said. </p><p>Both sides have agreed at the highest level that they are not a threat to each other and both sides will qualitatively enhance the bilateral relationship at all levels and in all areas while addressing differences through peaceful means in a fair, reasonable and mutually acceptable manner, he said. </p><p>"It is also our intention not to let our differences affect the overall development of bilateral relations." </p><p>Surie pointed out that if one reviews the progress in bilateral ties over the last six years it is clear that our relations have entered a dynamic phase. "The task ahead is to make this process self generating, self sustaining and to mutual benefit."</p> </span> <div style="margin-top: 20px;" align="center">Copyright By <a href="http://chinadaily.com.cn">chinadaily.com.cn</a>. All rights reserved</div></div><br>Siddharth Varadarajanhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/07721228307097170092noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-19172415.post-1148559562393647242006-05-25T05:19:00.000-07:002006-05-25T05:19:22.483-07:00Iran could be west’s trial run — Mbeki<span style="background-color: rgb(51, 204, 0);">Iran could be west's trial run — Mbeki </span><br style="background-color: rgb(51, 204, 0);"><br><a href="http://www.businessday.co.za/articles/topstories.aspx?ID=BD4A205658"> http://www.businessday.co.za/articles/topstories.aspx?ID=BD4A205658</a><br>25 May 2006<br><br>Jonathan Katzenellenbogen<br>International Affairs Editor<br><br>WESTERN states could be putting pressure on Iran in a "trial run" to prevent countries without nuclear weapons from enriching uranium, President Thabo Mbeki said last night. <br><br>If Iran's peaceful nuclear ambitions were blocked, other signatories to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), which include SA, might have to forgo this right at some stage, Mbeki said at a dinner in London. <br><br>In this light, he said, Iran's rights to the peaceful use of nuclear technology needed to be protected like those of other countries. <br><br>"So the Iran thing is not unique in itself, but is a pacesetter for (what) might happen in the future," he said. <br><br>"We believe that Iran's rights in this regard need to be protected. In part we are raising this because you get these whispers that Iran constitutes a trial run, and if there is success in terms of prohibiting Iran to do the things they are permitted by the (non-proliferation) treaty, that will be extended to all other countries." <br><br>Mbeki also warned that placing the Iranian nuclear programme before the United Nations (UN) Security Council could raise tension. <br><br> "You will have escalating actions taken by the security council which will lead to conflict that nobody should really want." <br><br>He said SA would prefer the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to handle the Iranian question. <br><br>Mbeki's remarks at the dinner, ahead of his meeting yesterday with British Prime Minister Tony Blair, highlighted the stark differences between SA and the UK, the other five permanent members of the security council and Germany, which are putting pressure on Iran to drop its uranium enrichment programme. <br><br> Earlier this year, SA abstained from an IAEA vote, which was passed, proposing that Iran be referred to the security council over its programme. <br><br>"So that you not only have a small club of nuclear weapon states, but then you also have a small club of countries that can do anything at all in terms of developing nuclear technology for peaceful purposes," Mbeki said. He also said that "in all our interactions, the Iranians will insist that they are committed" to peaceful nuclear use and pointed to ayatollahs having issued a fatwa against the production of nuclear weapons. <br><br>SA had undertaken to help in confidence-building measures to convince the international community that Iran's intentions were peaceful, Mbeki said. <br><br>Earlier in London, senior officials from security council permanent members and Germany met to weigh up a package of incentives and threats drafted by European Union (EU) leaders to defuse the nuclear stand-off with Iran, but both sides dampened hope of a breakthrough arrangement. <br><br>Iran says it has mastered a limited uranium enrichment cycle. <br><br>The EU package is likely to include an offer of a light-water reactor and an assured supply from abroad of fuel for civilian atomic plants so that Iran would not have to enrich uranium itself. The package will also warn of possible targeted sanctions if Iran, the world's fourth-biggest oil producer, refuses the offer. <br><br>Diplomats said they would first discuss sanctions aimed at officials involved in Iran's nuclear programme before seeking ways to halt trade deals. <br><br>But some EU officials, many security analysts and the IAEA say Washington should start direct dialogue with Iran after 26 years of official silence. They believe the only way to entice Iran back to good-faith negotiations and get it to stop seeking sensitive atomic know-how would be a US pledge not to try to topple Tehran's Islamic government. <br><br>IAEA chief Mohamed ElBaradei was expected to tell US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice in talks in Washington yesterday that US-Iranian engagement was vital to resolving the crisis, said Vienna-based diplomats familiar with ElBaradei's thinking. <br><br>A defiant Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad yesterday urged "resistance" in the dispute, and said Iran would deliver a "historic slap in the face" to any state that tried to deprive it of nuclear technology . <br><br>In Washington, Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert said in an address to the US congress yesterday that Iran posed a threat to Israel's existence and urged swift international action. <br><br> "A nuclear Iran means a terrorist state could achieve the primary mission for which terrorists live and die: the mass destruction of innocent human life." With Reuters <br><br>---- <br>Siddharth Varadarajan<br>Deputy Editor<br>The Hindu<br>I.N.S. Building, Rafi Marg<br>New Delhi - 1<br><br>Telephone: +91-11-2371-5426<br>Fax: +91-11-2371-8158<br>Mobile: +91-98111-60260<br><br>The Hindu: <a href="http://www.thehindu.com">http://www.thehindu.com</a><br>My personal website: <a href="http://svaradarajan.blogspot.com">http://svaradarajan.blogspot.com</a><br> Siddharth Varadarajanhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/07721228307097170092noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-19172415.post-1147702067535214722006-05-15T07:07:00.000-07:002006-05-15T07:07:47.546-07:00Kremlin Voices Concern at U.S. Conventional Missile Plans<p class="mobile-post">Kremlin Voices Concern at U.S. Conventional Missile Plans</p><p class="mobile-post">By AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE, MOSCOW</p><p class="mobile-post">05/11/06</p><p class="mobile-post"> The Kremlin voiced worry May 11 at reported U.S. plans to mount<br />non-nuclear warheads on intercontinental strategic missiles to strike<br />targets anywhere in the world within minutes with no prior warning and<br />called for talks on subject.<br />"I think this would be an irresponsible decision," said Sergei<br />Sobyanin, the newly-appointed head of President Vladimir Putin's<br />Kremlin administration, in a briefing to a group of foreign reporters.<br />The use of such a weapon could produce confusion and an unpredictable<br />response from other countries, Sobyanin said.<br />"This is an extremely dangerous trend," he said, adding: "There needs<br />to be a dialogue about this."<br />Although he did not directly name the United States, Putin on May 10<br />also raised Russia's concern over plans to put conventional warheads<br />on intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), weapons long at the<br />center of the former U.S.-Soviet Cold War arms race and key<br />disarmament treaties.<br />"The launch of one such missile may trigger an inadequate response<br />from the nuclear powers, including a full-scale retaliatory strike<br />with the use of strategic nuclear forces," Putin said in his annual<br />state of the nation address.<br />A U.S. Defense Department report posted on the Internet states that<br />plans to incorporate conventional weapons capabilities into U.S.<br />strategic nuclear forces have been under investigation since Congress<br />called for a post-Cold War review of the country's nuclear deterrent<br />forces in 2001.<br />Western arms experts have cautioned, however, that Russia in<br />particular would have to be provided with some way of distinguishing a<br />conventionally-armed ICBM from a nuclear-tipped ICBM to ensure that<br />any use of such a weapon was not a nuclear strike.<br />U.S. experts say that conventional ICBMs would give the option of<br />striking a target anywhere on Earth within about 30 minutes and with a<br />large element of surprise, since there is no reliance on easily<br />detectable ships or aircraft.</p><p class="mobile-post">-- <br />Siddharth Varadarajan<br />Deputy Editor<br />The Hindu<br />I.N.S. Building, Rafi Marg<br />New Delhi - 1</p><p class="mobile-post">Telephone: +91-11-2371-5426<br />Fax: +91-11-2371-8158<br />Mobile: +91-98111-60260</p><p class="mobile-post">The Hindu: http://www.thehindu.com<br />My personal website: http://svaradarajan.blogspot.com</p>Siddharth Varadarajanhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/07721228307097170092noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-19172415.post-1147701873474157842006-05-15T07:04:00.000-07:002006-05-15T07:04:33.630-07:00Pentagon Defends Global-Strike Plan -- Conventional warheads for SLBMs<p class="mobile-post">Pentagon Defends Global-Strike Plan<br />Wade Boese</p><p class="mobile-post">Arms Control Today May 2006</p><p class="mobile-post">A recently unveiled initiative to arm some U.S. submarine-launched<br />ballistic missiles (SLBMs) with conventional warheads has lawmakers<br />wondering whether dangerous misunderstandings and miscalculations<br />could arise with other nuclear powers, particularly Russia. Pentagon<br />officials downplay the possibility, contending that the benefits of<br />the new capability outweigh the potential risks.</p><p class="mobile-post">The Department of Defense is asking Congress this year for $127<br />million to start replacing nuclear warheads with conventional warheads<br />on 24 Trident D-5 SLBMs. Within two years, two dozen missiles would be<br />equally dispersed among 12 separate submarines, which means each<br />vessel would carry 22 nuclear-armed and two conventional-armed<br />missiles. The conventional warheads, four per missile, would be either<br />a solid slug or a bundle of rods known as a flachette round, not<br />explosive warheads.</p><p class="mobile-post">Although the Bush administration revealed its intentions to pursue<br />conventional global-strike capabilities in its December 2001 Nuclear<br />Posture Review, the SLBM option was first detailed in early February<br />as part of the Quadrennial Defense Review. (See ACT, March 2006.) The<br />so-called prompt global-strike concept behind the SLBM conversion<br />seeks to enable the United States to attack a target anywhere in the<br />world with a conventional warhead in less than an hour.</p><p class="mobile-post">At a March 29 hearing of the Senate Armed Services Strategic Forces<br />Subcommittee, legislators expressed some unease about the SLBM<br />proposal. Subcommittee chairman Jeff Sessions (R-Ala.) and ranking<br />member Bill Nelson (D-Fla.) both questioned whether submarines with<br />mixed loads might cause confusion for other countries about the type<br />of missile fired and its intended target. In such a circumstance, they<br />worried a country might mistakenly conclude that it was under U.S.<br />nuclear attack and potentially retaliate with nuclear weapons.</p><p class="mobile-post">Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Policy Peter<br />Flory said the Pentagon takes this concern "very seriously." However,<br />he and General James Cartwright, commander of U.S. Strategic Command,<br />minimized the danger of miscalculation. In addition to its traditional<br />mission of exercising operational control over deployed nuclear<br />forces, Strategic Command over the past few years also has been tasked<br />with overseeing the development and fielding of missile defenses and<br />global-strike capabilities.</p><p class="mobile-post">Flory said that the United States has emergency communication<br />mechanisms, such as hotlines, with Russia and China "for mitigating<br />any potential risk of misperception." Cartwright and Flory also stated<br />the United States would rely on advance notification measures and<br />military-to-military talks to help alleviate uncertainty. They further<br />asserted the launch and trajectory of a conventional system could be<br />made to appear differently than that of a nuclear missile.</p><p class="mobile-post">Cartwright also made the case that the United States has a long record<br />of launching non-nuclear missiles without a negative incident. "Since<br />1968, we've launched 433 of these warheads on these missiles without<br />ambiguity through notification processes," Cartwright testified. The<br />general was referring to SLBM and land-based ICBM test launches not<br />involving nuclear warheads, a spokesperson from Strategic Command told<br />Arms Control Today April 21.</p><p class="mobile-post">Claiming that Russia is the sole country with the current capability<br />to detect and respond rapidly to a ballistic missile launch, Flory<br />argued that "the Russians will know very quickly as they have all the<br />way through the Cold War and up to today what the trajectory is and<br />where the impact points will be."</p><p class="mobile-post">Still, Russia detected a missile launch near Norway in January 1995<br />that led Kremlin leaders to be notified that the United States might<br />have initiated a surprise nuclear attack. Moscow did not immediately<br />order a counterattack and, after anxious minutes, eventually<br />determined that the "missile," which was a scientific rocket, posed no<br />threat.</p><p class="mobile-post">Flory and Cartwright maintained that proceeding with conventional<br />SLBMs was worthwhile. Cartwright contended such a capability gives the<br />United States an option for dealing with "fleeting targets" that have<br />a high "regret" factor if they are not destroyed, such as<br />unconventional weapons threats, enemy command and control elements,<br />and terrorists. "In many cases, nuclear weapons are not going to be an<br />appropriate choice for those types of targets, and so you want a<br />conventional alternative," Cartwright said.</p><p class="mobile-post">SLBMs were selected over ICBMs as the inaugural conventional prompt<br />global-strike option in part because of their greater accuracy and<br />global range. U.S. ICBM fields are in Montana, North Dakota, and<br />Wyoming, limiting the missiles' reach and increasing possible<br />overflight and miscalculation problems, particularly with Russia.</p>Siddharth Varadarajanhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/07721228307097170092noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-19172415.post-1147617021254270232006-05-14T07:30:00.000-07:002006-05-14T07:30:21.253-07:00Iran's oil exchange to trade oil for euros, not dollars: Russian analysis<div> <p> <br>14.05.2006 Source: URL: <a href="http://english.pravda.ru/world/asia/80261-iran_oil-0">http://english.pravda.ru/world/asia/80261-iran_oil-0</a></p> <p>On the 5th of May Iran registered its Oil Exchange, which will become the fifth Stock Exchange of its kind in the world. Other exchanges operate in New York, London, Singapore and Tokyo. Which exact companies will be allowed to trade at this Exchange is, like the official opening, still unknown. Yet the Iranian Exchange will be unique, as all trading will be conducted in Euros. On the already functioning Stock Exchanges business is conducted in dollars and, because of this, the specific term 'petrodollars' came into use. If the Iranian Petroleum Exchange allows the major oil companies to trade on its floor then the dollar seriously risks losing its position in the world market. This is a possibility that many experts already consider very plausible. </p> <p><strong>Will the situation change on the World Oil Market? How will the opening of the Oil Exchange affect the rate of the dollar?</strong></p> <p>The present happenings in the Oil Market are already well known – the price of oil will continue to grow. But what changes will occur with the creation of the new Exchange? From now on will all the oil have to be purchased from the Iranian Exchange? With the opening of the new exchange neither the price of milk will rise nor will it decrease in quantity. This is a fully political gesture on the part of Iran. </p> <p>As concerns the introduction of trading with the euro, this corresponds perfectly with the present direction of the world economy: the dollar falls and the euro gets stronger.</p> <p>If we compare the presumed turnover of the Iranian Exchange and the full turnover of the economy of the USA we will see that the same mistakes are still being made. The dollar will continue to fall while the price continues to grow on oil. The growth will continue as long as American pursues its present political agenda. The USA of course has its dividends - to raise the competitiveness of its own goods. </p> <p>Iran declares that with the opening of the Exchange it hopes to reduce the influence of America on its own economy and the economy of the region. But can it achieve this?</p> <p>At present the USA has practically no influence on Iran and its economy. In turn Iran does not have the potential to influence USA politics. Therefore, from the Iranian perspective, they are prepared to make their different political declarations and gestures. The end, however, is easy to miscalculate. It could lead to the liquidation of Iran's atomic aspirations. </p> <p>So the creation of this new Exchange, the games of Iran, in which they continue to play, will carry on until Uncle Sam decides to put his foot down, for when he does, the games will soon come to an end.</p> <p><strong>Will Iran gain any profit from the opening of the new Oil Exchange?</strong></p> <p>Undoubtedly Iran has the potential for economic profit. Yet the creation of the Exchange will, however, not play a defining role in the in the Iranian economy, with or without the euro Iran has its own political agenda and economic motives have, for a long time, not played a very important role. One main concern is that Iran is governed, not only by political motives, but by deeply rooted religious ones as well. </p> <p>Russia has now to adjust its focus of attention from the economic area to the political. By this I mean her new political energy agenda.</p> <p>What's more, these new events will, in no way, have an affect on the world's economic direction. Just as the prices on oil and gas have grown, so they will continue to grow.</p> <p><strong>How long will the rise in energy prices continue?</strong></p> <p>This will eventually lead towards a crisis that will hit the economy of the oil producing countries. To begin with, I think, it will quickly strike the developing countries such as China and India, followed later by Europe and the USA. </p> <p>At this very moment we are seeing the same crisis, only in a slower from, that already occurred when the Arabian countries established an embargo. Now it is just on a larger scale, though, in reality, it is the same thing. </p> <p>The point is not that the 'world does not have sufficient oil' for this simply isn't true. World supplies of oil will last us yet many more years, but for the West there exists the problem of Iran, problems of the new Latin American countries, terrorism from the East, Russia, and the constant concerns of energy which still leave the West feeling very insecure. And all these problems are coming from the very countries that provide the west with its energy. </p> <p>The price, therefore, continues to rise but in reality a barrel of oil is still sold at a cheap price.</p> <p>However, the desire to reduce the consumption of oil in order to find different sources of energy does still not exist, despite the fact that these alternatives are now ready for development. The problem of thermal reactors is still being dealt with very ineffectively, while the use of other forms of energy are inexhaustible, and could help solve the present energy problem. In theory this is a task that will be decided in the next century. </p> <p>There is, of course, the possibility to use hydrate methane, another powerful source of energy, and, if it were developed and used effectively, would provide the same amount of energy reserves as oil and gas combined. </p> <p>So in fact there are solutions to the present day problems, only there is not the political desire to realize them.</p> <p>And when the political situation reaches its peak, when Iran and Saudi Arabia decide to shut off the supply to the west, then it will be the west that will have to find and develop these alternative fuel sources.</p> <p>Politcom</p> <p>Translated by Guerman Grachev<br>Pravda.Ru</p> <p> © 1999-2006. «PRAVDA.Ru». When reproducing our materials in whole or in part, hyperlink to PRAVDA.Ru should be made. The opinions and views of the authors do not always coincide with the point of view of PRAVDA.Ru 's editors. </p> <p>[LiveInternet: показано число просмотров и посетителей за 24 часа]</p> <p>Rambler's Top100 </p></div> <div> </div> <div>Siddharth Varadarajanhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/07721228307097170092noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-19172415.post-1147616818301465142006-05-14T07:26:00.000-07:002006-05-14T07:26:58.313-07:00Iran's oil stock exchange, next week<div> <p>IRIB, 26 April 2006</p> <p>Tehran, April 26 - Oil Minister Kazem Vaziri Hamaneh said on Wednesday that the establishment of Oil Stock Exchange is in its final stage and the bourse will be launched in Iran in the next week.</p> <p>He told reporters, upon arrival from Qatar where he attended the 10th General Assembly of International Energy Agency and consultations with OPEC member states, that registration of the Oil Stock Exchange is underway and the entity will operate after being approved by by Council of Stock Exchange. </p> <p>He rejected a statement attributed to him saying that Oil Stock Exchange will bring to the ground the US economy and said, "I don't know who has speculated that I've not talked about US economy." Asked about conference on energy in Doha, he said that more than 60 countries and 30 oil companies and consultants took part in the conference. </p> <p>Vaziri Hamaneh said that serious discussions were held including security of supply and demand, security of investment in energy and environment issues.</p> <p>"The best method for security of demand in the oil sector is that consumers should be given opportunity to enter into partnership with the suppliers in investment in oil industry." He said that the conference called for diversifying energy resources and cooperation of the developed states with the countries possessing oil and gas resources. </p> <p>Asked about the oil price rise, Vaziri-Hamaneh said that oil price is being influenced by political situation, whereas it should be freed from political impacts and economic and technical fundamentals should determine the oil prices. </p> <p>"As long as political impacts dominate the oil market, price hike will continue," he concluded.</p></div> <div> </div> <div>Siddharth Varadarajanhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/07721228307097170092noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-19172415.post-1147616698817217262006-05-14T07:24:00.000-07:002006-05-14T07:24:58.823-07:00Euro oil bourse: Iran signs its own death warrant<div> <p>By Jerome R. Corsi</p> <p>May 8, 2006<br><br>© 2006 WorldNetDaily.com</p> <p><a href="http://www.worldnetdaily.com/news/article.asp?ARTICLE_ID=50100">http://www.worldnetdaily.com/news/article.asp?ARTICLE_ID=50100</a></p> <p>Last week, Iran's oil ministry granted a license to establish an Iranian oil bourse on the Gulf island of Kish, an economic free zone, to price and trade oil in the Euro, not in the dollar. This idea – strongly backed by the administration of President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad – may well be the final straw that draws the United States into war against Iran. </p> <p>In 2000, Saddam Hussein received U.N. permission to sell Iraqi oil for euros, not dollars. Saddam further received permission from the United Nations to convert the $10 billion oil-for-food reserve fund from euros to dollars. </p> <p>Many Bush administration critics have argued that the real reason for the 2003 war against Iraq was not concern that Iraq had or would use WMD, but concern by the U.S. Treasury that Saddam Hussein was waging an international economic war to convince oil-producing nations to hold their foreign exchange currencies in the euro, not the dollar. </p> <p>The proposal to establish an Iranian oil bourse first surfaced under the presidency of Khatami. The idea languished for months, until last month when President Ahmadinejad again took up the initiative and pressed for action. Iran's goal is to create a bourse where oil is priced in the euro, to compete with the dollar pricing of oil that now dominates the major international oil exchanges, the New York Mercantile Exchange, NYMEX and London's International Petroleum Exchange, IPE. </p> <p>Pricing oil transactions in the euro will create more of a psychological impact. Iran's real goal is to shift the world away using the dollar as the major currency of foreign exchange holdings. This little understood market has been key to our ability to sustain our economic growth, despite the unprecedented budget deficits of the Bush administration. </p> <p>Today, the U.S. Treasury is increasingly dependent upon 70 percent or more of world foreign exchange reserves being held in the dollar. China has just signed a $100 billion deal with Iran to develop the huge Yadvaran oil field. For decades to come, Iran promises to be China's major supplier of oil and natural gas. China is also the second largest holder of foreign reserve dollar holdings, second only to Japan. China has already announced their intention to block any serious sanctions coming out of the Security Council deliberations. Undoubtedly, Iran will push China to increase their foreign reserve currency position in the euro, simply to show their economic support for Iran. </p> <p>We expect that the Iranian oil bourse will be relatively small and experimental at first. But for the Ahmadinejad administration to press for opening the bourse at a time when Iran's nuclear program is being discussed by the Security Council shows the extent of Iran's defiant determination to oppose the United States. </p> <p>Ahmadinejad has continued to make statements threatening Israel, while asserting that economic sanctions cannot harm Iran economically. Ahmadinejad has a point. With over $200 million a day in windfall oil profits, Iran has more than enough cash flow to support their struggling economy and to fund the aggressive development of their nuclear program. </p> <p>Iran should be careful, however, in also taking on the established order of international oil. Sanctions already in place shut American oil companies out of participating in Iran's rich oil markets. Iran is the fourth largest exporter of oil in the world, none of which flows directly to the United States. Already the price of oil has spiked to nearly $75 a barrel over international uncertainty with Iran's nuclear program. If a deepening Iranian crisis moves the price of oil toward $80 a barrel, while Iran is threatening to open up an oil bourse to price oil in the euro, Iran is only asking for a confrontation. </p> <p>Taking on the Bush administration with a possible nuclear threat to Israel is a seriously dangerous policy whose end-game may well end up in war. If Iran wants also to seriously threaten the dollar's position as a dominant foreign reserve currency, a war becomes almost certain. The Iranian oil bourse may never be mentioned by U.S. policymakers as a official reason the United States decides to go to war with Iran, but it may end up being the straw that broke the camel's back.</p> <p>Jerome R. Corsi received a Ph.D. from Harvard University in political science in 1972 and has written many books and articles, including co-authoring with John O'Neill the No. 1 New York Times best-seller, "Unfit for Command: Swift Boat Veterans Speak Out Against John Kerry." Dr. Corsi's most recent books include "Black Gold Stranglehold: The Myth of Scarcity and the Politics of Oil," which he co-authored with WND columnist Craig. R. Smith, and "Atomic Iran: How the Terrorist Regime Bought the Bomb and American Politicians." </p> <p> </p></div> <div> </div> <div>Siddharth Varadarajanhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/07721228307097170092noreply@blogger.com0